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ABSTRACT 
This study set out to develop an aircraft design methodology, which gives com- 
bat aircraft more operational and cost-effectiveness by considering these factors early in 
the design process. In this methodology, an aircraft will be considered as a sub-system 
of an overall system, representing an entire operation scenario. Measures of operational 
and operational cost-effectiveness indicate the quality of, and relationships between, the 
major design aspects; i. e. susceptibility, vulnerability, reliability, maintainability, and 
operational cost. These measures are functions of aircraft measures of performance and 
measures of effectiveness. A mission operation simulation was developed as the transfor- 
mation tool, to performance and effectiveness measures. 
The measures of aircraft performance developed in this methodology have been evalu- 
ated by simple, yet sufficient, models because of the paucity of available data, information 
and the appropriateness of such assessment methods during the early design stages. An 
aircraft performance in susceptibility terms is measured both in the forms of probability 
of detection, which is predicted through its radar cross section (RCS), and probability of 
hit. The RCS prediction model in this study generally uses an aircraft's external shape, 
and the probability of hit is also evaluated from the aircraft presented areas. 
The probability of kill is a measure of aircraft performance used the vulnerability 
design methods. This value relates directly to number and sizes of the critical components 
installed in the aircraft, and their layout. The modification of the critical component 
layout can directly affect the aircraft probability of kill. In this study, only two major 
threat types are considered; i. e. contact and proximity warheads. 
Manoeuvrability probability has been introduced, and been used together with the sus- 
ceptibility and vulnerability probabilities to predict the overall operational survivability 
probability in this study. 
Aircraft reliability and some maintainability probabilities are predicted by using avail- 
able unclassified data and fundamental aircraft design parameters and variables by dint 
of statistical analysis and the Pareto principle. 
Operational cost in this methodology is calculated throughout the aircraft Life Cycle 
Cost (LCC) by averaging the total operation cost over the total number of operational 
aircraft in one base and total number of flying hours for an aircraft fleet's entire life. The 
average operation cost in conjunction with the number of aircraft lost and of weapons 
released during the mission simulation gives the total operational cost for the overall 
scenario. 
An alternative method used to integrate all probabilities into the operation mission 
simulation is by using the reliability block diagram technique in conjunction with an 
event tree diagram. The Monte Carlo simulation technique has been used to generate 
more accurate results by means of random value usage. 
Most results from the operation mission simulation are in the form of integer num- 
bers; therefore, the genetic algorithm optimisation method was mainly used in this study. 
However, the gradient-based optimisation method can also be used to give approximate 
predictions. The results from the optimisation can finally be used as examples of how to 
design a combat aircraft for operational and cost-effectiveness. 
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al, a2 Leading and trailing fragment spray angles from the axis of the static 
warhead detonation [Degree] 
61 
i 
SZ Angle of leading and traling fragment spray [Degree] 
17 Constant value = 1.781072 
A Radar wavelength [m] 
Ax, µy Mean value of x and y 
0 Angle between incident wave and x axis of the target [Degree] 
7r Constant value = 3.14159 
'II Elevation angle of the missile [Degree] 
p(x, y) Probability density function of miss distance 
a Radar cross section [m2] 
O'X, UV Standard deviation of x and y 
9 Angle between incident wave and z axis of the target [Degree] 
a, b, l Dimension of geometrical object in cartesian coordinated system [m] 
Ap Presented area [m2] 
Ai Vulnerable area [m2] 
Alt Maximum altitude [m] 
B,, Noise bandwidth [Hz] 
Coperation Average operation & support cost per aircraft per flying hour [$] 
CContract Total contract cost [$] 
CDisposat Disposal cost [$] 
CFII Flying hour cost [$] 
CFtvaway Flyaway cost [$] 
CFuet Total fuel cost [$] 
CGSE&IS Ground support equipment and initial spares cost 
CInsta, t Installation support funds [$] 
CAlaintenance Average operational maintenance cost per aircraft per flying hour [$] 
xix 
Cnrission Total operation & support cost for entire fleet during mission simula- 
tion [$] 
COperation Operation and Support Cost [$] 
CPersonnel Total personnel cost [$] 
CProduction Production Cost [$] 
CRDT&E Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Cost [$] 
Csortie Sortie cost [$] 
CSuccessfulSortie Successful sortie cost [$] 
C Sustain Total sustaining support cost [$] 
CTarget Target cost ('Bang per Buck') [$] 
CTraining Service allowance, personnel support and training cost [$] 
Cvnit Unit level consumption cost [$] 
CwVeapon Weapon cost [$] 
CFuel Cost of fuel per litre [$] 
CDAirfran, 
e 
Total cost of airframe development [$] 
CDAvionics Total cost of avionics development 
CPAvionics Total avionics production cost [$] 
CPEngine Total cost of engine production [$] 
DEF Deflated rate factor 
DMHR(100) Highest aircraft's component defect man-hour rate [Hour/ 1000 flying 
hours] 
DMHR(70) Lowest aircraft's component defect man-hour rate [Hour/ 1000 flying 
hours] 
DR Defect rate [per 1000 flying hours] 
Ei Expected number of encounters by ith threat type 
El Threshold setting 
FH Aircraft flying hours [Hour] 
FHY The average annual flight time [Hour] 
FR(100) Highest aircraft component's failure rate per 1000 FH 
FR(70) Lowest aircraft component's failure rate per 1000 FH 
xx 
FT Effective temperature [K] 
G Gain of transmitting antenna 
H Aircraft height [m] 
k The Boltzmann's constant = 1.3806503 x 10-23 [J/degree] 
ki Constant = 2ir/A 
L Loss factor 
M Mach number 
MA/G Aircraft mission mass [kg] 
MAirframe Airframe-only mass [kg] 
MFuel Aircraft fuel load [kg] 
MATcomposite Percentage of composite materials in airframe 
MTBF Mean time between failure [Hour] 
MTTR Mean time to repair [Hour] 
MTTR(100) Highest aircraft's component mean time to repair [Hour] 
N Number of fragments in the warhead 
n Number of fragment hits on aircraft 
NE Number of engines per aircraft 
NFH Number of flying hour 
NKijz Number of target kill 
NLARGE Number of largest single buy from the program 
NLa3t Number of aircraft kill 
NOperation Number of aircraft in operation 
NNROD Number of production aircraft 
NRDT&E Number of test aircraft 
NSTAT Number of stationary test aircraft 
NTake-off Number of take-off during the mission simulation 
NSuccessfulSorties Number of successful sorties during the mission simulation 
P Power of the transmitter radar [Watt] 
Pn The false alarm probability 
xxi 
PA, Pa The probability of threat being active 
PD, PD/A The Probability of aircraft being detected 
PF/J, PF/D The probability that the proximity warhead fuses the aircraft 
PH/I) rH/D The probability that threat propagator hits the aircraft 
Pr/L, P; The probability that the threat weapon intercepts the aircraft 
Pilo, PI The probability of threat weapon being launched 
Pvtewi The Manoeuvrability Probability or Weighting Factor of i aircraft view 
in a specific flight phase, i= Front, Rear, Left, Right, Top, Bottom 
PH The probability of being hit 
PKiH The probability kill, given a hit 
PK The kill probability 
Ps The survivability probability 
PK/F The probability that aircraft is killed given fusing 
R Distance between antenna and aircraft [m] 
RED Economic discount rate [%] 
ROAC Packing density of the fuselage [kg/m3] 
s Distance between detonation to the fragment spray [m] 
S/N The signal to noise ratio 
SM Total aircraft schedule maintenance [Man-hout per flying hour] 
SM2-Proputsion Schedule maintenance for 2nd line schedule engine inspection and main- 
tenance [Man-hour per flying hour] 
SMAionics Schedule maintenance for 2n`ß line avionics maintenance [Man-hour per 
flying hour] 
SMpost-Flight Schedule maintenance for post-flight [Man-hour per flying hour] 
SMpre-Flight Schedule maintenance for pre-flight [Man-hour per flying hour] 
SMpropulsion Schedule maintenance for 1st line propulsion inspection and mainte- 
nance [Man-hour per flying hour] 
tJfaintenance Time in maintenance occurrence [Hour] 
TSLAfax Uninstalled engine maximum thrust at sea level [N] 
Tsortie Sortie time [Hour] 
Thrust Total thrust [kN] 
xxii 
TIF Technology improvement factor 
TLIFE Operated aircraft life [Year] 
TT4 Maximum turbine inlet temperature [°R] 
Vf Average fragment speed respecting to a stationary warhead [m/s] 
V. Missile speed [m/s] 
V Target (aircraft) horizontal speed when encountered by proximity war- 
head [m/s] 
Vý, 
ax Maximum true airspeed 
[m/s] 
W. Aircraft wing area [m2] 
We Aircraft empty weight [kg] 
WV Uninstalled avionics mass [lb] 
x, y Cartesian coordinate 
YR52 Years from first flight year relative to 1952 [Years] 
CDAE Engineering cost for development airframe [$] 
CDDS Development support cost [$] 
CDE Engine development cost [$] 
CDEF Cost of engine fit for the development aircraft 
CDFT Flight test cost [$] 
CDMME Manufacturing material and equipment cost [$] 
CDQL Quality control cost [$] 
CDV Avionics development cost [$] 
CDVF Cost of the avionics fit for the development aircraft [$] 
CEP Circular Error Probable 
CJA Disposal advanced material cost [$] 
CJM Disposal labour effort cost [$] 
CJIVIAT Disposal composite material cost [$] 
CJT Disposal cost [`then-year' dollar] 
CLE Engineering rate [$/hour] 
CLM Manufacturing labour rate [$/hour] 
xxiii 
CLT Quality/tooling labour rate [$/hour] 
COAC Mechanical contract cost [$] 
COCS Supply contract cost [$] 
CODLR Depot level reparable cost [$] 
COEC Engine contract cost [$] 
COF Cost of Fuel, other petroleum, oil, and lubricants [$] 
COM Total operation personnel cost [$] 
COMMAT Maintenance material cost [$] 
COMSS Miscellaneous support supply cost [$] 
COTAD Temporary additional duty cost [$] 
COUTRN Transport cost [$] 
COVC Avionics contract cost [$] 
CPAE Production engineering cost for development airframe [$] 
CPE Engine production cost [$] 
CPI Consumer Price Index 
CPMME Manufacturing material and equipment cost [$] 
CPQL Quality control cost [$] 
CPR Average annual civilian payment [$] 
CSASTT Total service allowance, personnel support and training cost [$] 
CSEK Replacement support equipment and modification kit procurement cost 
[$] 
CSEPCS Enlisted permanent change station cost [$] 
CSET Enlisted training cost [$] 
CSISF Installation support funds [$] 
CSM Total support personnel cost [$] 
CSOPCS Officer permanent change station cost [$] 
CSOT Officer training cost [$] 
CSSE Sustaining engineering support cost [$] 
CSST Total sustaining support cost and installation support funds [$] 
xxiv 
CSTF Training fund [$] 
DAR Depot arrival rate [Hour] 
EDML Development manufacturing cost [$] 
EDTP Tooling cost [$] 
EPML Development manufacturing cost [$] 
EPR Average annual enlisted payment [$] 
EPTP Tooling cost [$] 
ERM Unit cost for an engine repair [$] 
ERO Unit cost for an engine overhaul [$] 
FADT Advanced design tool factor 
FAMA Advanced materials cost factor [$] 
FATF Advanced technology factor 
FATT Advanced technology testing factor 
FCS Flight control system 
FLO Low-observable features factor 
FIvIOF Crew-ratio 
FPROR Overhaul/repair ratio 
FS Security factor 
GALib Genetic Algorithm Library in C++ langauge 
GSE&IS Ground Support Equipment and Initial Spares 
LCC Life Cycle Cost [M$] 
MOE Measure of Effectiveness 
MOEs Measures of Effectiveness 
MOP Measure of Performance 
MOPs Measures of Performance 
NOM Total number of operation personnel 
NOMC Number of operation civilian 
NOME Number of operation enlisted 
NOMO Number of operation officer 
xxv 
NOMOF Number of active flight-crew member 
NPART Number of partners 
NSMC Number of support civilian 
NSME Number of support enlisted personnel 
NSMO Number of support office 
O&S Operation and Support 
OPR Average annual officer payment [$] 
RAF Royal Air Force 
RATE Production rate during manufacture [/month] 
RBD Reliability Block Diagram 
UAV Unmanned Air Vehicle 




Since end of the cold war, military budgets have been dramatically reduced; however, new 
aircraft are still required to replace the old ones. To fulfil all possible military requirements 
with few aircraft types, a new generation of combat aircraft is being developed. These 
aircraft will be multi-role and also be more operationally and cost-effective. Thus, more 
efficient design in the early stage which considers most possible design aspects has to be 
done (see Fig. 1.1). 
Susceptibility II Vulnerability II Supportability 
Maintainability I>1 Design Methodology 1<I Reliability 
Operational Life Cycle Cost Effectiveness I Performance 
Figure 1.1: Aircraft design aspects 
Some of these aspects have been developed and integrated into either the conceptual 
or preliminary design processes [1'38]; such as Reliability & Maintainability (R&M); Sup- 
portability; Survivability and Life Cycle Cost (LCC). Some previous works have been also 
developed methodologies, designed to integrate models of aircraft component effectiveness 
and life cycle costs into either the conceptual or preliminary design processes E2,28,44,541 
Due to restricted subject such the survivability, some developed methodology or assess- 
ment model cannot be published in details [23]. Nevertheless, all published previous works 
took only one design aspect into account. One such methodology integrates operation sim- 
ulation and cost estimation into the early design process at the same time as the other 
design disciplines will be described in this thesis. 
1 
1. Introduction 2 
This research aimed to develop a combat aircraft design methodology for operational 
and cost-effectiveness mainly by considering the survivability, reliability & maintainability, 
and life cycle cost. An approach to achieve this research objective is to develop a software 
application using as a tool to measure the aircraft measures of performance and also to 
measure the aircraft operational and operational cost measures of effectiveness. 
To measure an aircraft performance for specific design aspect and integration all to- 
gether with the mission simulation to measure aircraft operational and operational cost 
effectiveness, the assessment methodologies for the specific design aspects have to be de- 
veloped. An application with several pop-up dialog is programmed by using Microsoft 
Develop Studio C++ as a compiler. This compiler offers graphic display, drag & drop 
features, and also object oriented capacity. The main application name is `Mission Effec- 
tiveness Analysis'. 
To measure an aircraft operational effectiveness in the forms of the total number of 
specific sorties, targets, and aircraft, the mission simulation has to be integrated within 
the methodology. By using the reliability bock diagram in conjunction with the event 
tree diagram, these operational measures of effectiveness in the required format can be 
determined. 
The aircraft life cycle cost estimation model used for this research is based on previous 
work. With some validations, in some variables and sub-models, an aircraft life cycle cost 
during both peacetime and wartime scenarios can be predicted. Through this cost, the 
operational cost for an entire fleet in one base can be predicted. Together with the 
weapons released expense and aircraft lost cost, which are calculated directly from the 
mission simulation, the total operational cost for an entire mission operation can be thus 
evaluated. ` 
By combination of all sub-modules with the mission simulation, the operational and 
operational cost measures of effectiveness can be predicted. Used in conjunction with the 
Monte Carlo simulation technique, this gives more accurate predicted values. 
Two different optimisation methods have also been integrated within this methodology 
to search for the optimum solution for combat aircraft operational and cost-effectiveness. 
The Cranfield Unmanned Air Vehicle (U-99), which has been designed by MSc Stu- 
dents at Cranfield University, has been chosen as a case study because of the design 
performance requirements and data availability. 
1. Introduction 3 
The results from the optimisation can firstly be used as an indication to design the 
U-99 for operational and/or operational cost effectiveness. 
Additionally, by using the developed tool, trade-offs between aircraft measures of 
performance can be perform to achieve or improve the objective values. 
CHAPTER 2 
DESIGN METHODOLOGY FOR AIRCRAFT 
OPERATIONAL AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS 
In this chapter, three different design methodologies are described. The first two methods, 
developed and demonstrated by Raymer [36], Roskam [37] and Soban [42-44], use different 
concepts of aircraft definition. The third methodology is a combination of the first two 
methodologies, which also gives an opportunity to integrate several design aspects and 
an operation simulation early into the design process [16,17,32] This makes the third 
design methodology, therefore, wider-ranging in that it assesses operationally and cost- 
effectiveness. 
2.1 Conventional Aircraft Design Methodology 
This design methodology is commonly used as the fundamental process of aircraft design 
in aeronautical engineering. An aircraft is defined as an object throughout the design 
methodology. Three stages of aircraft design have been identified with different levels of 
[ detail, i. e. conceptual design, preliminary design, and detail design 36,37] 
Figure 2.1 shows that before the first design process can begin, the aircraft fundamen- 
tal requirements and performance have to be defined. These requirements come mostly 
from the customer; for example the government in the case of combat aircraft, and the 
airline company in the case of commercial aircraft. Sometimes these requirements may 
be modified during the design processes due to new customer specifications, updates of 
technologies or decreases in budget. Thus, the design process has to be repeated. It leads 
to increased expense and time consumption. 
2.1.1 Conceptual Design 
A combat aircraft conceptual design usually begins with a specific set of design require- 
ments, established by the prospective customer, rather than a company-generated guess 
as to what future customers may need. These design requirements include parameters 
such as aircraft range and payload, take off and landing distance, manoeuvrability and 
4 
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speed requirements, and so on. With these specifications, the first conceptual sketch of 
the entire aircraft, and some major components and systems can be characterised. There- 
fore, all fundamental design parameters and variables can be estimated. The first look at 
cost and manufacturing is also made at this time. 
An initial layout is analysed to determine if it really will perform the required mis- 
sion. Predicted aerodynamics, weights, and installed propulsion characteristics are also 
analysed, and subsequently used to do detailed sizing calculations. Furthermore, the per- 
formance capabities of the design are calculated and compared to the requirements. The 
details of the configuration are therefore, subject to change. All of this work will be done 
on paper, or on a computer. 
2.1.2 Preliminary Design 
Before this design stage can start, most of the major aspects of the conceptual design 
have to be finalished, and also the configuration has to be frozen. Thus, the specialist 
in particular areas will design and analyse their own portion of the aircraft. Testing is 
initiated in areas such as aerodynamics, propulsion, structures, and stability and control. 
Lofting, which is the mathematical modelling of the outside skin of the aircraft with 
sufficient accuracy to insure proper fit between its different parts, is performed in this 
design process. The objective of this design stage is to ready the company for the detail 
design stage, also called full-scale development, and also to establish confidence that the 
aircraft can be built on time and at the estimated cost. 
2.1.3 Detail Design 
This detail design begins with the actual pieces to be fabricated being designed. For 
example, during conceptual and preliminary design the wing box will be designed and 
analysed as a whole. During the detail design, that whole will be broken down into 
individual ribs, spars, and skins, each of which must be separately designed and analysed. 
This design stage also includes production design. Specialists determine how the aircraft 
will be fabricated, starting with the smallest and simplest subassemblies and building up 
to the final assembly process. 
During the detail design, the testing effort intensifies. The actual structure of the 
aircraft is fabricated and tested. Control laws for the flight control system are tested, and 
a detailed working model of the actuators and flight control surfaces is produced. This 
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design stage ends with the fabrication of the aircraft. 
............... 
Operation & System 
-< ...................: Requirements 
System Conceptual Design Preliminary Design Details Design Fabrication Study/Requirements 
" Wing-Body-Tail " Major load, " Mechanism, joints, 
configuration stresses,... 
. Aspect ratio, ... " complete " 
Refinement as 
" Gross weight, ... configuration results of 
test & 
" ... " ... operation 
Figure 2.1: Conventional Design Methodology 
2.2 System of Systems Design Methodology 
Soban [431 presented an alterative design methodology, "system of systems", which inte- 
grates survivability assessment into an aircraft design process. This method can show 
the effect of this design aspect during the preliminary design process, earlier than in the 
conventional design methodology. This allows for sufficient trade-offs and resource allo- 
cations to be made by measuring the effectiveness of the aircraft at a high level of design, 
i. e. theatre or campaign level. The theatre level is the highest of three levels in this design 
methodology (see Fig. 2.2). In using this method, an aircraft is treated as a sub-system 
of the overall system, which represents an operation or campaign. Various aspects of 
each system are measured to indicate their qualities, which are dependent on the system's 
level. The measures of each level are in the forms of Measure of Performance (MOP) or 
Measure of Effectiveness (MOE), which have been described more detail in section 2.3.3. 
Similar models have also been studied and presented by Simkins [311 and by Kitowski [28]. 
The following are some examples for classifications of system level: 
" Vehicle level: An aircraft A is more likely to be detected. 
" Mission level: Number of aircraft available at the end of a sortie 
9 Theatre level: Total number of targets destroyed 
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Vehic e LTege l, _'_ 
Top End Vekide De go/Eeon Vers. Tecino1op kl clon 
Regoinmew 
Figure 2.2: System of systems design methodology [43] 
2.2.1 Vehicle Level of Design 
In this level of design, only an aircraft is defined as a system. With its Measures of 
Performance (MOPs) in major design aspects, the "goodness" of the aircraft in these 
design points of view can be indicated in the form of probability values. These values are 
only functions of the aircraft design variables and parameters. For example, an aircraft 
geometric dimension is used to calculate its probability of detection, which indicates how 
easily the aircraft can be detected. 
As an output of vehicle level of design, aircraft IVIOPs can be passed to the mission 
level of design to measure the aircraft mission effectiveness. 
2.2.2 Mission Level of Design 
The objective function of this level of design is to link the vehicle level to the theatre level 
of design. Mission level of design is required because the outputs from the vehicle level of 
design are in the form of aircraft MOPs, and they do not usually map directly to be used 
as the inputs to theatre level of design. The inputs to theatre level of design are in the 
form of aircraft Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs). Therefore, the MOPs of vehicle level 
are transformed to be variables in mission level of design. 
A short time-scale of operation model; such as sortie or operational day, is defined as 
a system, in which an aircraft is referred to as a sub-system. The MOPS of the aircraft 
are used to measure the aircraft effectiveness at the mission level of design. For instance, 
an attack flight phase in a sortie during the entire operation is defined as a system. One 
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of the aircraft MOEs in the mission level of design is the aircraft probability of success 
in this flight phase, which is a function of the aircraft MOPs in several different design 
aspects, such as probability of detection, probability of kill, and probability of encounter 
by a different threat. 
Therefore, the output of the mission level of design is in the form of aircraft MOEs, 
and will be treated as mission MOPS for the theatre level of design. 
2.2.3 Theatre Level of Design 
Finally, the theatre becomes the system, and the aircraft and short time-scale operation 
(sortie or operational day) are relegated to be components of this new system. The theatre 
thus becomes a system of systems and is a function of the vehicle and mission levels of 
design. Therefore, the theatre level of design is a function of the components of the vehicle 
and mission levels of design, including aircraft and sorties. In other words, mission MOEs 
from the mission level of design become mission MOPs and are input variables for the 
theatre level of design. 
The campaign MOEs at the theatre level of design are used as a measure of the 
aircraft "goodness" for the entire campaign. Tradeoffs can thus be made between vehicle 
design and mission requirements in the lower levels of design. These requirements, when 
optimised to fulfill theatre level goals and objectives, become the requirements to which 
the vehicle is then designed. 
2.3 Design Methodology for Operational and Cost- 
Effectiveness 
2.3.1 Aims & Development of Methodology 
The design methodology aimed to combine conventional design and "system of systems" 
design methods. This was to be achieved by integrating operation simulation, survivability 
assessment, reliability & maintainability assessment and life cycle cost estimation into a 
methodology for use in the conceptual and preliminary design stages (see Fig. 2.3). The 
aim was to measure aircraft operational and operational cost effectiveness as a function of 
aircraft MOPS in several design aspects, such as survivability, reliability, and operational 
cost. The final aim was to facilitate tradeoffs between aircraft MOPS using an optimiser 
to fulfill the main theatre objective functions, such as maximum number of sorties flown, 
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Figure 2.3: Flowchart of the operational and cost-effectiveness design methodology 
The aircraft performance aspects of this methodology was to be firstly measured in 
three main design aspects, i. e. survivability, reliability & maintainability, and operation 
cost. Integration of an operation simulation, tradeoffs between aircraft MOPs in these de- 
sign aspects should be be executed directly after the conceptual design. With results of op- 
timised aircraft MOPs in these three design aspects, the operational and cost-effectiveness 
aircraft design parameters and variables should then be calculated. These include most 
of the aircraft design parameters, aircraft performance, sketchy aircraft geometry, and 
major internal critical components or systems layout. Examples of these are wing area, 
aircraft empty weight, aircraft height, maximum altitude, and so on. The results of these 
evaluations will be subsequently fed into more detailed design processes; i. e. preliminary 
and detail design. 
Within the operational and cost-effectiveness design methodology, the aircraft MOPs 
in all the design aspects below are predicted directly from aircraft conceptual design 
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parameters and variables at the vehicle level of design, considering only aircraft hardware. 
These MOPS are indicative of the quality in each design aspect the aircraft has. 
The application namely `Mission Effectiveness Analysis' has been implemented based 
on the flow chart, as illustrated in Fig. 2.3. This application comprises several pop-up 
dialogs, which represent each design aspect studied in this research . 
The purpose of 
this application is to transform the aircraft design variable into aircraft MOPs, aircraft 
operational and operational cost MOEs (details and rough user manual, see Appendix F). 
Table 2.1 shows an example of the transformation from aircraft design parameter into 
aircraft MOPS for specific design aspect. 
Table 2.1: Example of transformation from aircraft design parameter into aircraft MOPS 
for specific design aspect 
Design Aspect Design parameters Measures of performance 
(Inputs) (Outputs) 
Susceptibility external geometry, and presented PD, PFIjorPH, J 
areas 
Vulnerability critical internal components and 
systems, external presented areas 
Reliability Height, Empty weight, Altitude, 
Thrust, Wing areas, Number of 
engine 
Maintainability Empty weight, Altitude, Height, 




Defect arising rate per 1000 
flying hours 
DMHR, Scheduled mainte- 
nance 
factor 
One of the greatest difficulties in developing this methodology was the security and 
commercial restrictions placed upon the data required. Another difficulty was the com- 
plexity of the assessment required for the design aspects involved, such as probability of 
kill/hit of aircraft critical components, mean time to repair, and avionics development 
costs. The result of this complexity was that either the assessment could not be per- 
formed, or the timescales involved would be too long. Some constraints and assumptions, 
therefore, had to be made in this methodology, as shown in later chapters and appendices. 
The transformation methods from conceptual design parameters to Measures of Per- 
formance (MOPs) value in survivability design are described in chapter 3. These include 
susceptibility and vulnerability. The MOPS in reliability & maintainability are described 
in chapter 4. The functionality of the survivability, reliability & maintainability, and 
life cycle cost modules are explained in chapter 6. These are used to measure aircraft 
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operational and cost-effectiveness. 
One approach to measure mission effectiveness was to use a Reliability Block Diagram 
(RBD) in conjunction with an event tree diagram to combine many aircraft probability 
values together (aircraft MOPs). This could give probability values in each flight phase 
during a sortie (mission MOPs). The calculation and methods used are described in 
chapter 6. 
2.3.2 Campaign Definition 
This methodology was designed to show how operationally effective a new design of com- 
bat aircraft will be, by measuring its operational effectiveness at the theatre level. In 
other words, the designed aircraft will be examined for its operational requirements in 
computational simulation early during the design process. For example, the number of 
aircraft lost in ten days of operation, exposed to high levels of opponent's defenses, can be 
directly estimated after the first conceptual design. Therefore, an operational simulation 
of the aircraft mission requirements has to be established early and then merged into the 
design process. Additionally, some design aspect assessments refer directly to campaign 
definition. For example, an opponent's defensive systems affect the aircraft MOPS and 
MOEs in terms of vulnerability. 
An entire campaign includes both friendly and foe armaments, defenses, capabilities, 
campaign duration, and so on. Therefore, it is not very easy to obtain this information 
at the early design stage. Additionally, it is too complex to simulate and also it is not 
necessary to consider all details. So, some constraints and assumptions have thus been 
made (for details, see Chapter 6). 
2.3.3 Aircraft Measures of Performance and Effectiveness 
Through this methodology, the aircraft design variables and parameters become aircraft 
MOPs for several design aspects through survivability assessment, reliability & maintain- 
ability assessment, and life cycle cost estimation sub-modules. This section introduces 
principles by which these variables and parameters are transformed into aircraft 1VIOPs 
for major design aspects. 
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2.3.3.1 Measurement of Survivability 
The aircraft MOP in the case of survivability design is a probability value of aircraft 
survival, which is a function of two other aircraft MOPs, i. e. probability of aircraft being 
hit (susceptibility) and probability of aircraft being killed by a given hit (vulnerability). 
Both aircraft MOPs, which are outputs of the vehicle level of design, are functions of 
fundamental aircraft design parameters and variables. With an integration of threat 
analysis and aircraft manoeuvrability at the mission level of design, the aircraft Measure 
of Effectiveness (MOE) for survivability design can be evaluated. 
MOESurvivability 
=f 
(MOPSuaceptibility7 MOPVulnerability7 MOPXIanoeuvrability) 
""") 
In other words, the aircraft MOE for survivability design integrates an ordinary air- 
craft MOP for survivability (Ps), and the aircraft MOP for manoeuvrability (Weighting 
Factors). Aircraft manoeuvrability is simply represented in this study as a weighting 
factor (for details, see chapter 3 and Fig. 3.13). 
Aircraft geometry 
(E t vial shape) Measure of performance for Susceptiölty usceptiibility design aspect Assessment (ps) 
Aircraft (scented areas 
Assessment 
Aircraft components geometry 
(Internat layout) 
Measure of Performance for Aircraft component presented areas Vulnerability Vulnerability design aspect (Pp) Assessment (Pes 




Measure of Performance for 
Sumvabibty design aspect _ý, 
Measwe of Effectiveness for 
(PI) Survivablty design aspect 
Aircraft Maneuverability 
(Weighting Factors) 
Vehicle Level Mission Level Theatre Levd 
Figure 2.4: Aircraft Measures of Performance and Effectiveness for Survivability 
2.3.3.1.1 Measurement of Susceptibility 
The aircraft MOP for susceptibility can be represented as the probability of being hit 
(P), which is mainly a function of another two aircraft MOPs, i. e. the probability of 
detection (PD) and conditional probability of hit (PHI or PFUI). 
The first aircraft MOP is the probability of detection (PD), which measures how easily 
Survivability 
Assessment 
an aircraft is detected by the opponent searching systems during the campaign. This 
2. Design Methodology for Aircraft Operational and Cost-Effectiveness 13 
measure is mainly a function of aircraft signatures. Ball I'] introduced three major aircraft 
signatures with different characteristics and assessment methods; i. e. radar, infrared, and 
visual signatures. Due to major threat types dominated in this study, the radar signature 
in the form of radar cross section (v) had been chosen to evaluate an aircraft probability 
of detection (for details, see Section 3.1.2). 
On the other hand, the second aircraft MOP, the conditional probability of hit (PH/I 
or PFUI), measures how likely the possibility is that the aircraft will be hit by threats. This 
measure mainly depends on threat type (penetrator or external explosive) and specific 
aircraft presented areas (for details, see Section 3.1.3). 
2.3.3.1.2 Measurement of Vulnerability 
The aircraft MOP for vulnerability can be expressed as the probability of a kill by a given 
hit (PKIH). This value is a function of three aspects related to aircraft critical components, 
namely; system presented areas, layout, and probability of a kill by a given hit (for details, 
see Section 3.2). 
The aircraft MOP for survivability from vehicle level of design refers directly to the 
aircraft itself, but the mission MOP (or aircraft MOE) for survivability, from the mission 
level of design refers to the nature of the environment in which the aircraft operates, and 
aircraft behaviour during short-timescale operations (See Fig. 2.4). 
2.3.3.2 Measurement of Reliability 
For this design aspect, an aircraft failure rate can represent one of aircraft MOPs, by 
characterising how reliable aircraft are per 1000 flying hours. This value is a function 
of several conceptual design parameters and variables, such as maximum empty weight, 
aircraft height, maximum altitude and so on. Details of MOE in reliability and reliability 
assessment methodology are described in Chapter 4. 
In mission level of design, aircraft MOP for reliability is one of the main direct effects on 
aircraft IVIOE. For example, the aircraft operational defect arising rate, which is defined 
as 10% of failure rate per flying hour, results in a direct impact on the probability of 
successful flight phase, probability of aircraft availability for next sortie, and so on. 
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2.3.3.3 Measurement of Maintainability 
There are numerous alternatives which represent aircraft MOPS for maintainability at 
the vehicle level of design. Two of these are Defect Man-Hour Rate per 1000 flying hour 
(DIVIHR) and Scheduled Maintenance (SM). The first value, DMHR, indicates how many 
man-hours of maintenance the aircraft requires during 1000 flying hours. The second 
aircraft MOP for maintainability shows how regularly the aircraft has to be inspected, 
components replaced, and also repaired. 
At the vehicle level of design, for this methodology, these two values have their own 
measurement methods (see Section 4.2). However, both values are used at the mission 
level of design to measure aircraft effectiveness in terms of operational cost per flying hour 
(for details, see Chapter 5). 
2.8.3.4 Measurement of Manoeuvrability 
Several forms of aircraft MOP can represent aircraft ability to manoeuvre during a mis- 
sion. One of these aircraft manoeuvrability-performance measures is predicted using a 
weighting factor to indicate an average percentage of aircraft visible to the threat in 
each mission flight phase. This MOP shows how quickly an aircraft changes its flight 
characteristics in each flight phase, and thus its manoeuvrability. 
2.3.4 Measures of Operational Effectiveness 
Before aircraft operational effectiveness at the campaign level can be measured, the air- 
craft effectiveness in a short operation timescale, or at a mission level of design, first 
has to be evaluated. These aircraft MOEs are functions of aircraft MOPS and campaign 
definition. 
In other words, at the theatre level of design, aircraft MOEs become mission MOPS, 
and are used as variables to measure operational effectiveness, through utilising a RBD. 
In this way, aircraft MOPs become indirect variables for operational MOEs; therefore, an 
aircraft can be measured for operational effectiveness. 
It is very hard to give a general definition of operational effectiveness, because it 
depends on overall mission, campaign, and organisation of operations. Table 2.2 shows 
examples of MOPs and MOEs at all three levels. 
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Table 2.2: Example List of Measures of Performance and Effectiveness 
Measure of Performance 
(Vehicle level) 
Probability of detection 
Probability of kill/hit 
Weighting factors 
Defect man-hour rate 
Defect arising rate 
Measure of Effectiveness 
(Mission level) 
Probability of successful 
flight phase 
Probability of survival of 
aircraft 
Probability of target de- 
struction 
Probability of aircraft 
being in maintenance 
Probability of availabil- 
ity of aircraft for next 
sortie 
2.3.5 Measures of Cost-Effectiveness 
Measure of Effectiveness 
(Theatre level) 
Number of sorties flown 
Number of killed aircraft 
Number of destroyed tar- 
gets 
Number of aircraft in 
maintenance 
Number of available air- 
craft 
This methodology also aims to measure operational cost-effectiveness, which can help to 
integrate the best design alternatives [48] into an early design stage. However, the exact 
spend during real missions cannot easily be estimated. One possibility is to evaluate 
the operational cost through the Life Cycle Cost (LCC) at the vehicle level of design. 
Operational cost-effectiveness together with operational MOEs can be measured at the 
theatre level of design; for instance, sortie cost, weapon cost, aircraft loss cost. This 
method has been used here, and is presented in chapter 5. 
Finally, measures of both operational and cost-effectiveness can be evaluated together 
at the theatre level of design. This activity completed the development of the overall 
methodology. 
Table 2.3 shows the aircraft measures of both operational and cost-effectiveness at the 
theatre level of design. 
Table 2.3: Measure of Effectiveness at the theatre level of 
Operational Effectiveness ess Operational 
effectiveness 
Total number of sorties Total operation cost 
flown 
Total number of destroyed Total weapon cost 
and cost- 
tion cost per sortie 
Cost per destroyed target 
targets 
Total number of available Total aircraft lost cost 
aircraft 
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2.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has: 
" introduced a "system of systems" design methodology, which has defined an aircraft 
as a subsystem of the overall system, namely the campaign [44] 
" shown a newly developed design methodology for operational and cost effectiveness, 
by merging the conventional design methodology and the "system of systems" design 
methodology, together with cost-effectiveness measures. 
9 clarified aircraft MOPs, and MOEs in terms of susceptibility, vulnerability, surviv- 
ability, reliability, maintainability, manoeuvrability, and cost. 
9 shown how missions and campaigns can be measured for operational and cost- 
effectiveness. 
" explained relationships between aircraft MOPs, aircraft MOEs, mission MOEs, and 
campaign NIOEs, in selected design aspects. 
CHAPTER 3 
SURVIVABILITY ASSESSMENT 
This design aspect is one of the most important for combat aircraft design. An impor- 
tant issue is that most of the data and also the assessment methods are often military 
classified. Therefore, simple models for predicting a survivability probability value have 
been developed and introduced. This gives an opportunity to adequately evaluate aircraft 
MOP in survivability during conceptual design. 
Aircraft combat survivability is defined as capability to avoid and/or withstand a man- 
made hostile environment. Firstly, the capacity to avoid guns, missiles, radars and all of 
the other elements of opponent's defense that make up the man-made hostile mission en- 
vironment is referred to as the susceptibility. On the the other hand, the aircraft inability 
to withstand the man-made hostile environment is referred to as the vulnerability [6]. 
Aircraft survivability can be measured by the parameter, called the probability of 
survival (Ps), which in turn is related to the probability of kill (P,, ). The probability 
of kill is the product of two survivability concepts: susceptibility (P) and vulnerability 
(P,, I). Hence the survivability probability can be determined as: 
PS =1-Pic =1-PJ, P, c, H (3.1) 
In this chapter, the main concepts and models to evaluate aircraft survivability will 
be explaining; the rest of the theory and models, including results are described and 
illustrated in Appendix B. 
3.1 Susceptibility Assessment 
Susceptibility is the probability that the aircraft will be detected and be hit. This value 
is a function of those things that would make the aircraft more difficult to be seen and 
tracked, such as stealth, manoeuvrability, tactics, and avionics. The probability of hit 
(P) can be divided into five categories with conditional probabilities as follows: 
" The probability of the threat being active when the aircraft arrives (PA) 
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" The probability of the aircraft being detected, given the threat is active (PD/A) 
" The probability of the threat weapon being launched, given the threat is active and 
detects the aircraft (PL/D) 
" The probability that the threat weapon intercepts the aircraft, given that the threat 
propagator was launched (PIlL) 
9 The probability that the threat propagator hits the aircraft or the proximity warhead 
fuses, given the propagator intercepts the aircraft. This is called the conditional 
probability of hit (PH/I or PF/I). 
In the operational and cost-effectiveness design methodology, the susceptibility assess- 
ment has the function of transforming aircraft design parameters and/or variables into 
aircraft MOP for susceptibility at the vehicle level of design; which means only PD/a, PF/I, 
and Pp are measured directly from the susceptibility assessment. The rest of the con- 
ditional probabilities can be defined as the opponent weapons, which are input into the 
campaign definition for this methodology. Therefore, subscripts of these probabilities 
have been redefied to indicate their source. This is done by using lowercase letters for 
probabilities valued by the campaign definition (Pa, P,, P; ), and using uppercase letters 
for probabilities valued by susceptibility assessment (PD, PH/D, PF/D)" The probability of 
hit can be thus split into two groups and be calculated as follows: 
PH 
= 
PArD/APL/DPI/L(PH/I or rF/I) 





In this chapter, only the probability values evaluated by the susceptibility module 
will be described. Aircraft signature is one of the susceptibility assessment results, which 
leads to the calculation of the probability of detection, PD. An aircraft has many different 
kinds of signature, such as the radar signature, the infrared signature, visual and the aural 
signatures. All of the signatures, except for the aural signature, are electromagnetic in 
origin. Due to the wide-ranging disciplines to be integrated into this design methodology, 
only the radar signature has been chosen to evaluate the probability of detection. This 
is because this kind of aircraft signature can be detected from a great distance, and 
although radar is only one of several sensors that is considered in design of a low-observable 
platform [27]. It is the dominant one. 
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Hovanessian [24] has defined the Radar Cross Section (RCS) of a target as an equivalent 
area producing the same amount of energy returned to the radar as would be produced 
by target scatterer. The RCS of a target can represent the size of the target as well as 
the geometric shape and discontinuities, " such as corners. 
Radar Cross Section is then defined as a measurement value used to estimate the size 
of the aircraft signature (a) by using the combination of transmitting and receiving radar 
signals. The RCS depends strongly upon the direction from which the signal arrives, the 
direction of the receiving antenna, and the size and shape of the object. The total cross 
section of a complex object can be computed by an assembly of simpler shapes and by a 
number of techniques of differing levels of complexity M. 
The scattering characteristics of a target are strongly dependent upon the frequency 
of the incident wave. At high-frequency regions, called the optical region, all dimensions 
of the target are large compared to the wavelength, and thus the cross section can be 
approximated by the theory of geometrical or ray optics and of physical or wave optics 151. 
Additionally, most long-range ballistic missile defense radars operate with frequencies 
greater than 1 GHz (L band and above); therefore, simple shapes cross section approxi- 
mation models are used in this region. 
This methodology aims to integrate susceptibility assessment into an early design 
stage to measure the aircraft performance in this design aspect. To calculate the exact 
RCS, requires more details of aircraft design, complex calculation, and consideration of 
the Radar Absorbing Material (RAMMBI), which has been used in most of new generation 
of combat aircraft; such design details are not available at the early design stage. They 
have modest levels of accuracy, but can not be consistently for accurate comparison of 
alternative configurations; therefore, some complex shape will be neglected; such as cavity 
and joint edges. The following approximate predictions for simple shape cross section are 
thus adequate for this methodology. 
3.1.1.1 Sphere Cross Section 
Spheres have a symmetrical shape, therefore their radar cross section is obviously inde- 
pendent of aspect angle. For this reason spherical shapes can be used as a standard 
target without concern for their exact orientation with respect to the radar. Also, if it 
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is in motion, its cross section will not fluctuate with change of aspect. The sphere cross 
section can be approximately calculated as: 
(T = 7T(Il 
where a is a radius of the sphere. 
3.1.1.2 Rectangular Flat Plate 
(3.3) 
To predict radar cross section of a flat plate is not easy due to the unsymmetrical shape. 
However, Blake M divided flat plate cross section calculation into two categories; large 






Figure 3.1: Plane wave scattering by a rectangular plate [27] 
In general terms a rectangular plate has a predefined edge dimension a in the x coor- 
dinate and b in the y coordinate system, where the coordinate system is defined such that 
the x-y plane coincides with the plane of the plate itself. So, the angle between an incident, 
wave and the z axis of the plate, or normal vector of the plate, is defined as 0.0 is defined 
as the angle between the incident wave and the x axis of the plate (see Fig. 3.1). If the 
Incidlent, wave is asslune(l to be lying on the y-z plane of the plate coordinated system, 
the radar cross section of the plate will he calculated with Egn. (3.4). If not lying on the 
y-z plane, the flat plate cross section can he evaluated with the Egn. (3.5). 
47A' sin(k1 a sin 0) z a(H) = cos H (3.4) 
, \2 kola sill 0 
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ý(B 
47rA2 sin(kia sin 0 cos 0) sin(kib sin 0 sin 5) 2 




where a, b are edge dimensions, A is the radar wavelength, A is the flat plate area, and 
kl = 2ir/A. 
However, if a plate is flat, with the conducting surface perpendicular to the direction 
of radar line of sight, and only if the overall dimensions of the plate in any direction are 
large compared to the wavelength, then this cross section can be shown as: 
47rA2 
3.1.1.3 Circular Cylinder 
(3.6) 
The cylinder has proved to be very useful in modeling portions of aircraft such as fuselage, 
wing tanks, and engine nacelles. Very thin circular cylinders whose radii are very small in 
comparison with the radar wavelength have been extremely useful in modeling the sharp 
edges of some wing surfaces. Very thin cylinders are referred to here as thin wires. 
Unlike the sphere, the cylinder is, in general, polarisation-sensitive. However, very 
large cylinders (with all dimensions much larger than a wavelength) are polarisation- 
insensitive. If the cylinder axis is perpendicular to the direction of propagation, the cross 




where a is the cylinder radius and 1 is the cylinder length. 
If the angle between the radar line of sight and the cylinder (0), is fairly large 
((4ira sin 9)/A » 1), then the exact expression for the radar cross section is quite compli- 
cated: 
aA sin 9 sin[(2irl/A) cos B] 2 




Crispin [131 derived a general equation to calculate the cross-section for a cylinder whose 
dimensions are small in comparison to the wavelength, such as a wire, sharp leading edge 
(thin wire). Eqn. (3.9) where the effective cross-section for 0 is not close to 90°: 






ry7r sin 0) J 
where ry = 1.781072,0 is the angle between the wire and the direction of incidence, and 
0 is the angle between the polarisation direction and the plane formed by the wire and 
the direction of incidence. 
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In the case where 0= 90°, equation(3.9) can be reduced to: 
L _I i 14 10 
7rl2cos4q5 
2a+ 171 z 
77ra 
3.1.1.4 Finite Cone 
(3.10) 
The finite cone can be used to model wing surfaces and portions of a fuselage surface. If 
the cone base is circular with radius a, and has a finite length of L, then the radar cross 
section of this simple finite cone shape for 0= 90° is given by: 
_ 
87rL3 sin a 
9\ cos4 a 
3.11 
where A is the radar wavelength, and a is the half cone angle (see Fig. 3.2). 





AL tan a 
= tang(B - a) (3.12) 87r sin 9 
A 
a 
Figure 3.2: The finish-cone geometry [131 
3.1.1.5 Large, Smooth, Curved Surfaces 
For a very large surface, it can be assumed that the principal radii of curvature is very 
large compared to the wavelength, but is finite. The simple calculation of cross-section 
for this kind of shape is given by Eqn. (3.13): 
a= 7rRl R2 (3.13) 
where Rl and R2 are the principal radii of curvature of the surface at the point where the 
radar wave front first strikes it. 
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3.1.1.6 Complex Targets 
The electromagnetic problem of cross section calculation can become very complicated 
for the above described simple geometric shapes, thus, necessitating the use of approx- 
imation techniques. It is understandable that exact calculation of the cross sections of 
more complicated targets is virtually impossible. However, techniques of approximate 
calculation have been developed, yielding results that are in reasonable agreement with 
experiment M. This approximation, called the random phase method, simply averages the 
contributions of all Q's of simple geometric shape assemblies of the target over all possible 




3.1.2 Probability of Detection by Radar 
A detection by radar occurs when the total power level processed by the radar receiver, 
Signal and Noise (S + N), is above a selected power level called the threshold (see 
Fig. 3.3). The signal-to- noise ratio (S/N), when S+N is equal the threshold, is de- 
fined as (SIN)__ M. Therefore, the probability of detection (Po) is then a function of 
the signal to noise ratio (S/N) and the false alarm probability (P), and can also be 
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Figure 3.3: Conditional detection by threshold setting 161 
PD =1- e-SAN I IOý 
{ 4(S/N)ln(u)} (lu (3.15) 
Pn 





u(Et) = P,, = exp {-Et /2} 
(3.16) 
(3.17) 
Where S/N is signal-to-noise ratio of the radar with G gain transmission power. R is 
the distance between radar and aircraft. FT is the effective temperature, L is signal and 
echo power loss factor. k is the Boltzmann's constant, and B,, is the noise power that lies 
within the signal bandwidth of radar receiver. 
Signal-to-noise ratio is a function of power processed by a radar receiver and is direct 
proportional to aircraft cross section (v), as shown in equation (3.16). Additionally, S/N 
is also the reciprocal to the distance between aircraft and radar receiver to the fourth 
power. On the other hand, the probability of false alarm (Pa) can be determined directly 
from the threshold setting of radar. 
Hovanessian [24] showed some typical results from equation (3.15) - (3.17) in Fig. 3.4, 
which can be used as a simple alternative to predict probability of detection by radar. 
3.1.3 Conditional Probability of Hit 
After an aircraft has been detected, the enemy then engages the aircraft with their weapon, 
which generally can be divided into two main categories; contact warhead (penetrator) 
and proximity warhead (blast and fragments). The contact warhead has to hit directly 
to kill or damage the aircraft. On the other hand, the proximity-fused warhead detonates 
outside the aircraft at a detonation distance. Its blast and fragments will then hit and kill 
or damage the aircraft. It is not necessary for all shot penetrators and fragments from the 
detonation to hit the aircraft. Some will hit and some may miss the aircraft. This matter 
will also affect the conditional probability of hit. Additionally, the conditional probability 
of hit depends on the threat weapon type which intercepts the aircraft; a contact warhead 
(PH/D) or a proximity warhead (PFAD). 
3.1.3.1 Miss Distance 
The measure of the threat system's ability to position a warhead within the vicinity of 
the aircraft is the closet point of approach of the propagator with respect to the aircraft. 
This miss distance is essentially an error. In general, the miss distance is a function of the 
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Figure 3.4: Probability of detection vs signal-to-noise ratio and probability of false 
alarm [24] 
three spatial coordinates (x, y, z) whose origin is centred at the aim point of the target 
(normally the centre of gravity of the aircraft). However, in simple evaluations the two 
spatial coordinates (x, y) and sometimes only one dimension (r) are used (see Fig. 3.7). 
3.1.3.2 Conditional Probability of Hit by a Contact Warhead 
The probability that the aircraft is hit, when it is detected (PI, ID), depends upon the 
miss distance distribution and upon the physical size of the aircraft presented area to the 
propagator. Assuming that an aircraft has been shot with N propagators at N different 
locations of x, y pairs, the distance from the aircraft aim point to any x, y pair is the 
miss distance for that shot, and the distances x and y are the coordinate errors. If the N 
miss distances are independent from one another and there is no correlation between the 
x and y components of the miss distance, the assumption is made that the probability 
density function of the miss distance p(x, y) can be represented by two dimensional normal 
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distribution as: 
1 
P(x, y) = exp 





2y)2 1 (3.18) 
27rQ QJ 2JJ 
where v.,; and cx are the standard deviation of miss distances x and y respectively; µx 
and p. are mean values of miss distance x and y. 
If the two means (µ.,, µy) are found, or assumed, to be equal to zero, and if the two 
standard deviations (o,.,, vy) are found, or assumed, to be equal, the bivariate distribution 
simplifies to the circular normal distribution given by: 
1 r2 
P(r) - 2irv2 exp - 2ýý 
(3.19) 
The presented area of the aircraft in the miss distance plane, which is defined as a 
plane that contains the miss distance vector and is normal to the relative propagator path, 
is given by: 
AP = ffL(xY)dxdY 
L 
(3.20) 
An aircraft is hit only when x and y define a location within the physical extent of the 
aircraft; location of (x, y) pairs outside the aircraft boundary are misses. Consequently, 
the probability of a propagator hit on the presented area of the aircraft is given by integral 
of p(x, y) over the extent of the aircraft: 




Due to the complexity of evaluating for a general aircraft external shape, two alter- 
native approximated aircraft shape representations can be used, i. e. the "Shoe Box" and 
the "Carlton". The difference between the two methods is that the "Shoe Box" defines a 
rectangular area with side lengths x,, and Yo as shown in Fig 3.5. Therefore, Ap = x0y0. 
On the other hand, Carlton, or the diffused Gaussian method uses a function H(x, y), 
which defines the probability that locations (x, y) lie on the aircraft presented area (see 
Fig. 3.6). Aircraft presented area can be then evaluated as: 
AP=J: J: H(x, y)dxdy (3.22) 
Then PH/D with N propagators becomes: 
00 
= PxiD JoJ 00 P( x, J)H(x, J)dxdJ (3.23) 
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Figure 3.6: Presented area represented by Shoe Box and Carlton methods 
If circular symmetry about the aiin point is assumed for the reiss distance distribution, 
and if the aircraft presented area is taken as a circle of radius 7r0, and oý, _ or. y = (r,.. 
Then the aircraft presented area can he determined as the circle area of this radius 
(Al, = 7r7" ), as illustrated in Fig. 3.7. Thus, the P, 1, can he estimated from one of 
following equations [61: 
1- exp 
(27 ) Shoe Box 
1'io = (3.24) 
A'' Carlton 2na? +Ap 
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 
X/X0 
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Figure 3.7: Circular symmetric miss distance <<'l 
3.1.3.3 Conditional Probability of Hit by Proximity Warhead 
0 
28 
On the other hand, a propagator with a proximity warhead does not have to hit, the 
aircraft to kill or damage it. Instead, the aircraft is killed when the proximity warhead 
fuses in a location that causes one or more warhead fragments, discrete rod, continuous 
rod, or penetrators to hit the aircraft. Additionally these hits inust he sufficient to kill the 
aircraft. If the warhead detonates close enough, the blast effect may also daiiiage and/or 
kill the aircraft. Most of the current air target warheads are designed to kill the target 
with fragment spray, whose kill or damage mechanism is similar to the kill or daniage 
mechanism inflicted by multiple hits of contact warheads or penetrators. Therefore, the 
blast-fragment warhead is chosen to represent the proximity warhead. 
From a susceptibility point of view, the miss distance of each fragment fron a prox- 
imity warhead detonation and the number of fragments penetrating the target are the 
major factor in the evaluation of this threat type. The number of fragments penetrating 
the aircraft depends on the number of fragments in the proximity warhead, fragment im- 
pact locations, and the terminal effects parameters; such as the fragment mass, impact 
velocity, and detonation distance (see Fig. 3.8). In general, the fragments will he ran- 
donily distributed throughout the fragment spray zone. Time expected number of hits on 
the aircraft can be estimated by assuming that a presented area, of the aircraft is hit with 
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a uniform density spray of fragment [5] . 
This is expressed in Eqn. (3.25). 
NA,, 
ryt = (3.25) 2irs2(cos S1 
- cos 
b2) 
where N is the number of fragments in the warhead, and s is the detonation distance 
between fragment spray and the warhead. bi and S2 are the leading and the trailing 
fragment spray angles which are defined as: 
I V,,,, sinT +Vfsin(q, +ai) arctan T, i=1,2 (3.26) V,,, cos W+ Vfcos(gf + (xi) - Vt 
A 
Figure 3.8: Warhead detonation and fragment spray 
where Vt is the target horizontal speed, V,,, is the speed of the missile, is the elevation 
angle of the missile, Vf is the average fragment speed with respect to a stationary warhead, 
and ai and a2 are the leading and trailing fragment spray angles from the axis of the 
static warhead detonation, respectively. 
The number of fragments, which supposedly directly hit the aircraft is dependent 
upon detonation distance and the number of fragments along the aircraft length. In this 
case, the probability of fuse (PF/D) becomes 1.0 for all 7), direct fragment hits, and the 
probability of hit can be calculate as n hits by contact warhead (see Fig. 3.8). In other 
words, a hit by a proximity warhead becomes n multiple hits by a contact warhead with 
a PH, o of 1.00 for detonated fragments within aircraft presented area. 
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3.2 Vulnerability Assessment 
Vulnerability is the probability that the aircraft will be killed if hit [61, and is a function 
of aircraft critical component configurations, including specific armament, system loca- 
tions and redundancies. An aircraft consists of many components, and each individual 
component has a level of vulnerability; thus, each component vulnerability contributes in 
some measures to the overall vulnerability of the aircraft. The aircraft vulnerability is 
indicated by the probability of kill given a hit, PK1t,. This probability can be evaluated 
using the following procedures: 
" Identification of the critical components considering redundancy level 
" Identification of each critical component Damage-Caused Failure Mode 
" Calculation of each individual critical component vulnerability 
" Identification of overlapped areas of these critical components 
" Calculation of each overlapped area critical component vulnerability 
" Summation of each individual critical component and each overlapped area of these 
critical components vulnerability considering to their layout (Shielding Effect for 
Overlapped Area) 
3.2.1 Kill Tree Diagram 
A kill tree diagram is a logic symbology, which shows a top-down approach that starts 
with aircraft kill event and then determines what event or combination of events can cause 
the aircraft kill event. The kill tree diagram can be illustrated by the generic fault tree as 
shown in Fig. 3.9. At the bottom of each branch of the diagram, all critical components 
resulting is an aircraft kill event are shown. With the basic logic gates (AND, OR), critical 
component redundancy can be illustrated. 
3.2.2 Shotline Technique 
This technique has been used to identify the overlapped area of critical components by 
superimposing a planar grid over the aircraft model and then passing parallel shotlines or 
ray towards the grid nodes N. A list of the penetrated components is then generated. 
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Attrition Kill 
Aircraft cannot fly II Aircraft cannot be controlled 
Loss of lift Loss of thrust Loss of structural Loss of control unit Loss of power supply integrity 
1 LL1 L3 
Figure 3.9: Kill tree diagram for UAV 
In the vulnerability assessment module used for this methodology, the overlapped area 
of the critical components within the same shotline (see Fig. 3.10) can be examined in 
two categories; i. e. shielding effect and non-shielding effect. For shielding effect, the front 
critical component may be used as a shield for the critical components behind. On the 
other hand, for non-shielding effect the overlapped areas of the critical component will be 
redefined as an additional non-redundant critical component. The components behind are 
automatically killed when the front component of the overlapped area is killed. Therefore, 
the total number of critical components increases. The effect of these two definitions of 
overlapped area will be discussed later. 
3.2.3 Vulnerable Area given by a Single Hit 
The vulnerable area technique is a theoretical threat-presented area that, if hit by a 
damage mechanism, would result in an aircraft or components kill M. The vulnerable 
area of the ith component (A,,; ) depends on the presented area of the component in the 
plane normal to the approach direction of the threat (Ap; ) as illustrated in Fig. 3.11. The 
probability of component kill, given a hit on the component (Pk/lt; ) is as follows: 
A,, = Ap, Pry/, t; 
(3.27) 
The determination of the Pk/, L of each component is a very difficult undertaking. 
It requires a combination of complete analysis of critical data and sound engineering 
judgment. There is no universal methodology for arriving at a numerical value for PkII, 161. 





Tank No. 4 
1, bob 
Shotline 
Figure 3.10: Identification of Overlapped area by shotline technique 
APe (engine) APf (fuel tank) APP (pilot) 
AVe (engine) Af(fuel tank) AvP (pilot) 
Ap (Aircraft) 
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Figure 3.11: Presented and vulnerable areas of critical components and aircraft Is] 
Therefore, the assumed Pk-1h in Table 3.1 are chosen as guideline and/or default value in 
vulnerability assessment. These values have been assumed by Ball [6] 
Table 3.1: Assumed default probability of kill of a component, given a hit on the 
component Pk1h 
Critical component Pk1h 
Pilot 1.0 
Fuel system 0.3 
Engine 0.6 - 0.7 
Avionic 0.8 - 0.9 
Before the vulnerable areas of the overlapped areas of the critical components can be 
determined, the probability of kill given a hit, and presented area of overlapped critical 
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components both have to be defined and calculated depending on their redundancy. The 
presented area of overlapped critical components is defined as the intersection of presented 
areas of all overlapped critical components, arranged by the same shotline (see Fig. 3.12). 
It is possible to acquire redundant overlapped areas if an aircraft has symmetrically re- 
dundant critical components; unless overlapped critical components are always defined 
and considered as non-redundant components. 
No. 1= Tank No. 2 + No. 1 
Tank No. 2 
Tank No. 1 
Overlapped No. 2 = FCS + Tank No. 2 FCS 
+ Tank No. 1 
Overlapped No. 3 = FCS + Tank No. 2 
Figure 3.12: Overlapped areas from tank no. 1, tank no. 2 and FCS 
The probability of a kill of an overlapped area, given a hit on the overlapped area, 
has to be determined. This determination depends mainly on the redundancy level of the 
overlapped critical components, which can be classified as follows. 
3.2.3.1 Overlap of Non-Redundant Critical Components 
A hit in this overlapped area can kill one or more of the components intersected by the 
shotline. Thus, the component kills along the shotline are not mutually exclusive. Assume 
there are C non-redundant critical components along all shotlines within the overlapped 
area. This overlapped area, with its C components, can be considered to be a composite 
non-redundant critical component. The probability that all C components survive the hit 
(P81140) is given by the joint probability that each of the C components survives the hit. 
c 
Ps/jto = PS/hi Ps/h2Ps/IL3... Ps/tic = rl(1 - Pk/lit) (3.28) 
i=l 
Hence, the probability of kill of an overlapped area of non-redundant critical compo- 
nents given a hit is given by: 
c 
Pk/hc) Pkllti) (3.29) 
1 i=1 
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3.2.3.2 Overlap of Redundant Critical Components 
If redundant critical components overlap each other, or another redundant component, 
a single hit on the overlapped region can kill all redundant critical components. There- 
fore, an overlapped area of redundant critical components becomes automatically non- 
redundant, unless there is another identical overlapped redundant component onboard 
the aircraft. The probability of kill of this kind of overlapped area can be evaluated as: 
C 
Pk/{to= Pk/h1Pk/h2Pk/j13... Pk//tc _ Pk/h; (3.30) 
i=1 
3.2.3.3 Overlap of Redundant and Non-Redundant Critical Components 
In this case, an overlapped area comprises C1 non-redundant critical components and C2 
redundant critical components. The overlapped region can be killed by killing one of the 
C1 non-redundant critical components or by killing all C2 redundant critical components. 
Hence, the probability of kill for such an area can be calculated as: 
=1 ({fl(i Pkt/L; )}{1 -11 Pk/! L }) (3.31) 
Z=1 , 
j=1 
Finally, the vulnerable areas of overlapped critical components can be evaluated ac- 
cording to Eqn. (3.27), and their redundancy can be categorised as described above. 
An effect on consider for overlapped area of critical components is the determination 
of the vulnerable areas of the non-overlapped regions of the critical components. The 
presented area of these critical components are deducted, or sometimes replaced by the 
intersection of the presented areas. For instance, three intersection regions from fuel tank 
no. 1, no. 2, and the flight control system, shown in Fig. 3.12, can therefore be evaluated. 
The results are shown in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2: Aircraft component presented areas with overlapped critical components 
Component An [f t`] Pkt h[-] A [f t`] Redundancy 
Fuel Tank No. 1 20 (45-25) 0.3 6.0 redundant 
Fuel Tank No. 2 15 (45 - 25 - 5) 0.3 4.5 redundant 
FCS 0 (20 - 15 - 5) 0.95 0.0 non-redundant 
Overlapped No. 1 25 0.09 2.25 non-redundant 
Overlapped No. 2 15 0.9545 14.181 non-redundant 
Overlapped No. 3 5 0.965 4.825 non-redundant 
Total 80 - 21.256 - 
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3.2.3.4 Shielding Effect applied to Overlapped Critical Components 
One possible to reduce the vulnerable areas of the critical component overlapped area 
is to use the front critical component of the overlapped area as a shield for the behind 
critical components. The assumed shield capability in this study is 10%. That means the 
probability of kill of the behind critical components will be reduced by 10%. Additionally, 
the reconfiguration of the critical component layout by moving the less critical component 
to the front of the overlapped area is another method to supplementary reduction of kill 
probability of the overlapped area. This effect is valid within the overlapped area only. 
By this approach, the kill probability of the overlapped area reduces. Table 3.3 shows an 
example of calculation of the kill probability of the Overlapped No. 2. In this example, 
the FCS has been positioned between the fuel tank No. 1 and No. 2 for the reconfiguration 
layout. 
Table 3.3: Calculation of the kill probability of the Overlanned No. 2 
Component 
Non-Shielding Effect 
Probability of kill 
Fuel Tank No. 1 

















The total aircraft vulnerable area calculated from a single hit is then the summation of 
all non-redundant critical components and non-redundant overlapped critical components, 
which can be more or less than the total aircraft vulnerable areas resulting from a single 
hit without overlapped areas. This depends on the layout of the critical components and 
the consideration of the shielding effect of the front component of the overlapped area. 
For instance, if the aircraft designer rearranges these three critical components so that no 
overlapped areas of critical components exists; its vulnerable areas will be 19 f t2, instead 
of 21.256 f t2. In case that the front critical component in the overlapped area can be 
used as a shield for the behind critical components, the aircraft vulnerable areas will be 
reduced to 21.147475 ft2 for the original layout, and to 19.518 ft2 for the reconfiguration 
layout. 
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3.2.4 Aircraft Kill Probability by a Single Hit of a Nonexplosive Penetrator 
The aircraft kill probability, given a random single hit on the aircraft (PKIH), is the 
summation of the kill probabilities of the non-redundant critical components, given a 
random hit on the aircraft (PkIH; ). This can be calculated as: 
Pk/x, _ PltlHiPklhi = (AnilAn)(AilApt) 
= A,: /An (3.32) 
In the case that an aircraft has been hit by a single nonexplosive penetrator, it is 
impossible to kill an aircraft by killing only one of the redundant critical components. 
Hence, the kill probability given a random single hit on the aircraft with C non-redundant 






i=1 i=1 p 
3.2.5 Aircraft Kill Probability by Multiple Hits of Penetrators 
It is assumed that the random distribution of hits by more than one penetrator or fragment 
over the aircraft is uniform, and all hits are assumed to travel along parallel shotlines from 
the same direction. Ball [6] offers five alternatives to estimate these probability values; 
i. e. Binomial approach for N hits, Poisson approach for E expected hits, Tree diagram, 
Markov chain, and Simplified approach. With the first two methods, the effects of critical 
component redundancy cannot be considered in kill probability by multiple hits. The third 
method, the tree diagram, examines kill expressions for each hit, considering redundant 
and non-redundant critical components, and the sum of these values up to aircraft kill 
probability by N hits. A disadvantage of tree diagram is that it is too detailed and time 
consuming. The Markov chain or state matrix method offers an opportunity to determine 
aircraft, kill probability by multiple hits of nonexplosive penetrators with consideration 
of redundancy for less detailed calculation for each hit. The results of the tree diagram 
and Markov chain will be identical because both methods use the same principle. The 
last method is the simplified approach, which considers that more than one component 
can be killed by one hit and that the kill of one component has no effect on the kills of the 
other components, given N hits (or E expected hits). The aircraft kill probability by this 
method is a logical summation of all redundant and non-redundant critical components 
3. Survivability Assessment 37 
kill probabilities after N hits (or E expected hits), which can be calculated by either 
binomial or poisson methods. 
Ball has also shown that the results from the Markov chain, the simplified approach 
by the binomial method, and the simplified approach by the poisson method are very 
similar. Hence, the Markov chain method has been chosen to determine PKIH by multiple 
hits of nonexplosive penetrators or fragments in this methodology because the matrix can 
be simple constructed and be less complicated used. 
Markov Chain or state matrix method defines the state vector {S}, which describes all 
redundant critical component kill states and all possible aircraft kill states given a single 
hit as: 
" One or more of the non-redundant critical components or overlapped critical com- 
ponents have been killed, resulting in an aircraft kill, denoted by Knrc. 
" One of the redundant critical components Cm has been killed, denoted by Krc,,, in cl. 
" All of the redundant critical components Cm have been killed, resulting in an aircraft 
kill, denoted by Krcc,,,. 
" None of the non-redundant critical components and none of the redundant critical 
components are killed, denoted by NK. 
Note that a summation of all state probability values in {S} must always be unity; or 
in other words, the aircraft must exist in one of the possible states. 
{S} = {Knrc Krcl ;,, cl Krc2 ;n cl Krccl ... 
NK}T (3.34) 
The transition matrix of probability [T] specifies how the aircraft will translate from 
one state to another as a result of a hit on the aircraft. The state vector after ith hits, 
where i=0,1,2, ... N, is shown in Eqn. 
(3.35). For instance, if an aircraft includes three 
non-redundant critical components and one set of two redundant critical components, the 
transit matrix of probability [T] can be evaluated, as shown in Table 3.4. 
where ADAC is an aircraft presented area; Ap,, rc 
is the total presented area of all 
non-redundant critical components. APKrc represents the area of the nth critical n in Cm 
component of the mth redundant critical component set. APN, C is the total presented 
area of all non-critical components. Therefore, the state vector {S}('+') can be given by: 
{S}(2+1) = [T]{S}() (3.35) 
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Table 3.4: State transition matrix 
1A Probability of transition from this state PAC Knrc Krc 1 ;,, cl Krcz ;,, Cl Ifrccl NK To this state 
APac APKnrc APKnrc 0 APK 
rc 
Knrc 
0 APNK + APKrc 0 0 n APICr Krcl ill cl 
1/ADAC 0 
l I. Cl 
0 APNK + APKrc 0 
cl in Cl 
APKrc KrC2 111 QI 
0 APKrc 
2 in CI 
APKrc APAC 
2 I. C1 
0 Krccl 
0 
2 in C1 
0 
, in Cl 
0 0 APN,, NK 
An aircraft kill is defined by those states that specify either a kill of any of non- 
redundant components (Knrc) or a kill of the members of the m sets of redundant com- 
ponents (Krcc, ). Hence, the probability the aircraft is killed after ith hits is given 
by 
BK/H = Knrc( + Krcgl + Krcgý2 + ... + Krcgz 
(3.36) 
3.2.6 Aircraft Kill Probability by Proximity Warhead 
The proximity-fused high explosive warhead produces primary damage from the blast 
and high velocity fragments or penetrators generated by the detonation. An aircraft 
vulnerability given by an external blast is usually expressed as an envelope about the 
aircraft where the detonation of a specified charge weight high explosive will result in a 
specified level of damage or kill to the aircraft M. Detonation outside of these envelopes 
will result in little or no damage to the aircraft or in a lesser kill level. Envelopes are 
determined for a variety of encounter conditions that allow for variations in aircraft speed 
and altitude, as well as aspect (aircraft view). Aircraft critical components vulnerable 
to the external blast consist principally of portions of the structure and control surface, 
which are out of scope of this design methodology. Therefore, the blast damage effect is 
excluded from the vulnerability assessment module. 
On the other hand, penetrators or fragments spray from warhead detonation can 
directly damage the aircraft following the same principle as multiple hits by contacted 
warheads or penetrators, as shown in Fig. 3.8. The measure of vulnerability on encounter 
with this threat is the probability that the aircraft is killed given fusing, PJ IF . To 
determine this value, the actual number or expected number of fragments that hit the 
aircraft has to be calculated first (see Section 3.1.3.3). Then, the aircraft kill probability by 
those fragment hits can be evaluated using the same kill probability calculation principle 
as the multiple hits by penetrators (see Section 3.2.5). 
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3.2.7 Lethal Radius 
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The lethal radius is an alternative measure of aircraft vulnerability. It is defined as the 
detonation distance between the proximity warhead and an aircraft, where the aircraft 
kill probability is 0.5, neglecting of the threat blast effect. The PF/D of proximity war- 
heads can thus be described as a function of the number of fragments (N) depending on 
detonation distance (s) (details see Section 3.2.6). Assuming that the threat proximity 
warhead detonates within the lethal radius, the aircraft is then killed. Therefore, the 
lethal radius can indicate only how good an aircraft is in terms of vulnerability, and will 
not be considered in this design methodology. 




3.3 Probability of Survivability 
Aircraft survivability is measured as Ps, which is a function of P1 Ix, PKIF, PID, PFAD and 




i1 - PDrF/DrIC/F Proximity warhead 
Survivability depends upon the encounter threat type, aspect (or aircraft view), and 
scenario. The survivability assessment for this methodology includes survivability on en- 
counter with both nonexplosive penetrator and proximity warhead (external explosive) 
in the six main aircraft views; i. e. front, rear, right, left, top and bottom views. In 
a real combat scenario, an aircraft cannot fly only in one attitude (appearance) (see 
Fig. 3.13) and PD, PJ/H, PH/D, Px/F, PF/D also depend on the aircraft aspect facing the 
threat. Therefore, an alternative way to consider this effect is to define the manoeuvra- 
bility probability Piet11 (or weighting factors) and to integrate this value into survivability 
assessment as: 
Top 
Ps =1-E Pview; PDj(PH/DjPlt/Hi or PF/DiPK/F; ) (3.39) 
i=Front 
So, aircraft survivability of each aircraft view (appearance) facing the threat in each 
flight phase can be determined. The average survivability in each flight phase can finally 
be evaluated by the summation of the survivability values in each view. 
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3.3.1 Probability of Manoeuvrability (Weighting Factors) 
Due to the real flying and mission specification, an aircraft has to change its aspect (view) 
facing the threat encounter direction. Therefore, probability of a specific aspect facing the 
threat (or weighting factors) has been defined and used to determine an average aircraft 
aspect facing threat encounter direction during a specific flight phase. In this research, 
this probability of a specific aspect is renamed to probability of manoeuvrability. The 
probability of nianoeuvrability is therefore, defined as the probability of each of the six 
aircraft views directly facing the threat encounter direction in a specific phase during a 
sortie. By assuming that threat encounter directions are constant and uniform throughout 
the mission, multiple aircraft views during each flight phase can be seen by threat weapons, 
as illustrated in Fig. 3.13. Sometime in the real situation, an aircraft may use terrain to 
reduce these probability of manoeuvrability in some specific flight phase. If in this case, 
the total manoeuvrability probability may be less than unity. Unfortunately, this case 
is out of scope of this research. Therefore, the total manoeuvrability probability in each 




Figure 3.13: Aircraft nianoettvrability in attack flight phase 
Table 3.5 shows an example of aircraft manoeuvrability probabilities during the mis- 
sinn simulation. These values will be set up as default values and be used as option 2 of 
the results shown in chapter 8. 
3.3.2 Probability of Encounter 
In real combat situations, not only the aircraft inanoeuvrability has to he takeln into 
account, but the probability of single or multiple encounters by one or more different threat 
types during the mission have to be examined. In this section, the effect of probability of 
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Table 3.5: Aircraft manoeuvrability probabilities 
Flight phase Top Right 
Aircraft views 
Left Front Rear Bottom 
Preflight 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 
Outbound 0.05 0.15 0.15 0.60 0.00 0.05 
Attack 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.40 0.00 0.15 
Inbound 0.05 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.60 0.05 
Postflight 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.00 
encounter by two main weapon types after each other (cannot be at the same time) on 
aircraft survivability is introduced. 
In a flight phase during a sortie, an aircraft may be shot at several times by one or 
more weapon types. It is assumed that each threat can encounter only one aircraft and is 
independent of other threats. The aircraft mission survivability depends on the number 
of encounters and types of weapon. An aircraft can survive the mission only when it 
survives each encounter during the mission. The probability that the aircraft survives the 
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Figure 3.14: Block diagram for independent encounters survivability probability 
In the other words, the aircraft can survive the encounters only when it survives all 
shots. Therefore, an aircraft survivability probability given N encounters from the same 
weapon type can be determined as follows: 
N 
Ps = Psl Pst Psi ... PSN = 
11 
Si Pi=1 
P, Cl)(1- PK2)(1- PK3) ... (1 - PKN) 
(3.40) 
i=1 
where Pst is the probability of aircraft survivability given the ith encounter; and P1 
is also the aircraft kill probability given the ith encounter. 
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If an aircraft encounters N weapon types; each type has an expected number Ei. The 
aircraft mission survivability is hence calculated as follows: 
PS(mission) 














_ exp(-EEPK, ) (3.41) 
Z-1 
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3.4 Chapter Summary 
This survivability assessment chapter has: 
9 shown an overview of the survivability model. 
9 presented a simple model to evaluate aircraft RCS by using simple geometric shapes 
to represent an aircraft. 
" shown the determination method of aircraft probability of detection through its 
radar cross section and opponent radar performance. 
" presented alternative simple methods to determine aircraft probability of being hit 
by contact and proximity warheads. 
" explained the vulnerability probability determination methods for the two main 
threat weapon types. 
9 introduced manoeuvrability probability and integrated this into the survivability 
probability. 
9 explained how aircraft mission survivability probability can be determined through 
considering susceptibility, vulnerability, and manoeuvrability probabilities. 
CHAPTER 4 
RELIABILITY & MAINTAINABILITY 
Reliability & Maintainability (R&NI) is another important design aspect which has to 
be considered during the combat aircraft design process, because the reliability & main- 
tainability will directly affect to aircraft available for the next sortie, which is one of the 
objective functions of this research. 
Prediction of realistic R&M figures for a combat aircraft during the conceptual and/or 
preliminary design phases is a continuing problem for both designers and operators. This 
is primarily due to paucity of hardware details. Theses details are generally not available 
for analysis and evaluation during the early design stage. A statistical approach is used 
to estimate the aircraft reliability. On the other hand, aircraft maintainability can be 
indirectly evaluated by a model used in aircraft life cycle cost estimation. 
The main concepts and results will be shown in this chapter, and the rest of principles, 
methods, models, and results are demonstrated in Appendix C. 
4 .1 Reliability Assessment 
Reliability can be quantified as the probability of successfully completing the mission 
without failure. Due to the lack of system and component details during the concep- 
tual and preliminary design stage, historical data were statistically analysed and used to 
develop the reliability probability prediction techniques. 
In this section, four reliability assessment alternatives are examined and explained; 
i. e. Direct linear regression, Pareto distribution, Combination between linear regression 
and Pareto distribution, and Empty weight functionality. 
4.1.1 Direct Linear Regression 
Serghides [38] introduced a method to estimate the reliability and maintainability of each 
aircraft component by using the historical data with statistical analysis. The main prin- 
ciple of this method is to select the two best design parameters in the following criteria 
to create a linear equation to estimate for both military and civilian aircraft thirteen 
44 
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component defect rates (DR). 
1. Highest linear correlation between aircraft defect rate data with the aircraft design 
parameter. 
2. Engineering judgement basis, for example a design parameter which can indicate 
size of a system, such as height or weight. 
With the selected design parameters, the linear regression equation can be built in the 
form: 
DR, ,,, =bo+bl"Xl+b2"X2 
where bo, bl, and b2 are constant equation coefficients, and Xland X2 are selected aircraft 
design parameters for each particular system. 
Serghides also developed a technology improvement factor (TIF) based on the year 
1952 to validate his prediction method and multiply this value with the pre-calculated 
system DR. Hence, the total aircraft DR can finally be calculated by summing all thirteen 
aircraft components DR: 
13 
DRAircraft = DRSystemi 
Z=1 
A newer model was required to ensure correct prediction for modern aircraft, the 
development was undertaken by Whittle [52]. This model has been used by Woodford [53I 
to predict total personnel and unit level consumption costs. 
4.1.2 Pareto Distribution 
Al-Ahmed [l] showed that finding a realistic relationship between the R&M and the con- 
ceptual and/or preliminary design variables could be difficult for each system because 
each aircraft consists of more than thirty different systems. Many of these system's R&M 
figures are not directly related to the way the aircraft is designed. 
Al-Ahmed also discovered that if the aircraft reliability data are sorted in a descending 
order, this graph follows Pareto distribution regardless of the aircraft age. This means 
that the whole aircraft reliability can be predicted by a few system reliabilities of aircraft 
systems failure rate distribution, which contribute 80% of the total failure rate by using 
Pareto principle [3°1 
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Figure 4.1: Pareto distribution 
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To approximate this failure rate distribution of aircraft main systems, Al-Ahmed had 
developed equations to estimate the following parameters, which are necessary to define 
the Pareto curve, as shown in Fig. 4.1. 
1. The highest failure rate figure, FR(1). 
2. The lowest failure rate figure, FR(8). 
3. Number of systems per aircraft, NoS 
Hence, the rest of aircraft system failure rates can also be calculated by using the 
Pareto distribution in the form: 
FR(n) = FR(1) - n-ý' 
4.1.3 Empty Weight Functionality 
(4.1) 
An alternative to predict an aircraft failure rate is to develop a function of an aircraft 
empty weight [31, unfortunately this method needs a large number of reliability data, 
which is not easy to collect due to restriction. However, four linear graphs from available 
reliability data (1985,1987,1993,1996) are plotted; and show that aircraft failure rate 
may be possible a function of aircraft empty weight as shown in Fig 4.2. 
By using all available aircraft reliability data, an average linear equation for aircraft 
failure rate evaluation has been discovered as: 
(4.2) FR = 0.0476 + 0.0666 " We 
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Figure 4.2: Failure rate as a function of empty weight 
4.1.4 Combination between Linear Regression and Pareto Distribution 
Both Serghides and Al-Ahmed had their own data to produce their models to predict 
the aircraft reliability, and they are not comparable with each other due to the different 
aircraft classifications and aircraft technologies used. Additionally, it was possible to 
predict aircraft reliability by using a combination of the two above aircraft reliability 
prediction methods with classified data A 
Firstly, six aircraft design parameters, which relate to almost major aircraft systems, 
are selected to investigate their linear and exponential correlation with the entire aircraft 
failure rate. These parameters are 
9 Aircraft empty weight, We 
" Number of engines per aircraft, Ne 
" Altitude, Alt 
" Gross wing area, Wa 
" Aircraft height, H 
9 Total thrust, Thrust 
Secondly, failure rate distributions of all available data have been plotted and analysed. 
The 40: 70 portion has been found as shown in Fig. 4.3. In other words, 40% of major 
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aircraft systems give approximate 70% of the total aircraft failure rate; and also the 
remaining 60% of the aircraft systems have an approximately constant failure rate, which 
is approximate equal to the lowest FR from the critical 40% of aircraft systems. 
Failure Rate for Aircraft P 
800 
09362 







02468 10 12 
No. of System 
Figure 4.3: Failure rate distribution of aircraft P 
The next step is to develop either exponential and/or linear regression equations to 
predict the highest and the lowest failure rate from two almost complete available data 
sets [4,381 The results from these analyses show that linear regression equations are the 
best solution to predict the highest and the lowest failure rates by assuming that aircraft 
consist of thirteen major systems (details see Appendix C). The aircraft system failure 
rate distribution, which is evaluated from these two linear regression equations firmly 
supports the 40: 70 portion of the Pareto principle. The highest and the lowest failure 
rate are given by: 
FR(100) =122.245 - 61.126 "H+2.299 Thrust + 0.0149. We + 0.00166 " Alt 
+125.517"NE-1.465"WQ, (4.3) 
FR(70) =90.896 - 1.806 "H-4.9641 " Thrust - 0.0197. We + 0.04018 " Alt 
- 232.866 " NE + 15.88 " Wa, (4.4) 
b=-0.8977117177 " (log {FR(70)} - log {FR(100)}) (4.5) 
where bis power variable in the Pareto distribution form. FR(100) is the predicted highest 
failure rate, and FR(70) is the predicted lowest failure rate. Failure rate is assumed to 
be constant for the remaining 60% of aircraft system. 
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Because the data used to develop the FR(100) and FR(70) were collected in 90's, 
they are not quite appropriate with the new design technology used in present aircraft. 
Therefore, a technology improvement factor has to be examined and be added into the 
equations. Serghides 1381 used the predicted system defect rate and the number of years 
measured from a reference date (1952) to the first flight of a prototype to develop the 
TIF for each aircraft system. But this method is too detailed and is not applicable to 
this design methodology, which expects a simple method to predict whole aircraft failure 
rate during the conceptual and/or preliminary design process. 
With regard to the decreasing trends of the new generation of combat aircraft in 
terms of both empty weight and failure rate (see Fig. 4.2), an alternative to the TIF 
development with these relationship may be possible and found as follows: 
Unmanned Aircraft 
Manned Aircraft 
We > 5000 kg, TIF = 1/3 
We < 5000 kg, TIF = 1/4 
We > 12000 kg, TIF = 1/2 
We < 12000 kg, TIF = 1/3 
The total aircraft failure rate collected after the year 1985 can thus be evaluated by the 
summation of thirteen aircraft system failure rates, which are calculated from distribution 
equations (see Eqn. (4.1) ): 
13 
FRA; rcraft = 
TIF "E FR(n) (4.6) 
n=1 
4.2 Maintainability Assessment 
Maintainability is defined as the inherent characteristic of an item related to its ability to 
be restored when the specified maintenance task is performed as required 1291. There are 
several possibilities to measure the maintainability; such as mean time to repair (MTTR), 
defect man-hour rate (DMHR), scheduled maintenance (SM) and so on. In this section, 
these major three maintainability measures, which relate directly to mission simulation, 
are described. 
4.2.1 Mean Time To Repair 
Knezevic [29] introduced methods to measure MTTR by using probability theory. This 
method can be used when aircraft maintainability function, which is a probability density 
4. Reliability & Maintainability 50 
function of aircraft MTTR, is known. If the number of aircraft systems (N) is known, 
the MTTR can be given by: 
co 
MTTR = f(t x m(t))dt (4.7) 
0 
where m(t) is the probability density function of maintainability. 
The only available maintainability data set N in the form of MTTR were examined 
with the Pareto distribution approach; it was found that MTTR followed approximately 
the 40: 60 relationship. This method can provide a probability density function in a form 
of a power expression. The possible methods to predict MTTRAjr... ft are: 
1. Using Pareto distribution as a probability density function of maintainability: 
N 




2. Using direct integration on Pareto distribution curve: 
N 
MTTRAircraft =J (MTTR(100) " nb)dn = 
MTT R(100) (N(1+b) _ 1) 
i 
3. Using Pareto principle 40: 60 portion: This method is similar to the above aircraft 
failure rate evaluation; the difference is that the portion of the total MTTR is given 
by a small number of aircraft systems. 
4. Using assumed value: Burleigh 1101 calculated MTTR,, f,,, = 1.53 hours from 
HAWK data and MTTRDa,,, o9e = 2.6 
hours from A-10 data. These two values 
are used as default assumed values throughout this research due to lack of main- 
tainability data in the form of MTTR. 
4.2.2 Scheduled Maintenance 
Woodford [53) presented a scheduled maintenance requirement for aircraft with the model 
taken from a paper by Harmon ["). The method predicts the scheduled inspection and 
maintenance effort requirements based on a systematic approach, and can be split into 
five discrete sections; pre-flight, post-flight, periodic (avionics), special (propulsion), and 
periodic (shop-propulsion). 
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Pre-flight: 




SMpost-Flight (1.2556 + 1.807772E -5" MA/c) X 0.99Yß52 (4.9) - 
V/-(l - MAT, Posit) 
Periodic (Avionics): 
SMAv; 
o,,; cs =(0.3266+2.06252E - 3. WV+2.41588E-3"ROAC)x0.98' 
2 (4.10) 
Special (Propulsion): 




s; o _ 
(0.1603 + 4.968525E -6" Ts, 'lax 
)x0.985YR52 (4.12) 
Total aircraft scheduled maintenance (SM): 
SM 
= 





These models are very simple because they are based mainly on mass and thrust. 
Unfortunately, there are paucity data available for scheduled maintenance; therefore, it is 
extremely difficult to check the accuracy of this model j53] . 
4.2.3 Unscheduled Maintenance 
With the same principles as aircraft failure rate prediction, an aircraft defect-man hour 
rate (DMHR) will be predicted. The 40: 70 ratio described in section 4.1.4 was again been 
observed. Due to the limited data avaiable [4,381 to develop models for DMHR(100), 
DMHR(70) and TIF, only two possible alternatives are examined and shown in this 
methodology, as follows: 
1. Combination between linear regression and Pareto distribution: This method uses 
the same principle, aircraft design parameters, and number of aircraft components 
4. Reliability & Maintainability 52 
assumption as the model for FR calculation. By using historical data [4,381, the 
DMHR equations can be given as: 
DMHR(100) = 4615.4050 - 230.2682. H+ 24.0820 " Thrust - 0.0501 " We 
- 0.2296 " Alt + 696.7274 " NE - 9.7865. Wa (4.14) 
DMHR(70) = 518.5990 - 19.6558. H-3.7209 " Thrust - 0.00054 " We 
- 0.02297 " Alt + 59.4110 " NE - 1.8700. WQ (4.15) 





DMHR(n) = DMHR(100) " nb (4.17) 
n=1 n=1 
2. Functionality of aircraft empty weight: From available maintainability data, two 
linear DMHR against aircraft empty weight traces were plotted. However, only 
two data sets are available, but the both trends of DMHR against empty weight 
can be clearly identified as shown in Fig. 4.4. Therefore, an average trend can be 
also used to predict general aircraft DMHR as: 
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16 
Figure 4.4: Defect man-hour rate as a function of aircraft empty weight 
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4.3 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has 
9 introduced a possible method to estimate aircraft reliability by using historical data 
with statistical analysis in the form of linear correlation and regression [38]. 
" shown a possible method to estimate aircraft reliability by using Pareto distribu- 
tion [11 
" presented a developed alternative model to predict aircraft failure rates by combining 
the above mentioned two models with consideration of technology improvement 
factors. 
" shown a very simple model to estimate aircraft failure rate as a function of its empty 
weight. 
" presented three alternative measures of maintainability; i. e. MTTR, Scheduled and 
Unscheduled maintenance. 
" shown alternative models to predict these three measures. 
CHAPTER 5 
LIFE CYCLE COST ESTIMATION 
This methodology attempts to integrate an operational cost analysis into the early design 
stage by dint of using mission simulation, taking aircraft mission requirement into account. 
However, there are some unpredictable parameters during aircraft design processes; such 
as threat performance, military readiness requirement, and mission strategy and so on. 
The accurate operation cost is therefore more difficult to predict. An alternative to 
evaluate this value is reversed calculation from aircraft Life Cycle Cost (LCC). 
There are numerous number of studies and bodies of research to model LCC, which 
differ in the details that they consider [11,25,37,45,46,531 . However, LCC can generally 
be 
split into five main sections; i. e. Research, Development, Test and Evaluation; Production; 






+ CGSE&IS + Coperation + CDisposat 
`5.1) 
The model used in this methodology is based on the model from Woodford [531, which 
can predict aircraft LCC mainly during the peacetime operation. The operation cost in 
LCC includes all costs, which can occur during aircraft life time. Therefore, the total 
operational cost per flying hour, which include operation, personnel, support and main- 
tenance cost per flying hour, can be evaluated. Additionally, an aircraft lost cost and 
weapon expense during a mission from a mission simulation module will be added up to 
estimate the total mission operational cost (details see section 5.6). 
Because of variation in inflation and foreign currency values, price can fluctuate ac- 
cording to local economic condition. Therefore, LCC will be simply represented as a 
`then-year' value, which is defined as a constant base year dollar value including the ef- 
fects of inflation or escalation, and/or reflect the price levels expected to prevail during 
the year of issue [15,31]. To include this inflation in the life cycle cost estimation, the Con- 
sumer Price Index (CPI) is integrated into most equations. The CPI has been normalised 
to 1983 dollars, with regard to the definition given by the U. S. Department of Labor, 
Bureau of the Labor Statistics ["). 
54 
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Figure 5.1: Consumer Price Index, 1983 = 1.00 
Fig. 5.1 shows the average CPI from 1978 to 2003 published monthly by the United 
States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labour Statistics [491, which can be simply mod- 
elled as a linear equation as: 
CPI = 0.0434(YRACC - 1983) - 85.114 (5.2) 
In this chapter, the principle method to predict an operational cost used in mission 
simulation will be introduced. Complete calculation methods and results are described in 
Appendix D. 
5.1 Research, Development, Test 4 Evaluation Cost 
The Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) cost covers all areas of research 
and development prior to full-scale production of the aircraft. This cost typically makes 
up about 15-20% of the LCC of modern, low-production combat aircraft, and is obviously 
affected by the number of aircraft over which this cost can be amortised. 
The model of RDT&E cost estimation is based on Burns Lill and Birkler [8] with vali- 
dation by Woodford [531. This method breaks the RDT&E cost into airframe development 
cost, engine development cost, and avionics development cost. These procedures obtain 
many different activities, and can thus be thought of as a `Activity-Based Costing' pro- 
cedure, which are calculated as an effort quantity (hours) and will be multiplied with the 
labour rates to estimate these costs (for the full model see Appendix D). 
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5.1.1 Airframe Development Cost 
There are several activities to complete an airframe development. Each activity cost 
depends on its effort quantity (hours) and labour rate as follows: 
1. Engineering cost for the airframe development can be estimated as a function of 
airframe unit weight, maximum true velocity, number of developed aircraft, number 
of partners, percentage of advanced material usage and also engineering labour rate. 
2. During the airframe development, all development support attributed to engineering 
cost can be evaluated as a function of airframe unit weight, maximum true velocity, 
number of developed aircraft, consumer price index, security factor and number of 
partner. 
3. Flight testing cost includes all costs incurred by the aircraft manufacturer to com- 
plete flight testing, except the cost of the production of the flight test aircraft. This 
cost can be estimated as a function of airframe unit mass, maximum true velocity, 
number of developed aircraft, consumer price index, security factor and advanced 
technology testing factor. 
4. Tooling cost mainly depends on the aircraft production rate, high production rates 
result in higher tooling cost. This cost also depends on airframe unit mass, maximum 
true velocity, number of developed aircraft, number of partners, and tooling labour 
rate. 
5. Development manufacturing labour cost includes all costs necessary for machin- 
ing, fabricating, assembly of the major structure, installation of purchased parts, 
government furnished equipment, and subcontractor assemblies and components. 
6. Manufacturing material and equipment cost is based on the low-observable features 
usages, this cost excludes engines and avionics. 
5.1.2 Engine Development Cost 
The engine development cost estimation methodology is based on the model developed 
by Birkler [8) and validated by Woodford [53]. This model can estimate the engine devel- 
opment cost before entry into service as a function of engine sea-level static gross thrust, 
mach number for supersonic design, and the maximum turbine inlet temperature. 
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However the cost of the engines for the development aircraft can be estimated dif- 
ferently. Mr. P. Pugh, formerly of the Directorate Project, Time, and Cost Analysis 
(DPTCAn), a division of the Ministry of Defence, suggested that production engine cost 
is an approximately 75% of the development engine cost. With the number of engines 
purchased for the RDT&E, depending on the number of test aircraft and the number of 
engines per aircraft, the total cost of engine for development aircraft can be found. 
5.1.3 Avionics Development Cost 
The avionics development cost estimation is contrary to the other development cost esti- 
mation because development and production cost of individual avionics systems are more 
dependent on the performance of that particular system, which is not measured in aircraft 
design terms. 
An alternative model to estimate avionics cost model is based on the uninstalled 
avionics mass, which is approximated 90% of the total avionics mass [11,461 
5.2 Production Cost 
Production cost is typically about 45-50% of the total LCC of modern combat aircraft, 
and also includes production engineering design, production investment (manufacturing 
facilities, tooling, jigs and fixtures), manufacturing labour, quality control, material and 
equipment, profit, overheads, administration, and purchasing of engines and avionics sys- 
tems. This cost per aircraft decreases with the number of aircraft built, as learning curve 
theory and economies of scale are applied [541 
Most estimation models for the production cost, except engine production cost, are 
similar to the model of RDT&E cost estimation, only they use both total number of 
developed aircraft and total number of production aircraft instead of number of just 
developed aircraft. 
5.3 Ground Support Equipment and Initial Spares 
The Ground Support Equipment and Initial Spares (GSE&IS) cost is very difficult to esti- 
mate, but with suggestions made by several members of the costing community, GSE&IS 
cost is simply set to 10% of the aircraft recurring flyaway cost [53], which is equivalent to 
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the total production cost divided by number of production aircraft. This gives approxi- 
mately 5% of total LCC. 
5.4 Operation and Support 
The operation and support (0&S) cost is the biggest portion of the total LCC and the 
most relevant to this design methodology. O&S costs for modern combat aircraft can be 
split into several major parts as follows: 
5.4.1 Personnel Cost 
Personnel costs depends on the number of officers, enlisted staffs, and civilian personnel 
in the first and second lines operation, and in support. The number of the first line 
operation personnel depends mainly on the scheduled maintenance, number of operational 
aircraft, and annual flying hours. On the other hand, the number of the second line 
operation personnel, which consists of officers, enlisted and civilian personnel, depends 
on unscheduled maintenance, DIvIHR (for details see chapter 4). This cost also includes 
the personnel cost for the service allowances, personnel support and training 
5.4.2 Unit Level Consumption 
This cost attempts to include all costs for consumables used in maintaining the aircraft, 
maintenance materials, miscellaneous support supplies, depot level repares, and tempo- 
rary additional duty. The unit level consumption estimation model can be divided into 
eight main categories as follows: 
1. Annual used fuel cost. 
2. The cost of other petroleum, oil and lubricants. 
3. Maintenance material cost. 
4. Miscellaneous support supply. 
5. Depot level repares. 
6. Temporary additional duty. 
7. Transport. 
8. Other. 
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5.4.3 Contracts 
This cost has been modified to calculate an annual contract value, rather than using the 
work-breakdown approach like the one for first and second line maintenance [531. This 
cost consists of the three main aircraft systems; i. e. airframe, propulsion, and avionics 
and supplies. 
5.4.4 Sustaining Support Cost and Installation Support Funds 
This cost includes the replacement support equipment cost; cost of modification kit pro- 
curement; sustaining engineering support; and cost incurred by the personnel pay and 
allowance, material, and utilities needed for the maintenance of the base. 
Normally an aircraft will be operated for a life of approximately 20 - 30 years. However, 
the summation of all of the previously calculated costs is an approximate expense only for 
one year of operation and support in the form of `then year' dollars (or `accounting-year' 
dollars). Therefore, the economic discount rate (RED) at 6% per annum has to be added 
for each year of operation and support. This rate is used for the majority of government 
[531 projects 
5.5 Disposal 
The disposal cost consists of disassembly labour, disposal of non-reusable material, sale 
of scrap material, and resale of on-board equipment. Depending on the relative values of 
these different components, the total disposal figure could be positive (cost), or negative 
(credit). 
The chosen model used in this methodology, developed by Woodford L53I is to add the 
estimated cost of labour to dismantle the aircraft, the cost of disposing of the non-reusable 
items, and subtract the value of the reusable items. The resale of systems is thought to 
be unlikely for the moment, as technology in these areas changes so quickly; the value of 
these items has been neglected. 
Total aircraft LCC can be calculated as the summation of the above mentioned costs 
as Eqn. 5.1 shows. Fig. 5.2 - 5.3 shows the results of LCC estimation of the U-99 aircraft 
during peacetime and wartime operations. 
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5.6 Mission Operational Cost 
The mission operational cost depends mainly on mission scenario, i. e. wartime or peace- 
time. As described above, the model used to estimate aircraft LCC in this methodology is 
based on peacetime operations; therefore, some maintenance costs will be deducted from 
total O&S cost during wartime operations. The weapon expense and aircraft lost cost 
will be included into the operation & support cost during wartime operations instead. 
5.6.1 Operational Cost during Peacetime Operations 
In peacetime operations, aircraft will be well maintained subject to high mission readiness. 
In this case, the entire four maintenance lines in Woodford's [531 model are included to 
predict the total operation & support cost. But the predicted total cost is an approximate 
operation & support expense for the entire aircraft life; therefore, an average O&S cost 
per aircraft per flying hour can be given as: 
COperation = 
COperation (5.3) 
Nope, ation " 
TLIFE " FHY 
Hence, the total mission operational cost during peacetime operation in this method- 






5.6.2 Operation Cost during Wartime Operations 
On the other hand, for the calculation of 0&S cost during a wartime scenario in this 
mission simulation, the third and the forth line maintenance (contract cost) will be omit- 
ted. Additionally, expense of weapons and aircraft lost will be taken into account instead. 











Therefore, the total mission operational cost in wartime scenario in mission simulation 
can be given as: 
NOperotion 
CAfieaion 
-C eapon ,N Veapon 
+ VFIVaway * =YLost +C Aeration 
FHi (5.6) 
i=1 
where CopCTaLjOT is an average operational cost per aircraft per flying hour in wartime, 
which can be estimated as shown in Eqn. (5.3). Ntiv,,, p, 1, is the number of released 
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weapons in a mission simulation and NLost is the number of aircraft lost during the same 
simulation. 
5.6.3 Measure of Operational Cost 
As described above, an operational cost includes all expenses, which occur during mission 
simulation. There is lots of information hidden in this cost, which can be linked and be 
used in conjunction with aircraft MOPs for specified design aspects. For instance, the 
total maintenance cost during the mission simulation can be linked with aircraft MOPs 
in reliability & maintainability in the form of FR, DMHR, and SM. The explanation 
is that FR directly affects the number of maintenance aircraft in a mission simulation; 
and maintenance cost is also a function of aircraft DMHR and SM (for the complete 
equation see Appendix C). 
From the aircraft life cycle cost estimation, the following cost can be broken down and 
may be used in this methodology to measure aircraft operational cost effectiveness. 
1. Operational maintenance cost: This cost covers all consumables used in maintaining 
the operational aircraft throughout the simulation excluding fuel, petroleum, oil, 
and lubricant. The operational maintenance cost per aircraft per flying hour can be 
estimated from following equation: 
(CUnit 
- vFuet)(1- DEF) (5.7) C°'aintenan`e 
RED " NO TLIFE " FHY peration 
DEF =(1 + RED) -TLIFE (5.8) 
2. Flyaway cost: This cost is used to indicate the average expense to build an aircraft, 
which can be estimated as: 
CPROD CFlvaway - 
NPROD 
3. Mission operational cost: This cost includes all expenses occurring in the mission 
simulation, which covers released weapon cost and aircraft lost cost. 




CFil - CAfission (5.10) 
NFN '"Operation 
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5. Cost[$] / Target: This cost is one of the main objectives of this research, by cal- 
culating a ratio between all expenses occurring in the mission simulation and the 
number of targets killed (`Bang per Buck') 
_ CTarget - 
CAfission 
NiCitt 
6. Cost[$] / Sortie: This cost can be used to indicate how much every take-off will 
cost. 
= 
CAlission /C yrý CSortie NTake-off `J, 1G 
7. Cost[$] / Successful Sortie: This cost shows an average cost for each sortie, in which 
an aircraft releases a weapon and returns to base, regardless of whether the target 
is damaged or destroyed. 
CSuccessfulSortie _ 
Cdlisaion 
NSuccesa f ulSorties 
(5.13) 
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5.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has 
65 
" introduced a model to integrate the aircraft life cycle cost estimation into a concep- 
tual/preliminary design process. 
" shown an alternative to convert part of LCC to mission operational cost during an 
early design stage. 
" presented measures of aircraft operational-cost effectiveness in this design method- 
ology. 
CHAPTER 6 
OPERATION MISSION SIMULATION 
Due to the fact that the environment of a real mission is far too complex. Therefore, 
a simulation is used as a tool to examine the relationships between aircraft design as- 
pects and to predict mission and operation measures of performance and effectiveness in 
the designed aircraft operational environments. Some constraints, assumptions and also 
definitions of the simulation are described here in this chapter. 
6.1 Threat Analysis 
From statistical data from the Gulf War in 1991, only 14 aircraft from over 923 USAF 
combat aircraft were lost. There were all lost to ground-based air defense, and none were 
lost in air-to-air combat [20,351 Therefore, the two major weapon types examined and 
considered within the mission operation simulation in this study are anti-aircraft artillery 
(AAA), which are represented by nonexplosive penetrator or contacted warheads, and 
surface to air missile (SAM), which are represented by proximity warheads. 
6.1.1 Nonexplosive Penetrator or Contacted Warhead 
In this study, the nonexplosive penetrator or contacted warhead represents the threat 
posed by bullets or cannon sizes from 14.5 - 57.0 mm. These threat types can be 
anti-aircraft self-propelled, towed and machine guns; such as ZPU-series 14.5-mm towed 
anti-aircraft guns, ZSU-57-2 self-propelled anti-aircraft gun systems, and ZSU 23-4 self- 
propelled anti-aircraft guns. The maximum altitude of the shell when fired in the anti-air 
[ role for these systems can be up to 15000 in depending on their caliber size 2Gj. 
Kill methodology for this threat type is to penetrate along the shotline through the 
aircraft from one side to another side. Aircraft components, which are on this shotline, will 
not be functional regardless of their kill level. But in this simulation, the contemplation 
of timescale during a sortie is not a relevant issue; therefore, every kill level given to an 
aircraft component will be considered as an immediate kill in that flight phase. 
Because of high revolution rate of automatic machine guns installed in these systems, 
66 
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an aircraft will probably encounter several shots, even if the aircraft flies through this 
defense system in a short period. By assuming that the shots keep constant direction and 
parallel with each other, and attack perpendicular to aircraft view, the probability of kill 
by this threat type will be estimated via Markov matrix with random numbers of hits. 
6.1.2 Proximity Warhead 
The surface to air missile represents a proximity warhead in this mission simulation. 
This threat system can be deployed from fixed installations or mobile launchers, their 
tracking and guidance system may use radar, infrared, or laser. High explosive warheads 
with internally grooved fragmentation can be proximity, contact and also command fused. 
Target initial detection range depends on the frequency of the installed radar system. 
Kill mechanism for this kind of threat can be given as: 
1. Explosion inside aircraft or on contact with aircraft: In this case, detonation occurs 
immediately or shortly after warhead impacting target. The results are detonation 
on or inside the aircraft with the accompanying blast and fragment spray in many 
directions. To predict this kill method exceeds the scope of this study. 
2. Blast: The missile explodes its warhead outside the target within explosion distance. 
In most externally detonating warheads the blast is a secondary damage mechanism, 
which will be neglected in this study. 
3. Fragments: After warhead detonation, internal fragments will spread around the 
warhead within the fragment spray zone (see Chapter 3). Fragments can also be 
treated as penetrators with the assumption of uniform constant direction and ve- 
locity. The number of fragment hits depends on the detonation distance and target 
presented area. 
As described above, in this mission simulation, blast effect will be neglected and the 
SAM is always assumed to be proximity fused with random detonation distance. The kill 
methodology of this threat type can be converted into multiple hits by fragments, and its 
kill probability can be also determined as the same principle using the multiple hits by 
penetrators. 
Probability of encounter by one threat type is a ratio of the number of single types 
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of weapon to the number of aircraft flying throughout the mission. In this mission simu- 
lation the probability of encounter by penetrator (Epcnetrator) and by proximity warhead 




Military aircraft are designed to execute one or more roles; but each category needs 
specific performance to complete every particular task during the mission. Generally, 
military missions can be divided into two main categories: tactical and strategic combat; 
and combat support mission. 
Tactical and strategic combat mission has been chosen for this design methodology 
concept with several alternative missions studied; such as combat patrol, air superiority, 
and escort. Finally, bombing mission has been selected to be the primary mission due to 
the case study aircraft (U-99) specification used. The flowcharts of studied missions are 
shown in Appendix E. 
The bombing mission used in this mission simulation using the U-99 specification [40,41) 
can be described as: 
" There are five main flight phases in a sortie; Pre-Flight, Outbound, Attack or Pen- 
etration, Inbound, and Post-Flight phase. 
9 Outbound and Inbound phases include a cruise segment of 750 nm or 1389 km with 
a cruise speed of Mach 0.78 at 40000 ft or 12192 m. 
" U-99 releases its weapon during the attack or penetration phase at 25000 ft or 7620 
m with 1.5 turn. 
9 Take-off and landing distance should be less than 3500 ft or 1066.8 m. 
" The weapon carried is a Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) which is installed 
in the weapons bay above the main fuel tank. Its weight is approximately 454 kg. 
Therefore, U-99 has to fly upside down before releasing its weapon during the attack 
phase and turn back over afterwards. 
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6.3 Operation Simulation Concept 
Burleigh [101 showed a simple methodology to predict combat aircraft mission readiness by 
using approximated default values of aircraft reliability, maintainability and survivability 
in mission simulation. His method used all parameters as average constants throughout 
the simulation. Number of sorties flown, aircraft kills and so on, can hence be calculated 
by multiplying those values and the total number of aircraft, operation days, sorties per 
day and so on. 
For instance, the number of aircraft kills at the end of the operation day is a summation 
of the total aircraft kills in each sortie, which is a result of the multiplication of the 
probability of attrition and the number of available aircraft in that sortie as: 
sorties per day 
NAIC kill = 
(PsiNAvailable in itli sortie) 
i=1 
where Psl is an average constant attrition probability. 
From the above equation, the number of aircraft kills in ith sortie become a floating 
point value, but his model need only the integer number. Hence, this number has to be 
revalued by ignoring the floating point numbers. 
An alternative to evaluate the number of available aircraft is to use separate time 
clock for each aircraft and its system component to identify when the component and/or 
aircraft obtains failure status during the simulation 111. By this method, each aircraft will 
launch, be repaired, or be in maintenance separately depending on Mean Time To Repair 
(MTTR) and Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF). 
Systcm I System 2 Systcm 3 .......... Systcm n 
Figure 6.1: Time clock for each aircraft t'1 
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Another possible method used to evaluate the number of sorties flown during the 
mission, is reliability block diagram analysis. This method will evaluate the event success 
probability, such as the success probability of each flight phase, of maintenance, of aborting 
the mission and of failure [17]. The number of aircraft, which can get through preflight 
phase, is defined as the number of sorties flown by individual aircraft. At the end of 
operational day, the total number of sorties flown in that operational day is the summation 
of all the sorties flown in that operational day. The summation of the total sorties flown in 
every operational day throughout the mission simulation gives the total number of sorties 
flown in the mission simulation. 
On the other hand, the number of complete sorties is defined as the number of aircraft 
which returns to their own base after a sortie, in an operational day, or in the mission 
simulation. Another measure related to sorties in this study is the successful sorties, 
which has a similar definition to the complete sortie. The difference between complete 
and successful sorties is that aircraft achieving a successful sortie have released their 
weapons during the penetration phase and returned to their own base. Such numbers can 
be used to measure an aircraft operational effectiveness. 
NO Increase No. of 
Stop Missi Dey < 
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t auto File for each 
craft and Sortie 
Information Pre[Lght Phase 
Outbound Phase 
Attack Phase F<->-l Enemy Encounter 
Inbound Phase 
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( Mainton nee Base ) 
Figure 6.2: Flowchart for Operation Mission Simulation Module 
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Because most aircraft measures of performance and effectiveness are in the form of 
probability values, the Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) with the event trees is an al- 
ternative to predict such numbers of sorties flown, complete sorties, successful sorties, 
targets killed and so on. The fundamental of RBD and event trees calculation has been 
explained in Appendix A. This method decides that an event can occur if the occurrence 
value is greater than or equal to the probability of the specific event, which can be added 
and subtracted depending on its event tree diagram. 
By using this method, each aircraft will obtain a different random value in each flight 
phase to compare with the flight phase success probability, which will be explained in a 
later section. Integer numbers which indicate how many aircraft have or have not achieved 
an event are recorded and passed to the subsequent events. This procedure will continue 
until the aircraft completes the sortie and the mission. A similar principle has been used 
to predict the following values: 
Table 6.1: Predicted value per sortie from mission simulation module 
Value Calculation method 
Number of sorties flown Number of aircraft which achieve pre-flight phase suc- 
cessfully. 
Number of complete sorties Number of aircraft which can approach post-flight phase 
by following sortie route. 
Number of successful sorties Number of aircraft which achieve complete sortie and 
release their weapon during attack phase. 
Number aircraft in mainte- Number of aircraft which still remain in maintenance in 
nance post-flight phase. 
Number of killed aircraft Number of aircraft which obtains event probability 
greater than or equal to kill event in flight phase. 
Number of available aircraft Number of total aircraft deducted by Number of killed 
aircraft. 
Number of targets detected Number of weapons which are released during the attack 
phase due to assumption of using smart bomb. 
Number of targets killed Number of targets which obtain random value greater 
than the default target kill probability. 
Table 6.1 shows the concept of how to predict an integer number of specific aircraft, 
sorties, and targets in each sortie, which can be added up at the end of the operational 
day and entire mission to obtain the total results for the operational days and the mission. 
For instance, total number of sorties flown for the entire mission of m operational day, 
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and k sorties per day can be calculated as: 
m operation day 
NTotal 
sorties flown -)1 VTotal sorties flown in i day 
i=1 
m operation day k sortie per day 
i=1 j=1 
NTotat 
sorties flown of j sortie in i day 
6.4 Success Probability Assessment 
To evaluate final successful event probability, every opportunity which can possibly occur 
during this event has to be drawn and linked together regarding their logical consequence 
(RBD), an example has been shown in Fig. 6.3. Together with the logical `AND', `OR' and 
`NOT' combination (RBD) and the event trees diagram, the final successful probability 
value can be evaluated. All possible occurrences, their definitions, and their logistical 
combinations can be described as: 
1. System failure: This can happen due to either defect arising rate in every flying hour, 
which is assumed as 10% of total aircraft failure rate, or damage rate from being 
attacked in previous flight phase. By using RBD parallel connection (logical `OR' 
combination), these two possible events can be combined together. The probability 
calculation from the new combined event can be evaluated as Eqn. (6.1). If an 
aircraft achieves this occurrence, mission abort status has to be called with the 








2. System not failure: This occasion is the opposite of system failure. The probability 
value can be evaluate by using logical `NOT' combination. 
1 
System not failure =1-1 Sy3tent failure 
(6.2) 
3. Survive: This occasion can occur if an aircraft achieves the `system not failure' 
occurrence. For survival probability itself, an aircraft has to survive all encounters 
occurring during this flight phase, which includes several SAM and AAA threats 
(details see chapter 3). The combination of more encounters and `system not fail- 
ure' events can be linked together as the RBD series combination (logical `AND' 
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combination). The survive event probability value can be thus calculated as: 
PSurvive 
-l System not failure 
X 'Survive all encounters (6.3) 
4. Not survive: This is the opposite from `survive' occurrence, and the number of 
aircraft, which achieves this occurrence, will obtain status `KILL' and be added. to 
the number of killed aircraft. 
PNot 
survive =1 System not failure 
X `1 -j Survive) (6.4) 
5. Damage: This occurrence will happen if the aircraft gets through `survive' occur- 
rence; but it has been shot and obtains component damaged. The damage value 
will be randomly generated and be added into the aircraft damage rate. 
PDamage =1 Survive XP Damage rate (6.5) 
6. No damage: An aircraft achieves this either by not being hit or by being hit but 
not being damaged. 
PNone 
damage =" Survive 
X (1 -+ Dantage) (6.6) 
7. Mission abort: This will occurs if the aircraft gets damaged with a certain damage 
rating, which causes the aircraft to return for repair. The probability of abort 
mission in each event is assumed constant as 0.38% for this mission simulation. 
'Mission 
abort 
=P Damage XP Abort (6.7) 
8. Mission not aborted or Continue: This possibility is the second alternative to con- 
tinue a sortie, even if an aircraft gets damaged but it is still functional and able to 
complete the designed mission. 
PJlfission 
not abort 
= l-Damage X 
(1 
-j ltfis ion abort) (6.8) 
9. Maintenance: An aircraft will still stay in the `maintenance' event if the aircraft 











Afnintenance against mission abort 
PJlfaintenance = PAfaintenance against damage X PAtaintenancc against mission abort 
(6.11) 
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10. Successful flight phase: This probability value is a summation of all possibility 
probable value that allow the mission to continue except for post-flight phase, which 
concerns only the probability that an aircraft will be available for the next sortie. 
(see an example in Fig. 6.3) 
PSýicre"ssfv, 






11. Unsuccessful flight phase: This is the opposite to the above occurrence. 
P(lrrsurrr. 








flight pho. r 
(6.13) 
In every flight phase in this mission simulation, a similar sequence of occurrences is 
obtained. Fig. 6.3 shows an example of the event tree diagram to evaluate the successful 
inbound phase probability value. 
Figure 6.3: Reliability Block Diagram for Inbound phase success probability calcula. tioii 
6.5 Monte Carlo Simulation Technique 
Klonte Carlo simulation methods are stochastic techniques, which means that they are 
based on the use of random numbers and probability statistics to investigate problems. 
This method provides approximate solutions with tolerance errors ["I 
There are several methods to use Monte Carlo simulation technique to predict solutions 
to the problem, but one of these is to use a random value to compare with the event 
Inbound Rate =I . Damage +1 -Abort 
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probability to decide which event will occur. The number of occurring events will be 
recorded and statistically analysed. After a certain number of trials, the probability 
distribution of an event occurring can thus be plotted similar to the graph shown in 
Fig. 6.5. 
The principle of using Monte Carlo simulation technique with Reliability Block Dia- 
gram is that every possible occurrence in each flight phase in this mission simulation has 
to be examined and calculated regarding its event tree diagram. These values can be used 
to compare with the generated random value to determine which event an aircraft will 
achieve. For example every occurrence probability in outbound phase can be evaluated 
and shown as in Fig. 6.4. If the generated random value is 0.123, an aircraft will be 
killed. On the other hand, if the generated random value is 0.345, the aircraft will achieve 
successful outbound phase and will continue to post-flight phase. 
Unsuccessful Occurrence Successful Occurrence 
NOT SURVIVE SYSTEM FAILURE MISSION ABORT MISSION NOT ABORT NONE DAMAGE 
0.1443 0.147538 0.150776 4' 0.5751 
0.00 1.00 
Random Value - 0.123 Random Value . 0.345 
Aircraft being killed Aircraft complete flight phase 









'ýh N-b 0 f. a bo o. rip 9, - 'g, tio$ titia tip, 
) <tt 1'ßa 
Successful Sorties 
Figure 6.5: Normal curve of successful sorties after 20000 trials 
The number of specific aircraft, target, and sorties can be thus evaluated by summation 
of the number of aircraft and targets in specific categories. For instance, the number of 
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aircraft which achieve successful pre-flight occurrence can be used as the number flown 
in that sortie, and will give the total sorties flown in the operation day and the entire 
mission. 
With this principle, every flight phase will generate a random value to predict which 
occurrence of event tree diagram will occur. The specific number of sorties, aircraft, and 
targets can be calculated at the end of each simulation run. After a certain number of 
simulation runs or trials, statistical analysis of specific integer objective values can be 
processed as shown in Fig. 6.5. The mean and mode values from the analysis can be thus 
represented as the result of mission simulation [32J 
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6.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has 
" analysed specific threats used in this mission simulation. 
" examined and classified a bombing mission to simulate mission model for this study. 
" introduced a simple method to predict the total number of specific sorties, aircraft 
and targets by using directly probability and separate clock time. 
" described another alternative to predict the total number of specific sorties, aircraft, 
and targets by using RBD with event trees. 
" shown all possible occurrences in each flight phase in a sortie. 
" examined the successful and unsuccessful flight phase probability values, which are 
used to predict the numbers of specific sorties, aircraft, and targets. 
9 introduced Monte Carlo simulation technique to predict integer number results for 
this mission simulation. 
CHAPTER 7 
OPTIMISATION METHODS 
This chapter introduces two major optimisation methods used in this research; Gradient- 
based method and Genetic algorithms. The first method is commonly used to solve 
engineering problems; but it is not perfectly appropriate with the problem in this research 
due to the use of objective values in the form of integers. However, the gradient-based 
method can be used to guide variable trends and approximate objective values. On the 
other hand, the genetic algorithms do not use any gradient or partial differentials to 
search for the local/global minimum/maximum, but instead uses the objective value of 
a particular variable set to measure how good this variable is, compared to the other 
variable set. 
The first optimisation tool is an evaluation version of a commercial product, which can 
be of limited use. However, this version is still sufficient for the problem in this research. 
On the other hand, the second optimisation tool is freeware, and provides source code 
for future development. Nevertheless, no development was performed on the optimisation 
during this research, as the basic codes are sufficient. 
7.1 Gradient-based Method 
This method is commonly used to minimise or maximise the objective function in engi- 
neering and science. The fundamental principle of the gradient-based approach is used to 
predict the direction in which the search for the minimum/maximum objective function 
should proceed by using the first derivatives of the objective function and constraints with 
respect to the vector of the aircraft design variables. 
Because some objective values in this study are integer numbers, the gradient-based 
method can therefore cause particular problems or difficulties to find local and global 
minimum/maximum as the differential of a function with respect to the relevant variable 
will obtain a value constant of zero. 
The Solver DLL from Frontline Systems Ltd. [21) has been chosen because of the 
following reasons: 
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1. The company also provides an evaluation version, which can be downloaded free 
from the internet. 
2. A limit of the evaluation version is the maximum of ten variables that can be used; 
however, this number is sufficient to solve the problem in this study. 
3. This program can handle almost all possible problems, such as linear, quadratic, 
nonlinear, and nonsmooth. 
7.2 Genetic Algorithms 
Goldberg [221 introduced simple genetic algorithms as a search for best fit algorithms based 
on the mechanics of natural selection and natural genetics. They combine survival of the 
fittest among string structures with a structured yet randomised information exchange, 
to form a search algorithm with some of the innovative flair of a human search. In every 
generation, a new set of artificial creatures is created using bits and pieces of the fittest 
of the old; an occasional new part is tried for good measure. While randomised, genetic 
algorithms are no simple random walk. They efficiently exploit historical information to 
speculate on new search points with expected improved performance. The principles of 
this method are follows: 
1. Defining a representation: A single solution of the problem has to be represented as 
a single data structure (Genome). The population of solutions based on this data 
structure will be created depending on representation type. 
2. Defining genetic operator: The genetic algorithm will define how the population 
evolution takes place. 
3. Fitness scaling: An objective function will be used to determine how fit each genome 
is for survival. 
4. Selection/replacement: The genome operator uses selection/replacement strategies 
to generate new individuals. 
A typical genetic algorithm stop criteria is a number of generations, for which an 
optimiser should run. However, there are alternative stop criteria, such as measure of 
goodness of best solution, and convergence of population [50] 
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Figure 7.1: Flowchart of genetic algorithm 
Defining a Representation 
It is necessary to use a data structure which is appropriate for the problem because the 
representation has to be able to represent any solution to the problem. The number of 
possible representations is endless. These may be in purely numerical representation such 
as an array of real numbers or in Goldberg style, of a string of bits that map to a real 
number. 
Genome Operators 
Each genome has three primary operators: Initialisation, mutation, and crossover. With 
these operators, the populations will be created and evolved throughout the optimisation 
process as follows: 
1. The initialisation operator determines how the genome is initialised by stuffing the 
genomes with the primordial genetic material from which all solutions will evolve. 
2. The Mutation operators define the procedure for mutating each genome mutation, 
which means here different things for different data types. These should be able to 
introduce new genetic material as well as modify existing material. For example, a 
typical mutation for a binary string genome is flipping the bits in the string with a 
given probability. 
3. The crossover operator defines the procedure for generating a child from two par- 
ent genomes. Similar to mutation, crossover is specific to the data type, but it 
involves multiple genomes. The traditional crossover generates two children from 
two parents. 
4. The objective function has to be defined, and is used to evaluate genoffnes. Therefore, 
the genetic algorithm can determine which individuals are better than others. 
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Figure 7.2: Example of mutation and crossover methods [501 
The Population Object 
The population object is a container of genonies, and each genonie object has its own 
initialiser and evaluator for each individual in the population. It also keeps track of the 
best, average, derivation, and so on for the population. In this object, mating method 
and algorithm have to be defined. 
Each population object has a scaling scheme objective associate with it. The scaling 
scheme object converts the objective score of each genome to a fitness score that the 
genetic algorithm uses for selection. 
Objective Functions and Fitness Scaling 
This is the major difference between genetic algorithms and gradient-based methods. 
Genetic algoritlinis require only a single measure of how good a single individual is, 
compared to the other individuals, which is provided by objective function. Gradient- 
based methods use complicated differential equations or a smooth search score. 
The objective score is the value calculated directly from the objective function; it 
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is raw performance evaluation of a genome. The fitness score, on the other hand, is 
a possibly-transformed rating used by the genetic algorithm to determine the fitness of 
individuals for mating. Typical fitness scores can be obtained by a linear scaling of the 
raw objective scores. 
7.2.1 GAlib Optimisation Tools 
A freeware C++ library, named GAlib, has been chosen. This library has been developed 
at Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1501. Its source code can be downloaded directly 
from the internet. 
This library includes tools for using genetic algorithms to do optimisation in any C++ 
program by using any representation and any genetic operators. In this section, the major 
classes and functions used in this research are described. 
Class GAGeneticAlgorithm 
This is a base class of genetic algorithms, which keep track of evolution statistics such as 
number of mutations, number of crossovers, number of evaluations, best/mean/worst in 
each generation, and initial/current population statistics. It also defines the terminator, 
a number function that specifies the stopping criterion for the algorithm. 
The `evolve' member function first calls `initialize', then calls the `step' member func- 
tion until the `done' member function returns `gaTrue'. 
Class GASimpleGA 
This class is based on GAGeneticAlgorithm, and uses non-overlapping populations method 
to clone the individuals for its own population. This simple genetic algorithm creates an 
initial population by cloning the individual or population, which has been passed when 
this is created. Each generation the algorithm creates an entirely new population of 
individuals by selecting from the previous population then mating to produce the new 
offspring for the new population. This process continues until the stopping criteria are 
met. 
Elitism is chosen by passing `gaTrue' value into `elitism' member function, so the best 
individual from each generation is carried over to the next generation. 
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Function Terminators 
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The `done' member function simply calls the `completion' function to determine whether 
or not the genetic algorithm should continue. The `completion' function returns `gaTrue' 
when the genetic algorithm should finish, and `gaFalse' when the genetic algorithm should 
continue. 
The number of generation stopping criteria is set by default, in which the function 
compares the current generation to the specified number of generations. If the current 
generation is less than the requested number of generation, it returns `gaFalse'. Alter- 
native of stopping criteria is convergence of best individual scores, in which the function 
compares the population average to the score of the best individual in the population. If 
the population average is within `pConvergence' of the best individual's score, it return 
'gaTrue'. 
Class GAGenome 
The genome is a virtual base class. It defines a number of constants and function proto- 
types specific to the genome and its derived classes. 
The `score' member function returns the objective score of the genome using the 
objective function assigned to the genome. 
Class GABin2DecGenome 
This genome class converts binary strings to decimal values. Before using this genome, a 
mapping of bits to a decimal value has to be created by specifying how many bits will be 
used to represent the designed bounded numbers. 
The `phenotype' member function can get or set the mapping from binary to decimal 
numbers. 
Class GABin2DecPhenotype 
This class defines the mapping from binary to decimal values by using `add' member 
function to create a mapping that tells the `phenotype' that n bits should be used to 
represent a floating point number from given minimum and maximum values. 
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GAStatistics 
The statistics object contains information about the current state of the genetic algorithm 
objects. `BestIndividual' member function returns the best individual encountered by the 
genetic algorithm, which can be used for future analysis. 
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7.3 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has: 
9 briefly introduced the gradient-base optimisation method. 
" nominated an alternative tool to gradient-base method for integrating in the main 
program. 
9 presented an alternative method to optimise integer objective value, the genetic 
algorithm. 
41 introduced an optimisation tool for the genetic algorithm optimisation. 
CHAPTER 8 
RESULTS 
Some assumptions had to be made due to military restrictions and limited data and 
information availability. This also applied to assessment methods in some parts of the 
simulation (details see chapter 6). This chapter will show only general results generated 
from the application `Mission Effectiveness Analysis' by using the case study aircraft, 
U-99. The general results of individual sub-modules and their combination with the main 
application will be described. The remaining results of individual sub-module in details 
are shown separately in the relevant Appendices. 
8.1 Results from Susceptibility Assessment 
The susceptibility assessment sub-module is one part of the survivability assessment sub- 
module; its objective is to measure aircraft susceptibility performance; i. e. probability of 
being detected (PD), probability of being hit or fused when being detected (Ph/D or PFAD). 
As described in section 3.1, the aircraft probability of detection (PD) depends on the 
signal-to-noise ratio, which is a function of its RCS, threat's radar performance, and the 
distance between an aircraft and the signal-receiving radar system. In this section, the 
results of U-99's probability of detection are shown. 
8.1.1 Radar Cross Section 
RCS is commonly measured in the terms of dBm2 or m2 in many different angles. It is so 
difficult to access data to validate this sub-module, due to the fact that only limited details 
of aircraft front view RCS can be found in text books [18]. The B-2 and F-117 aircraft have 
thus been chosen to calculate their RCS, aiming to validate this sub-module. Another 
reason for choosing these aircraft is that their external shapes can be straightforwardly 
represented by simple geometrical shapes (details see Appendix B). 
Table 8.1 compares the calculated RCS generated from the susceptibility assessment 
sub-module with the RCS data from an open source [18]. The discrepancy between the 
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B-2 RCS predicted by this sub-module and the RCS value from the open source (ap- 
proximately 26 %) is significantly higher than an discrepancy in the case of the F-117 
RCS (approximate 0.28%). There are two reasons for this discrepancy in the case of 
the B-2 compared to the case of the F-117. Firstly, the complexity of the shape of the 
B-2 compared to the F-117 leads to a much higher discrepancy in calculation for the 
B-2. Secondly, the B-2 has significantly better usage of RAMM than the F-117, and the 
sub-module ignores the effects of RANI. However, the discrepancy between the predicted 
aircraft RCS by the susceptibility assessment module and the aircraft RCS quoted from 
published source may be less or more than the values shown in Table 8.1. It depends on 
radar frequency used to calculate an aircraft RCS in the susceptibility assessment module. 
This assumed radar frequency used here may be not the same as used to predict in the 
published source, because there is no such information about the radar frequency used to 
predict aircraft RCS quoted from the published source. 
Table 8.1: Comparison between selected aircraft front view RCS from published 
source [181 and calculated aircraft front view RCS from the susceptibility assessment sub- 
module 
Aircraft RCS [m ] Calculated RCS [M2 ] Discrepancy [%] 
B-2 0.1 0.12613468 26 
F-117 0.025 0.02492856 0.28576 
U-99 - 0.0061 - 
The aircraft RCS depends primarily on the aircraft external geometrical shapes in 
each aircraft view; therefore, each aircraft view RCS has to be separately calculated. The 
results of U-99 RCS in the six main aircraft views can be shown in Table 8.2. 
Table 8.2: Calculated U-99 RCS in six main views 
View RCS [m2] RCS [dBm2] 
Top 2807183.5 64.4827 
Left 0.01133908 -19.4542 
Right 0.01133908 -19.4542 
Front 0.00610207 -22.1452 
Rear 1.17095530 0.6854 
Bottom 2807183.5 64.4827 
An alternative way to present aircraft RCS is to plot these values in a concentric 
manner, as shown in Fig. 8.1. This method can show the aircraft RCS in the four main 
views compared, with each other. 





Figure 8.1: Results of U-99 radar cross section in dBm2 unit 
8.1.2 Signal-To-Noise Ratio 
As described in Chapter 3, the probability of detection cannot be predicted directly from 
the aircraft RCS, but can be predicted from the aircraft S/N. The aircraft S/N depends 
on several parameters, but most of them are assumed as constant throughout the mission 
simulation; such as temperature (no weather change), radar receiving system. The aircraft 
S/N in this research will thus vary only depending on aircraft RCS and distance between 
aircraft and radar receiving system in each flight phase. Therefore, the S/N for each 
aircraft view in each flight phase has to be independently evaluated. Table 8.3 shows the 
S/N of all six main aircraft views in every flight phase in a sortie. 
Table 8.3: Calculated S/N of six main U-99 views for each 
t Phase Left Right Front Rear 
t phase [dBm2] 
Bottom 
Pre-Flight 44.7216 -39.2153 -39.2153 -41.9063 -19.0757 44.7216 
Outbound 52.5295 -31.4075 -31.4075 -34.0985 -11.2679 52.5295 
Attack 79.1151 -4.8218 -4.8218 -7.5128 15.3178 79.1151 
Inbound 52.5295 -31.4075 -31.4075 -34.0985 -11.2679 52.5295 
Post-Flight 44.7216 -39.2153 -39.2153 -41.9063 -19.0757 44.7216 
An average S/N in each flight phase can be calculated through Eqn. (3.16) by using 
an average RCS, which is the result of the multiplication of each aircraft view RCS and 
the manoeuvrability probability (weighting factors) for the particular aircraft view in the 
particular flight phase. The manoeuvrability probability table option 2 (see Fig. E. 9) has 
been chosen to generate the results in this study. Table 8.4 shows the average U-99 RCS 
and S/N in each flight phase with manoeuvrability probability option 2. 
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Table 8.4: Calculated average RCS and S/N for each flight phase by using manoeuvra- 
bility probability option 2 
Flight Phase RCS [dBm ] S/N [dBm ] 
Pre-Flight 58.4621 38.9264 
Outbound 54.4827 42.7058 
Attack 59.2539 73.8863 
Inbound 54.4827 42.7058 
Post-Flight 58.4621 38.9264 
8.1.3 Probability of Detection 
With the assumed threshold setting default value of the receiveing radar system, the 
probability of false alarm, P,,, can be thus evaluated as 3.72665 x 10-6. Together with 
this Pr, value and the average S/N, the average probability of detection by the radar of 
the U-99 in each flight phase can be simply discövered by dint of the pre-calculated graph 
(see Fig. 3.4). Table 8.5 shows PD predicted by using average S/N in each flight phase 
and a threshold setting default value. 
Table 8.5: Average calculated S/N and PD in each flight phase predicted by using 
manoeuvrability probability option 2 
Pre- and Post-Flight Out- and Inbound Attack View 
S/N PD S/N PD S/N PD 
Top & Bottom 44.7216 --0.95 52.5295 -- 0.95 79.1151 _-0.98 
Left & Right -39.2153 --0.001 -31.4075 _-0.001 -4.8218 -- 0.006 
Front -41.9063 --0.001 -34.0985 _-0.001 -7.5128 -0.003 
Rear -19.0757 --0.001 -11.2679 --0.001 15.3178 _-0.65 
Average 38.701 -0.95 42.5294 -0.95 73.8863 -0.98 
8.1.4 Probability of Hit 
Table 8.6 shows the results of the probability of hit predicted from both `Carlton' and 
`Shoe-Box' models used to represent the aircraft presented area (see Fig. 3.6). The miss 
distance distribution, 0r, is calculated from an assumed 20 generated random hits, and 
miss distances in conjunction with the `Carlton' and the `Shoe-Box' model illustrating 
aircraft presented areas. 
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Table 8.6: PH/D of three main U-99 views in each flight phase evaluated from 20 random 
hits 
Vi Carlton Shoe-Box ew Qr AP PHID Ur AP P HID 
Top & Bottom 282.287 28.5571 0.578458 240.795 28.5571 0.799853 
Left & Right 44.0028 11.8748 0.603518 60.6532 11.8748 0.668563 
Front & Rear 33.5298 10.6451 0.61617 23.0322 10.6451 0.903382 
8.2 Results from Vulnerability Assessment 
In this methodology, only two main threat types have been considered; i. e. penetrator 
(represented by AAA) and proximity warhead (represented by SAM). The principle kill 
mechanism for the penetrator threat type is to destroy and/or damage aircraft compo- 
nents, which are on the shotline (definition see Chapter 3). The measure of aircraft MOP 
in vulnerability encountered by this threat type is probability of kill, P, {. 
On the other hand, the proximity warhead in this study is assumed to detonate outside 
the aircraft and produce fragments, which directly hit the aircraft afterwards. The number 
of fragments can be evaluated from the detonation distance. In this case, each fragment is 
considered as an individual penetrator. Therefore, the probability of kill by all fragments 
can be determined by using the same principle of multiple hits by penetrators. The lethal 
radius can be discovered, and can be used to represent the P,, Ext 
(details see Chapter 3). 
8.2.1 Probability of Kill 
The probability of kill is mainly a function of critical component vulnerable areas value 
(A, ). This value can be calculated from the critical component presented areas, which 
depend on the component layout, and kill probability by given hit on the component. 
Three alternative critical component layouts have been examined; i. e. non-overlapped 
area existence (non-overlapped), shielding effect of frontal critical component of the over- 
lapped area (shielding overlapped), and non-shielding effect of frontal critical component 
of the overlapped area (non-shielding overlapped). Redundancy is another consideration 
effecting the kill probability calculations. 
Table 8.7 shows the comparison of kill probability values of the U-99 in different critical 
component layouts, with consideration of fuel system redundancy. On the other hand, 
Table 8.8 shows the results of kill probability calculation without consideration of fuel 
system redundancy. Due to the semi-automatic grid counter method used to predict the 
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presented areas of both critical components and aircraft (see Appendix B), the vulnerable 
areas will be thus calculated in Grid unit, which can be convert into the SI unit, metre, 
by using factors shown in Table B. 9. 
Table 8.7: Calculated PK/H of U-99 with redundant fuel systems 
Top/Bottom Left/Right Front Rear 




























In this methodology, the incendiary threat type has not been taken into account; 
therefore, the redundancy of fuel system can reduce the aircraft P1 . 
Table 8.8: Calculated P,,, H of U-99 with non-redundant fuel systems 
nV ["nu] rK FI -*IV wriu rK H nV "LIuj £K H nV 1--. 1 1. A/11 
Non-Overlapped 149.80 0.05847 93.80 0.21174 93.00 0.26124 93.00 0.26124 
Non-Shielding Overlapped 149.80 0.05847 93.86 0.21188 91.64 0.25743 91.64 0.25743 
Shielding Overlapped 149.80 0.05847 87.93 0.19848 90.61 0.25451 88.92 0.24992 
8.3 Results from Reliability 4 Maintainability As- 
sessment 
The reliability & maintainability models used in this methodology are based on the combi- 
nation method, or the functionality of empty weight method, both described in Chapter 4. 
By using statistical analysis of historical data, both models can be thus developed and 
produced the results shown in this section. 
In the first method, the highest and the lowest values of reliability and maintainabil- 
ity for use in the prediction model were firstly developed. Fig. 8.2 shows the comparison 
between the actual highest failure rate and predicted highest failure rates from two devel- 
oped models; i. e. linear and logarithm regressions. An average error for the highest FR 
calculated by the linear regression model is approximately 8.5%, whereas 12% was found 
for the highest FR determined by the logarithmic regression model. 
Fig. 8.3 shows the calculated highest DMHR from linear and logarithm regressions, 
together with the actual data. An average error for the highest DMHR calculated from 
the logarithm regression model is approximately 13%, and approximately 12% for the 
value calculated from the linear regression model. 
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Figure 8.3: Comparison between the highest defect man-hour rate from linear and 
exponential regression analysis 
The linear regression model has, therefore, been chosen to predict the highest and the 
lowest FR and DMHR in this methodology. The Pareto distribution b coefficient could 
then be evaluated. At the final stage, aircraft FR and DMHR distribution over all 13 
major systems were evaluated by dint of Pareto distribution coefficients. The total aircraft 
FR and DMHR are simply a summation of all 13 major system FR and DMHR. Table 8.9 
shows the total FR calculated by the combination method, with the assumption of thirteen 
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major components with and without Technology Improvement Factor (TIF) compared 
with the result's total FR calculated by the functionality method and the real data. An 
average error of total aircraft FR calculated by the combination method with TIF is 
approximately 13%, and approximately 16% error for the total aircraft FR predicted by 
the functionality method. 
Table 8.9: Comparison between real aircraft failure rate and results of the combination 
method and functionality method [per 1000 flying hours] 
Aircraft al d R t 
Combination method thod ti lit F e a a Without TIF With TIF y me unc ona 
F2* 1493.5 1873.319 624.439 276.97 
A1* 1250.7 1149.294 383.098 285.029 
A2* 1052.4 1043.67 347.890 289.278 
ATR1* 832.8 803.302 267.767 472.974 
ATR2* 547.4 661.507 220.502 513.8 
F-104* 1147.2 1119.292 373.097 645.535 
A-7* 958.5 882.449 294.149 772.634 
GA1 Late 454.0 1270.121 423.373667 517.13 
GA2 445.0 1030.723 343.574333 513.8 
GA3 959.0 1494.386 747.193205 1013.433 
F-16 420.0 1149.976 383.325333 505.142 
F-18 700.0 1982.528 660.842667 743.237 
F-4 850.0 1626.063 813.0315 963.816 
F-15 710.0 1664.799 832.3995 863.117 
F-105 680.0 1170.958 585.479 905.341 
* Reliability data was collected in 1985 
Note: All aircraft displayed in this table were renamed, and taken from the available data 
sets [4,38] (except F-16, F-18, F-4, F-15, F-105, F-104) 
Table 8.10 shows the total aircraft DMHR calculated by the combination method com- 
pared with the total aircraft DMHR predicted by the functionality method and the real 
data. An average error for the combination method is approximately 57% and approxi- 
mately 41% for the functionality method. 
Table 8.11 shows the result of the U-99 FR and DMHR predicted by the combination 
method and the functionality method. The Pareto 40: 70 portion has been chosen to 
predict the FR and DMHR in conjunction with TIF. The difference between these 
predicted values from two prediction methods is approximately 11% for the FR, and 
approximately 22% for the DMHR. 
8. Results 94 
Table 8.10: Comparison between real aircraft defect man-hour rate and results of the 
combination method and functionality method [Der 1000 flying hoursl 
Aircraft Real data Combination method Functionality method 
F2 17029.7 17580.38 9462.7 
Al 13405.5 14248.79 9365.792 
A2 9584.4 10698.21 9314.694 
ATR1 7459.6 5118.266 7105.652 
ATR2 4990.7 4282.271 6614.7 
F-104 6216.3 5711.828 5030.52 
A-7 7810.6 7867.151 3502.082 
GA1 Late 3430.0 10744.59 6574.655 
GA2 4500 8384.919 6614.7 
GA3 959.0 3283.273 606.348 
Ti 5040.0 4383.341 9309.729 
Note: All aircraft displayed in this table were renamed, and taken from the available 
data sets [4,381 (except F-104) 
Table 8.11: Results of U-99 from reliability & maintainability assessment module 
Method Variable Failure rate Defect man-hour rate 
Highest (100) 401.7737 3368.80371 
Lowest (70) 20.48245 406.2553 
Combination method b coefficient -1.160382 -0.824707 
Aircraft with TIF 298.681 - 
Aircraft without TIF 1194.726 12285.26 
Functionality method Aircraft 265.315 9602.858 
8.4 Results from Life Cycle Cost Estimation 
The Life Cycle Cost (LCC) estimation model is based on Woodford's 153] model. This 
predicts the total aircraft LCC for the entire aircraft life in peacetime, by using mostly 
aircraft conceptual design parameters. The model has been partly validated and modified 
to be able to predict the total aircraft LCC during wartime (see Chapter 5). However, 
only operation cost and flyaway cost are used to evaluate the total operational cost during 
either peacetime or wartime in this study. The operation cost will be averaged out over 
the total number of flying hours and over the total number of operational aircraft in one 
base throughout the aircraft lifetime, as shown in Table 8.12. The Operation cost per 
flying hour for U-99 is the highest due to only 500 flying hours for its entire life time. 
The difference between the F-16 LCC during peacetime, calculated from Woodford's 
model and from the LCC estimation model in this methodology is approximately 4%, and 
approximately 3% for Eurofighter. Regarding the flyaway cost in FY92$M values quoted 
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Table 8.12: Results from life cycle cost estimation sub-module 
Aircraft LCC [M$/AC] Flyaway Cost [M$] Operation Cost [$/FH/AC 






















by Woodford [53], the flyaway cost for F-16 calcuated from the LCC estimation model 
was apporximately 12% less than from the quoted price. Similar to the flyaway cost for 
Eurofighter, the difference is approximately 4.5%. 
An alternative method used to predict the aircraft LCC is to use the FACET [25I 
commercial program. Mr. Pugh, formerly of the Directorate Project, Time, and Cost 
Analysis (DPTCAn), a division of the Ministry of Defence, used this program to esti- 
mate the U-99 LCC, as shown in Table 8.13. The difference between the U-99 flyway 
cost calculated from the FACET program and from the LCC estimation model in this 
methodology is approximately 4.4%. Regarding U-99 LCC predicted by FACET program, 
receiving directly from Mr. Pugh, the development cost does not take the avionics soft- 
ware development cost into account; therefore, the development cost discrepancy from 
both methods is significant high (approximately 86%). 
Table 8.13: Comparison between U-99 LCC calculated from the LCC estimation module 
and from FACET [25I 
Cost LCC estimation module [M$] FACET [M$] 
Development 3377.511 1817.874 
Production 2600.484 2717.604 
Flyaway 5.201 5.4351 
Fig. 8.4 shows the percentage of the operation cost over 4 years of peacetime scenario. 
An average operation cost is approximately $49,000 /aircraft/flying hour. 
In the case of the U-99 life being increased to 20 years, nearly a half of LCC has to 
be spent on the operation cost, as illustrated in Fig. 8.5. The average operation cost per 
aircraft per flying hour also increases to $461,000 by assuming that the U-99 can be used 
for a total of 500 flying hours, as in its design specification. 
Table 8.14 shows an overall U-99 LCC per aircraft during peacetime and wartime sce- 
nario comparing between 4 years and 20 years life time. The operation cost during the 
wartime scenario calculated from the LCC estimation model still excludes the weapons 

















Figure 8.5: Results from U-99 LCC estimation in peacetime scenario for 20 years life 
time 
released cost and the aircraft lost cost, which will be added later in the operation simula- 
tion module. The sum over these three major costs will be defined as the total operational 
cost 
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Table 8.14: Comparison between LCC per one U-99 [M$] during wartime and peacetime 






















8.5 Operation Simulation Results 
In this mission simulation, there are some assumptions and constraints, as described in 
Chapter 6, which can be concluded as follows: 
1. The mission scenario takes 10 operation days with a maximum of 2 operation sorties 
per day. The fleet size comprises 10 U-99 aircraft flying in the bomber role. 
2. It is assumed that the threat defence system is fully functional, with the highest 
level of defense. The encounter ratio (probability of encounter) by the AAA weapon 
type is approximately 5% and by SAM is approximately 2%. The number of contact 
warheads released and the detonation distance of the proximity warheads in each 
flight phase are both randomly generated. 
3. It is assumed that the aircraft has the manoeuvrability probability following option 
2 (details see Fig. E. 9). 
4. The maintainability and supportability reach the maximum level, with an additional 
12 hours of maintenance at the end of each operation day. 
8.5.1 Results and Effects of an Individual Aircraft Measure of Performance 
on Operational and Operational Cost Measures of Effectiveness 
The results from the operation simulation process, where only one specific aircraft MOP 
becomes a constant value throughout the simulation, will be presented in this section. 
With these results, the direct effect of an individual aircraft MOP on the operational and 
cost MOEs can be identified. The major aircraft MOPs investigated in this study are 
probability of detection (PD), probability of hit (P), probability of aircraft kill on en- 
counter with penetrators (P' Non), probability of aircraft kill on encounter with proximity 
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warhead, considering detonation distance (PKE,, ), defect arising rate or failure rate (FR), 
mean time to repair defect (MTTRDefeet), mean time to repair damage (MTTRDamage), 
and defect man-hour rate (DMHR). 
To only evaluate the effect of aircraft probability of detection on the operational and 
operational cost MOEs, without any interference of of the other aircraft MOPs, the prob- 
ability of detection for every aircraft view in every flight phase will be held at the same 
constant values. Fig. 8.6 shows the effect of the probability of detection on the entire op- 
eration and operational cost. Best fit linear modelling of the number of sorties flown, of 
complete sorties, of successful sorties, and of targets killed have been chosen to represent 
the actual data from the mission simulation. High order polynomial curves are not used 
to represent the data because, although the data is non-linear, it is every nearly linear 
and therefore, a linear approximation is sufficient in most cases. The remaining linear 
and polynomial curves representing the number of sorties flown, of complete sorties, and 
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Figure 8.6: Effect of the probability of detection on the operational and operational cost 
The number of sorties flown, complete sorties, successful sorties and also targets killed 
show decreases, of approximately 1.0 - 1.35 sortie reduction for every 10% increase in 
PD. The target killed reduction is slightly less. The reduction of these operational MOEs 
appear to be more likely to be linear, with constant inclination because of very low 
percentage reduction (less than 1%). On the other hand, the reduction of the operational 
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cost MOEs consist of bounds over certain PD regions. For example, the effects of PD 
variation on the total operational cost can be divided into three PD regions. 
1. PD between 0.0 - 0.65: In this region, the total operational cost reduces approxi- 
mately $184,000 for every 0.1 PD increase. 
2. PD between 0.65 - 0.75: The total operational cost fluctuates with a range of ap- 
proximately 5 M$ over this PD region due to Klonte Carlo simulation effect. 
3. PD between 0.75 - 1.0: The reduction ratio in this region is approximately $270,000 
per 0.1 PD increase. 
An explanation for the first and the third regions, where the total operational cost 
reduces continuously, is that the number of U-99 flying hours decreases due to the higher 
possibility of detection in an early sortie and/or in an early operational day. Consequently, 
the U-99 is more likely to be hit, damaged, or defective in the early mission simulation 
period. Hence, the number of U-99 take-offs decrease and the number of weapons released 
also thus reduces. The total operational cost reduction ratio per PD 10% increase in the 
third region gains nearly 50% from the reduction ratio in the first region. The main 
reason is that a U-99 with a higher PD is more likely to be killed or damaged in the earlier 
sorties and operational days; therefore, the total number of sorties flown, targets killed, 
and weapons released are less than the U-99 with lower PD. 
The PD in the second region, where the total operational cost varies for increased 
PD, cannot accurately predict when an additional U-99 will be killed because some other 
remaining U-99 MOPs are still randomly generated, and a small number of trials for 
Monte Carlo simulation is used. This region can possibly be minimised, by increasing the 
number of Monte Carlo simulation trials. 
The effects of PD on the other operational cost MOEs (for example, cost[$]/sortie and 
cost[$]/target) are quite similar to the effect on the total operational cost. These opera- 
tional cost MOEs can be considered as constant throughout the first and the third regions. 
For instance, cost[$]/target decreases by approximately $20 over a 0.1 PD increase in the 
first region (see Fig. E. 10). Comparing this $20 decrease to the original cost[$]/target of 
approximately $200,000, this reduction is only approximately 0.01%, which can be ne- 
glected. The reason for the very small cost[$]/target reduction percentages is that the 
reduced percentage over 10% increase in PD compared to the original value of number of 
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targets killed (approximately 0.831%), and of the total operational cost (approximately 
0.7365%) are both extremely small and close to each other. 
Using a similar approach to present the effect of the probability of detection, the im- 
pact of the aircraft probability of hit on the operational and operational cost has been 
illustrated in Fig. 8.7. The discontinuities of operational cost appear in the specific re- 
gions, where an additional aircraft is killed. Additionally, the slope of each discontinuity 
increases, but are nearly constant, due to the substantial reductions in the amount of ser- 
vice time and weapons released. This decrease operational cost, due to both service time 
and weapons released reductions, is small. This leads to increases only in the reduction 
inclination, and does not cause any step changes. The remaining effects of the probability 
of hit (PH) are similar to the effects of the Po. The number of sorties flown, complete 
sorties, successful sorties and targets killed are defined as the number of specific sorties 
and targets. The number of specific sorties and targets, however, reduces more, and also 
the total operational cost fluctuates in several PH regions. 
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Figure 8.7: Effect of the probability of hit on the operational and operational cost 
The trends of the specific sorties and targets reduction appear to increase over the PH, 
and may be plotted as exponential curves. The regions where the number of the specific 
sortie inclination increases, are the same regions, where the total operational cost has a 
step change. This shows that the increasing of the specific sorties inclinations relates to 
the increasing number of aircraft lost. The same relationship for the change in gradient 
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for number of targets killed against P,,, as shown in Appendix E. 
In the high PH region, the number of specific sorties, targets killed, and the total 
operational cost reduce much more than in the lower Pt1, due to aircraft being killed in 
an earlier stage of the mission simulation (see Fig. 8.7). The reason for this is the high PD 
value of the U-99 case study aircraft. The trend of the reduction of specific sorties and 
targets killed in this region can be represented by an exponential curve. However, the 
reduction for an overall PH range is still sufficiently represented by traces (see Fig. E. 11). 
The effects of PH are different to these of Po for the remaining operational cost NIOEs; 
such as cost[$]/sortie, cost[$]/target and cost[$] /successful sortie. These operational cost 
MOEs increase with higher ratio within higher P regions, due to smaller numbers of 
specific sorties and/or targets killed. Higher increasing cost ratios result from the oper- 
ational cost MOEs definition (see Chapter 5), in conjuction with the higher precentage 
reduction of the specific sorties and/or targets killed, compared to the reduced percentage 
of total operational costs within the high PH region (see Fig. E. 11). For instance; in the 
forth discontinuity area of the total operational cost, the reduction ratio in this region is 
approximately 2.3%. Similarly, the reduction ratio of targets killed in the same region is 
approximately 3.5%. Regarding the cost[$]/target definition, and both above described 
reduction ratios, this operational cost MOE will increase due to a greater decrease in the 
denominator, reduction of targets killed, in Eqn. (5.11). 
The above explanations can also apply to the results from the remaining aircraft MOPs 
on the operational and operational cost MOEs. 
There are two alternative ways to measure the aircraft MOP for vulnerability on en- 
counter with a proximity warhead, i. e. probability of kill, calculated through detonation 
distance, and lethal radius. The aircraft MOP for vulnerability on encounter with a prox- 
imity warhead in the form of lethal radius has units in metres. Therefore, the probability 
of aircraft kill, which represents the aircraft MOP for vulnerability on encounter, with a 
proximity warhead calculated through detonation distance, has been chosen so that both 
two values (probability of aircraft kill on encounter with a proximity warhead and with 
penetrator) can be directly compared. The effect of the aircraft vulnerability on encounter 
with a non-explosive (penetrator) has been shown in Fig. 8.8, by keeping the aircraft kill 
probability on encounter with penetrators value constant in every flight phase, throughout 
the simulation, regardless the number of hits. The kill probability on encounter with a 
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proximity warhead is also calculated through generated random detonation distances in 
every flight phase. 
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Figure 8.8: Effect of the probability of kill on encounter with penetrators on the oper- 
ational and operational cost 
Fig. 8.9 shows the effect of the aircraft kill probability on encounter with proximity 
warheads on operational and operational cost-effectiveness. In this approach, the prob- 
ability of kill on encounter with proximity warhead is set as a constant value instead. 
The impact of both PK on encounter with penetrators and P, t on encounter with 
proximity warheads, calculated through a random detonation distance, are quite similar to 
the impact of the PH. The specific sorties and targets killed reduction ratios over increasing 
P, t on encounter with penetrators tend to be constant and higher than the reduction ratios 
over PK on encounter with proximity warheads. However, the reduction ratios of specific 
sorties and targets for increasing P, t on encounter with proximity warheads seem to reduce 
(divergence). The causes of these phenomena are: 
I. ) The probability of encounter by penetrators has been set higher than by proximity 
warheads. Therefore, the reduction ratios of specific sorties and targets for in- 
creasing PK on encounter with penetrators are higher than the reduction ratios for 
increasing PK on encounter with proximity warheads. 
II. ) The reduction ratio of specific sorties and targets for increasing PK on encounter 
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Figure 8.9: Effect of the probability of kill on encounter with proximity warhead on the 
operational and operational cost 
with proximity warheads is reduced due to the lower probability of encounter by 
proximity warheads. In this case the aircraft would be more likely to be killed in a 
later sortie, and in a later operational day. Therefore, the total number of specific 
sorties and targets would not reduce much, even if the number of aircraft killed 
increased. 
The trends of the total operational cost reduction ratio follow the trends of the total 
number of sorties flown reduction ratio, for the same reason as described above. The 
remaining operational cost MOEs are similar to that of Pt,, in that there is an increasing 
ratio rise, yet in a different order, depending on the specific sorties, targets killed, and the 
total operational cost reduction ratios over increasing PK on encounter with penetrators 
and proximity warheads. 
The reliability probability effect on the operational and operational cost has been 
shown in Fig. 8.10. The maximum reliability probability value studied in this methodology 
has been set as 0.1 due to the assumption that the operational reliability is approximately 
10% of the aircraft reliability. 
The effects of the aircraft MOP for reliability on the operational MOEs are quite 
similar to the effects of the other aircraft MOPs, in which the specific sorties or targets 
killed approximately decreases steadily with different inclinations. The effect of reliability 
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Figure 8.10: Effect of the reliability probability on the operational and operational cost 
on the total operational cost fluctuated at the very low defect arising rate region. The 
costs decrease continuously instead. This shows that the effect of this design aspect 
directly affects the number of aircraft being killed, in the opposite way from the effects 
of the other aircraft MOPs. In the case that an aircraft had a high defect arising rate, 
this aircraft would be less likely to be killed. The main reason is that aircraft with high 
defect arising rate would operate in the mission simulation for a shorter time due to more 
maintenance being required. In the other words, for an aircraft frequently aborting a 
sortie, there was less risk of being attacked. The total number of aircraft killed, the total 
service time, and the total number of weapons released consequently reduced. 
Due to the research time-scale and because of LCC estimation modelling, the main- 
tenance cost was included within the total O&S cost, which was averaged over the total 
number of operational aircraft in one base and the total flying hours for the entire aircraft 
life. 
The effects of the reliability on the remaining operational cost MOEs are quite similar 
to the effects of the other aircraft MOPs. Trends of these operational cost MOEs de- 
pend on the specific sorties or targets killed reduction proportion, compared to the total 
operational cost reduction ratio, as discussed above. 
On the other hand, the maximum maintainability probability values represented by 
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mean time to repair defect and mean time to repair damage are both expanded to a maxi- 
mum of 12 hours due to the additional extra maintenance 12 hours at the end of operation 
day. Fig. 8.11 and Fig. 8.12 show the effect of each aircraft MOP for maintainability on 
the operational and operational cost. 
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Figure 8.12: Effect of the mean time to repair damage on the operational and operational 
cost 
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The effects of the MTTRDCfeCt and of the MTTRDa,,, age on the operational and opera- 
tional cost are very similar, shown by the traces and linear regression equations illustrated 
in Fig. 8.11 - 8.12. Therefore, the effect of MTTRDefect represents the aircraft MOP for 
maintainability in this study. 
In this study, the effects of U-99 MOP for maintainability in the form of MTTR could 
be divided into two main categories; i. e. U-99 with MTTR not present (MTTR = 0) 
and MTTR present (MTTR > 0). In case of U-99 with MTTR present, the MTTR 
value increasing had little influence on the operational MOEs, because they had no direct 
relationships with operational reliability. In the other words, these values were used only 
to estimate the maintainability probability, which is only a function of aircraft in mainte- 
nance duration and MTTR. These values were used to indicate whether the aircraft had 
finished their maintenance process, regardless of the aircraft defect arising rate, aircraft 
failure rate, and aircraft damage probability value. If the aircraft finished their mainte- 
nance, the probability of defect, failure, and/or abort mission were set as 0.0, or perfect 
condition. The effects of this approach on the operational MOEs are discussed below: 
I. ) The total service time and total number of weapons released decrease due to the 
longer maintenance requirement and fewer sorties flown. 
II. ) Due to the longer maintenance required, there were fewer aircraft operating in the 
mission simulation. The aircraft probability values of a "KILL" event in the event 
tree diagram in the sortie decreased due to their perfect condition (for details of 
calculation see Chapter 6). This led to fewer aircraft being killed, with higher 
MTTR values. 
III. ) In the case that the defect arising rate increased, in conjunction with high MTTR, 
this would increase the above effects. Therefore, aircraft would require maintenance 
for longer and more often. This led to fewer aircraft operations in the mission 
simulation. Consequently, the number of aircraft being killed were reduced, but 
fewer missions were performed. 
Consequently, all operational cost MOEs constantly slightly decrease or increase, with- 
out any bounds (step changes). Their inclinations depend on the specific sorties or targets 
killed reduction ratio compared to the total operational cost reduction ratio. 
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In the case of U-99 with MTTR not present, U-99 did not require any maintenance 
after operational sorties. They were consequently in perfect condition and immediately 
ready for the next operational sortie. Unlike the case of MTTR present, here the U- 
99 could be ready, at the earliest for the operational sortie after the next immediately 
operational sortie. Therefore, there were no significant effects of increasing MTTR values. 
In this study, scheduled maintenance and DMHR were not taken into account during 
the operation mission simulation. Hence, they only affect the operational cost, and do 
not affect the number of sorties during the mission operation simulation, as illustrated 
in Fig. 8.13. Therefore, the effect of scheduled maintenance will not be presented in this 
study. 
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Figure 8.13: Effect of the defect man-hour rate on the operational and operational cost 
MOEs 
The DMHR had a direct impact on the total operational cost via an average oper- 
ational cost per aircraft per flying hour (for details see Chapter 5). By increasing this 
value, the operational cost MOPS would also rise. 
The effects of increasing an individual U-99 MOP on the operational and operational 
cost MOEs are summaried and shown in Table 8.15. This can be used to indicate the 
approximate effects of this U-99 MOP on the number of specific sorties and targets, total 
operational cost, cost [$] /specific sortie, and cost [$] /target. 
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Table 8.15: Effect of increasing an individual U-99 MOP on operational and operational 
cost MOEs __ PD PH P, PEncounter Defect Arising MTTR DMHR 
Effect on number of -+ - -- - -- -+ X 
specific sorties and 
targets 
Effect on the total op- +- + + + -- -+ +- 
erational cost 
Effect on the remain- -{- - -}- - -}--}- + +1- -}- - +- 
ing operational cost 
MOEs 
X= No Effect 
-+= Slight decrease 
-= Decrease 
--= Significant decrease 
+/- = May increase or decrease 
+-= Slight increase 
+= Increase 
++ = Significant increase 
8.5.2 Results and Effects of Multiple Aircraft Measures of Performance on 
the Operational and Operational Cost Measures of Effectiveness 
To investigate all the effects of, and relationships between, every aircraft MOP in this 
study on the operational and operational cost MOEs is too complex and time-consuming. 
Therefore, only the effects of and relationships between all aircraft l\'IOPs for survivability, 
which is the major design aspect considered in this study, are examined in details. Then, 
the effects of and the relationships between aircraft MOPS in different aircraft design 
aspects will be briefly explored. 
The aircraft MOPS for survivability design aspect are probability of detection, prob- 
ability of hit, probability of kill on encounter with penetrators, and probability of kill on 
encounter with proximity warheads, calculated through the detonation distance. Fig. 8.14 
shows the effects of aircraft probability of detection and aircraft probability of kill on en- 
counter with penetrators, by increasing aircraft probability of kill on encounter with a 
proximity warhead, and constant aircraft probability of hit. Complete results and charts 
of these effects and relationships have been shown in Appendix E. 
Survivability is a combination of susceptibility (PD and P) and vulnerability (P,;,.. 
and PKExt). Therefore, the effects of, and relationships between, both design aspects can 
be shown, and will be discussed here as follows: 
I. ) In the case that an aircraft has a low probability of detection, the reduction ratio of 
the total number of specific sorties and targets slightly decreased for increases in P,; 
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Figure 8.14: Effect of PD and PKNon with increasing PKEyt and constant P on the 
number of the total sorties flown 
and PH. Additionally, reduction ratios seemed to decrease slightly with increasing 
PK. The explanation of this matter is that additional aircraft were killed, but were 
not killed earlier in the sortie and the operational day. 
II. ) In the case that an aircraft has a high probability of detection, the reduction ratio 
of the total number of specific sorties and targets dramatically increases, and signif- 
icantly increases for high regions of PE, and Px. The main reason is that additional 
aircraft were killed, and earlier in the sortie and in the operational day. 
III. ) In the case that the aircraft probability of hit increases, but the remaining prob- 
abilities are unchanged, then the relationships between the aircraft MOPs for sur- 
vivability are also unchanged. The only effect of increasing probability of hit on the 
operational MOEs is that the total number of specific sorties and targets reduces. 
IV. ) In the case that the probability of threat encounter in the mission simulation in- 
creases, the reduction of the total number of specific sorties and targets will slightly 
increase due to the supplemental effect of increasing the probability of encounter. 
The total operational cost, cost[$]/target, cost[$]/sortie and the other operational 
cost MOEs generally vary over increasing aircraft MOPs for survivability in the form 
of discontinuity curves, mainly due to increases in the numbers of aircraft being killed. 
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The total operational costs decrease nearly constantly before and after the bounds mainly 
because of the decrease in the total service time and weapons released. On the other hand, 
the remaining operational cost MOEs increase with different inclinations, depending on 
the specific sorties or target killed reduction ratios, compared to the total operational cost 
reduction ratio. The effect of aircraft MOPs for survivability on the total operational cost 
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Survivability consists of susceptibility and vulnerability; therefore, the aircraft MOP 
for survivability can be affected by increasing susceptibility or vulnerability, or by increas- 
ing both values. This can be summerised and shown in Table 8.16. 
Only the effects of reliability & maintainability will be examined in this study due 
to research time scale and the paucity of information in this design aspect. Therefore, 
each aircraft MOP for reliability & maintainability is considered separately, unlike aircraft 
MOPS for survivability. However, simple relationships between aircraft defect arising rate 
and the aircraft mean time to repair defect related to the operational and the operational 
cost MOEs can be discovered. Fig. 8.16 shows the effect of, and the relationship between, 
the aircraft MOP for reliability (defect arising rate) and aircraft MOP for maintainability 
(MTTRDefect) on the operational MOE. 
In the case that the MTTRDefeCt value is not equal to zero (aircraft with MTTRDeIect 
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 os 09 
01 02 03 0.05 06 07 08 09 
8. Results 111 
Table 8.16: Generic effects of increasing individual aircraft MOPs for survivability on 
operational and operational cost MOEs 
PD PH PK 
Low High Low High Low High 
P Low 
x X   
D High x X   
P 
Low  X X  
H High  X X  
P Low 
 
-I/ X X 
K High   X X 
Effect on specific sorties and targets -+ -- -- -+ - -+ 
Effect on total operational cost +- ++ ++ +- + +- 
Effect on the remaining operational 
cost MOEs 
++ ++ ++ +- + +- 
X: `No Effect' 
-+: `Slight decrease' 
+-: `Slight increase' 
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Figure 8.16: Effect of aircraft defect arising rate with increasing MTT RDe f,,, on numbers 
of the total sorties flown and the total targets killed 
present), the effects of this value on the total number of sorties flown and of targets 
killed are more significant than the effect in case that MTTRDeIFCt value is equal to zero 
(aircraft with MTTRDefeCt not present). On the other hand, the effect of increasing the 
MTT RDe f,,, of the aircraft with MTT Roe feCt present are quite small. Therefore, only 2 
assumed MTTRDefeet values (2 and 4.5) have been integrated to investigate the effect of 
aircraft MOP for maintainability, in conjunction with the other aircraft MOPs. 
In the case that an aircraft was predicted to have 100% survival (PD =0 and/or PK = 
0), the total number of specific sorties and targets continuously decreased, with increasing 
inclinations resulting from the increase of the reliability and maintainability probability 
values. The explanation is that aircraft stayed longer in maintenance, had earlier and 
more frequently-aborted missions. Therefore, the total operational cost decreased. The 
remaining operational cost MOEs, however, increased or decreased with approximately 
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constant inclinations, depending on the total operational cost reduction ratio, compared to 
specific sorties or targets killed reduction ratios. Some operational cost MOE inclinations 
were nearly the same regardless of the variation in maintainability. This could be caused 
by the fact that the reduction ratio of the total operational cost, compared to the reduction 
ratio of the specific sorties or targets killed for each MTTR value, were very close to each 
other. The physical explanation was that the survivability was not taken into account; 
therefore, none of the operational aircraft were killed. The reduction of targets killed was 
caused only by the aircraft abort frequency, and required longer maintenance duration, 
as described above. 
By combining all major aircraft MOPs in this study together, such as defect arising 
rate, PD, PKNon, . 
PKEX , MTTRD, f,,, and DMHR, the effects of all design aspects 
in this 
study on the operational and operational cost effectiveness can be shown, as illustrated 
in Fig. 8.17. 
In the cases where all survivability, reliability and maintainability aspects were mod- 
elled, the effects of increasing PD and Px on the operational MOEs are discussed below: 
I. ) In the case that an aircraft with high survivability (low PH and low PK) was assumed 
not to require maintenance, the total number of specific sorties and targets reduced 
slightly due only to the effect of aircraft defect arising rate. 
II. ) In the case that an aircraft with low survivability (high PH and high PK) was as- 
sumed not to require maintenance, the total number of specific sorties and target 
increased slightly over increasing defect arising rate. The reason is that aircraft 
aborted their mission more often and in earlier sortie phase, and in earlier oper- 
ational days, rather than being killed. This led to the fact that there were more 
operational aircraft in later sorties and later operational days, which could increase 
the number of take-offs (sorties flown). However, this did not guarantee that the 
other specific sorties and targets would also increase. 
III. ) In the case that an aircraft with high survivability was assumed to require mainte- 
nance, the effects of aircraft with low MTTR present and aircraft with high MTTR 
present on the total number of specific sorties and targets were quite small due 
to there being no direct relationship between MTTR and defect arising rate, as 
described above. The total number of specific sorties and targets decrease resulted 
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Figure 8.17: Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD, PKNon , 
PKExt and MTT Roe f,,, with 
a constant DMHR on the total number of sorties flown 
mainly from the effect of defect arising rate. 
The effects of these aircraft MOPS on the other remaining operational MOEs are quite 
similar to the effect on the total number of sorties flown, as shown in Appendix E. 
On the other hand, the effects of aircraft MOPs on the cost[$]/sortie and cost[$]/target 
are slightly different from the effect on the operational cost. However, there is a similar 
trend of increasing and/or decreasing of all three operational cost MOEs. For instance, 
all cost decreasing or increasing traces have a constant gradient for every PD and P, t. 
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Figure 8.18: Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD, P, KNon , 
PKExt and MTT RDe feet with 
a constant DMHR on cost[$]/target 
Fig. 8.18 shows the effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD, PKNon , 
PKE. 
t and 
MTT RDQ fett 
with a constant DMHR on cost[$]/target. 
Table 8.17 shows a summary of the effects of increasing multiple aircraft MOPs on the 
operational and operational cost MOEs. The `+' and `-' signs illustrated in the table are 
used to indicate the effect of increasing aircraft MOP within selected specific remaining 
aircraft MOP regions on operational and operational cost MOEs. 
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Table 8.17: Generic effects of increasing aircraft MOP within selected specific remaining 









Low High Low High Low High =0 >0 
P Low x X 
   
D High x X 
P Low X X K High  x x   
tA D f i i 
Low _I/ X X r e ec s ng High X X 
MTTR =0 
J   x x 
>0 J J J x x 
Effect on specific sorties 
and targets 
-+ -- - -+ - -+ +- -+ 
Effect on total operational 
cost 
+- + ++ +- -+ -+ -+ -+ 
Effect on the remaining op- 
erational cost MOEs 
+- ++ + +- +- +/- -+ +/- 
X: `No Effect' 
-+: `Slight decrease' 
+-: 'Slight increase' 
+/- : `May increase or decrease' 
-: `Decrease' --: `Significant decrease' 
+: `Increase' ++ : 'Significant increase' 
8.6 Results from Optimisation 
In this study, two alternative optimisation methods have been introduced and used. The 
results from these methods can be illustrated as examples of how to design a combat 
aircraft in a specific operation, for operational or operational effectiveness. 
Six aircraft MOPS have been investigated in this study to find the best solution to 
design the U-99 case study aircraft for operational or operational cost effectiveness in 4 
categories; i. e. maximum number of sorties flown, maximum number of targets killed, 
minimum cost[$]/sortie, and minimum cost[$]/target. The 6 MOPS are defect arising 
rate, probability of detection, probability of aircraft kill on encounter with penetrators, 
probability of aircraft kill on encounter with proximity warheads, mean time to repair 
defect, and defect man-hour rate. The following are the fundamental constraints of these 
variables: 
1. Maximum and minimum values of aircraft defect arising rate are 0.0 and 0.1. 
2. All aircraft probability ranges (PD, P, ýNon, 
PI(Ex! ) are 0.0 - 1.0. 
3. MTTRDefeCL has the upper limit of 5 hours. 
4. DMHR maximum value is 15.00 man-hours/flying hour. 
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5. The number of Monte Carlo simulation trials is 200 runs in each iteration. 
Due to non usage of multiobjective optimisation, and a wide range of variable con- 
straints applied to the optimisation problems, the results from the optimisation are, there- 
fore, part of several alternative solutions with the same constraints. 
8.6.1 Results from the Optimisation using the Gradient-Based Method 
As described in Chapter 7, the gradient-based method has been used to predict the 
approximate optimum solution due to some objective functions being in the forms of 
integer numbers. 
Table 8.18 shows the major results from the gradient-base "Solver" optimisation [21] 
The remaining results are shown in Appendix E. 




Targets Killed Sorties Flown 
Defect Arising 0.029519 0.099899 0.00494 0.00 
PD 0.062758 0.117555 0.29574 0.00 
PKNo 0.371593 0.485130 0.007653 0.618059 
PKExt 0.515784 0.216124 0.148098 0.330151 
MTTRDefect 4.180827 6.534311 0.6544909 0.00 
DMHR 0.00 5.374156 5.092504 4.074727 
Objective Value 187454.6562 117821.8125 136 198 
Ideal Value 200 200 
Iterations 232 244 205 868 
8.6.2 Results from the Optimisation using Genetic Algorithms 
There are two main alternatives to stop the "GAlib" genetic algorithms optimisation [50) 
i. e. convergence of populations and number of generations. To show the difference between 
the results from the optimisation using the gradient-based method and this optimisation 
method, the number of generations termination mechanism has been chosen to produce 
the results. 
Table 8.19 shows the major results from the "GAlib" optimisation with a maximum of 
100 generations of 100 populations. Another two parameters required for this optimisation 
method are percentage of mutation and percentage of crossover, which are set up by 
default as 10% for mutation and 60% for crossover (for details see Chapter 7). The rest 
of the results from this method are shown in Appendix E 
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Table 8.19: Results from the genetic algorithm optimisation 
Minimise Maximise 
Cost[$]/Target Cost[$]/Sortie Targets Killed Sorties Flown 
Defect Arising 0.011719 0.098817 0.000194 0.000933 
PD 0.0857886 0.169359 0.030381 0.002472 
PKNo 0.927993 0.279011 0.048066 0.57612 
PKEyt 0.138689 . 0.456199 0.000565 0.03917 
MTTRDefect 1.505455 7.514457 0.408179 0.730907 
DIVIHR 0.075532 4.2682538 2.873198 0.236438 
Objective Value 185332.7812 113487.3984 146 193 
Ideal Value 200 200 
The results from the genetic algorithms were slightly better than from the gradient- 
based method in the case of the integer objective function. The reason is that the gradient- 
based method uses the derivatives of the objective function and constraints to directly 
search for solutions and also to stop the optimisation. On the other hand, the results in 
the form of floating points from the gradient-based method are much closer to the results 
from the genetic algorithm. This shows how accurate the optimised solutions were from 
both methods. The gradient-based optimisation method usually required fewer iterations 
than was required by the genetic algorithms. 
The genetic algorithms use the objective function to determine the quality of the so- 
lution (population), which contains a set of all 6 variables (Genome). The stop criteria 
for the optimisation used in this study was the maximum number of solution develop- 
ments (generation). In each development, a specific number of the best fit populations 
will survive for the next generation, the rest will be taken away. All genomes in these 
populations will be mutated and/or exchange their parts relative to given values. This 
method, however, requires enormous amounts of time to achieve the best optimum. 
For this study, either optimised operational or operational cost MOEs can be achieved 
by several solutions; therefore, the results from the optimisation can be used as a guideline 
for the best solution. For instance, an alternative solution for maximum sorties flown is 
gained from attempting to obtain the lowest values of defect arising rate and PD as the 
primary condition, then followed by the P, CNon I PIKExt I MTTR, and DMHR 
in that order. 
Only one objective function can be considered for each optimisation run in this study, 
due to the research time scale. Therefore, the results have to be investigated further to 
see if they are reasonable. For example, the minimum cost[$]/sortie is approximately 
CHAPTER 9 
DISCUSSION 
One of the objectives of this study was to develop tools to simply, yet sufficiently, assess 
aircraft measures of performance for three major design aspects; i. e. survivability includ- 
ing susceptibility and vulnerability, reliability & maintainability, and life cycle cost. The 
reasons for this were that the developed methodology could be published, and used by a 
wide range of people. It was aimed to help aircraft designer and operational personnel 
to make decisions quickly, without the need for access to restricted data, at a stage of 
aircraft design that had been hitherto impossible. The results from using these tools were 
to be used to contribute to aircraft design knowledge, as discussed in this chapter. 
The results from the individual sub-modules and from the main module will be further 
clarified and discussed. The effects of, and the relationships between, the individual 
aircraft design aspects will be described and be discussed, relative to the results obtained 
from the use of the operation simulation module, together with optimisation. 
9.1 Design Methodology for Aircraft Operational and 
Cost-Effectiveness 
The design methodology developed in this research aimed to integrate all fundamental 
aircraft design aspects into the early design process, with consideration of operational and 
cost-effectiveness. This methodology was based mainly on two fundamental aircraft design 
methodologies; i. e. the conventional and the "system of systems" design methodologies. 
The fundamental approach of the new design methodology was an integration of the 
"system of systems" design methodology within the design processes of the conventional 
design methodology. The best, and most appropriate, position in the design cycle was 
between the conceptual and the preliminary design processes, because of the definition of 
input at the vehicle level of design used in the "system of systems" design methodology. 
The "system of systems" design methodology aimed to measure the performance and 
effectiveness of the system by using the performance of sub-systems to indicate system 
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effectiveness. An aircraft was defined as a sub-system of the system representing the en- 
tire operation scenario; therefore, its performance, basic design parameters and variables 
resulting from the conceptual design process could be used to measure performance of an 
aircraft in the terms of susceptibility, vulnerability, reliability, maintainability, manoeu- 
vrability, and life cycle cost. 
An entire mission, representing the overall system, in conjunction with the aircraft 
measures of performance, therefore, could be used to measure aircraft operational and 
cost-effectiveness. By this approach, the aircraft design parameters and variables could 
directly show trends and be used to improve the aircraft effectiveness for operational and 
operational-cost during the early design stage. 
The aircraft measures of performance could be represented in the form of the prob- 
ability values, which indicate the quality of an aircraft in a specific design aspect. On 
the other hand, the aircraft operational measures of effectiveness could be expressed in 
the form of numbers of specific sorties, targets, and aircraft. The aircraft life cycle cost 
together with aircraft operational measures of effectiveness could then indicate the op- 
erational cost measures of effectiveness in terms of cost per specific sortie, target, and 
aircraft. Procedures to assess these measures of performance and effectiveness were then 
developed, as follows: 
I. ) Measures of aircraft performance assessment: The susceptibility, vulnerability, and 
survivability design aspects could be individually predicted in the forms of proba- 
bility values. On the other hand, the reliability and maintainability were predicted 
in the forms of failure rate and defect man-hour rate per flying hour. However, 
the aircraft measures of performance for reliability and maintainability could be 
evaluated in the form of probability values during the evaluation of the aircraft 
operational measures of effectiveness. The assessment methodologies in this study 
were simplified due to restriction of data, information, assessment methods, and 
research time-scale limits. However, the assessment methodologies were sufficient 
to meet the project objectives. 
II. ) Integration of the aircraft measures of performance: One method to combining 
probability values was to use the reliability block diagram, together with the event 
tree diagram. This process combines and evaluates the success probability of a 
specific event in the mission simulation. However, the results from these methods 
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were still in the form of probability values. 
III. ) The aircraft operational and operational cost measures of effectiveness evaluation: 
Mission simulation was used to measure the aircraft operational and operational 
cost-effectiveness in the forms of the numbers of specific sorties, targets, and air- 
craft. The simulation transforms the probability values into the required formats. 
Additionally, with the results from both the modified life cycle cost and the mission 
simulation, the aircraft operational cost-effectiveness could also be expressed in the 
appropriate forms. To accurately achieve the numbers of specific sorties, targets, 
and aircraft, the Monte Carlo simulation technique was applied. This method can 
evaluate a number of aircraft in the specific events of the mission. This leads to the 
evaluation of the remaining required numbers of sorties, targets, and aircraft. 
Due to the research time-scale limits, only the aircraft measures of performance were 
optimised, instead of the aircraft design parameters and variables. The results could 
however, be used as guidelines for design of combat aircraft for operational and cost- 
effectiveness. Further developments are also required and will be clarified later in this 
chapter. 
9.2 Validation and Discussion of Susceptibility As- 
sessment 
9.2.1 RCS Validation 
One of the objectives in this study was to develop a simple susceptibility assessment tool 
to help in the prediction of an aircraft probability of detection (PD) through the aircraft 
RCS. The difference between the RCS predicted by this assessment sub-module and the 
published RCS for the F-117 aircraft was extremely small, unlike that for the B-2 aircraft 
(approximately 26% error). The reasons are: 
1. The external shape of B-2 is more complicated to divide into simple geometrical 
shapes than the external shape of F-117. This is due to the rounded edges and the 
curvature of the top view of the B-2. These estimation and assumption for the B-2 
were therefore, less accurate than for the F-117. 
2. The effect of radar absorbing material (RAM) is also neglected in this study. There- 
fore, the B-2 RCS predicted by the assessment sub-module is approximately 25% 
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higher than the published value. 
3. There is no information about the radar system, or the specific radar wave frequency, 
used to evaluate the published RCS values. The default radar wave frequency used 
in this assessment sub-module was 5.6 GHz based on an average SAM acquisition 
radar system, but this might be different from that used in the published B-2 and 
F-117 RCS evaluation. 
9.2.2 Susceptibility Assessment 
Considering only the external geometrical shape, the U-99 RCS in the front view has the 
lowest value, compared to the remaining 5 views, because the radar wave incident angles 
coming from the front view are smaller than from the other aircraft views with the same 
geometrical size and shape. Therefore, the radar signal reflecting from the front view 
is less than the other aircraft views. On the other hand, the U-99 RCS in the top and 
bottom views are the largest because of their geometrical shapes (assumed as flat plates) 
and large incident angle (approximately 90°). 
The manoeuvrability probability option 2 has been set as default because the percent- 
ages of each aircraft view in every flight phase are more sensible and appropriate to the 
U-99 case study aircraft specification (more details see Chapter 6), compared to options 
1 and 5. Additionally, the differences of susceptibility results between using option 2,3, 
and 4 are, on average, negligible in comparison to the results using option 1 or 5 (see 
Table E. 1). The susceptibility assessment results corresponding to option 5 achieve the 
optimum average RCS in this study because of the high percentage of front view and no 
view appearance of the top and bottom views during the attack phase, so the attitudes 
limit detection probability. This option may be applied in the case where the aircraft 
exhibits high manoeuvrability, to reduce the probability of exposing vulnerable views. 
The aircraft probability of detection (PD) for this study was predicted by using pre- 
calculated signal-to-noise ratios (S/N), in conjunction with the default assumed probabil- 
ity of false alarm (Ps) to derive PD from one of the two available pre-calculated charts [24] . 
The probability of detection considering the scintillation effect against signal-to-noise ratio 
with variations of P,, (see Fig. 3.4) has been chosen to predict the U-99 PD for this study. 
The scintillation, or multiple continuous illuminations as seen by radar, is produced by 
RCS variation with a period in the order of one second. 
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The results predicted by using this method are inexact, yet adequate, because the 
graph trends in the chart used for this study (with scintillation effect) appear to be con- 
stant over the maximum and the minimum scales in the chart. Additionally, the PD 
varies very little over the maximum and the minimum S/N regions. A further considera- 
tion is that the methodology is to be used for consistent comparisons of different aircraft 
configurations, where absolute accuracy is less important than relative accuracy. 
9.3 Discussion of Vulnerability Assessment 
Regarding threat analysis in this study, two major threat types have been used to en- 
counter the U-99 in the mission simulation; i. e. penetrator or contact warhead, and 
proximity warhead. An aircraft MOP for vulnerability on encounter with penetrators is 
the probability of kill 
The probability of aircraft kill on encounter with a single random penetrator varies 
with the total aircraft vulnerable area, which is the sum of the vulnerable areas of Non- 
Redundant critical components. Therefore, an aircraft P, t will be decreased by making 
critical components redundant. For example, the U-99 P, in the top/bottom view reduces 
by nearly 83% if all fuel tanks can be considered as redundant critical components. 
A second possible P, t reduction method has been discovered by using reconfiguration 
of critical component layout. However, this method does not necessarily always reduce 
an aircraft P1 , depending upon how, and which critical components are reconfigured. In 
the case that an overlapped area of more than one critical component exists, an aircraft 
P, variations can occur as follows: 
I. ) Overlapped area of redundant critical components: This overlapped area will in- 
crease the number of non-redundant critical components regardless of shielding and 
non-shielding effects of the front redundant critical component of the overlapped 
area. Consequently, the total vulnerable areas increase and also P,; respectively. 
However, an aircraft P,,, using the front redundant critical component of the over- 
lapped area as a shield (shielding effect) is still, yet slightly, less than the one 
without the shielding effect. The shielding effect can decrease P« more if the front 
critical component of the overlapped area increases its shielding capacity. 
II. ) Overlapped area of non-redundant critical components with non-shielding effect: 
An aircraft P1 usually decreases because the total vulnerable areas also decreases, 
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even if the number of non-redundant components increase. The main reason is that 
the presented areas of the overlapped critical components reduce by the presented 
areas of the intersection. This leads to a reduction of the vulnerable areas of one of 
the intersected non-redundant critical components. 
III. ) Overlapped area of non-redundant critical components with shielding-effect: The 
shielding effect of the front critical component in the overlapped area reduced the 
overlapped area PK by decreasing PK of the shielded critical components. This can 
be made more efficient by reconfiguration of the critical component layout in the 
overlapped area, in which the lower PK critical component is positioned in front of 
the higher PIS critical component. This is an explanation of the fact that the U-99 
PIS in the rear view is lower than in the front view because of shielding effects. 
IV. ) Overlapped area of redundant and non-redundant critical components: This kind 
of overlapped area, either with or without the shielding effect, cannot be used to 
directly judge whether the total vulnerable areas increase or decrease. It depends 
on how many non-redundant critical components are involved, how large are the 
intersections, and how the critical components are positioned. More details and full 
investigation are required in this case. 
The principle of the reduction of an aircraft lethal radius is to reduce the detonation 
distance of the proximity warhead, where is delivers as P,, value of 0.5 to the aircraft. 
An aircraft lethal radius can be thus reduced by the same way as described above (recon- 
figuration of the critical component layout). More details about lethal radius have been 
shown in Appendix E. 
9.4 Validation and Discussion of Reliability & 
Maintainability Assessment 
The aircraft MOP for reliability used in this study is the total aircraft failure rate (FR), 
which was predicted by the 2 different methods developed for this design methodology; 
i. e. the combination and functionality methods. 
During the development of the combination method, the best fitting mathematical 
model was investigated to predict the highest and the lowest aircraft system failure rate. 
The results in the previous chapter show that the highest and the lowest aircraft system FR 
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could be predicted from available reliability data sets by using statistical linear regression 
based on the 6 most major R&M related design parameters, and engineering judgement; 
i. e. We, Ne, Alt, Wa, H, and Thrust. 
The most complete reliability data sets available consisted of 13 - 15 major critical- 
failure systems. Most aircraft of the available data sets have 13 systems. Considering the 
failure rate distribution of each aircraft from the available reliability data sets, most air- 
craft failure rates follow the Pareto distribution, with a portion of 40: 70 - 40: 80. Therefore, 
the constant number of 13 major critical failure components and 40: 70 Pareto distribu- 
tion portion were set as the default values used to predict the aircraft MOP for reliability 
(total aircraft failure rate). 
In conjunction with the available reliability data sets, based on aircraft empty weight, a 
Technology Improvement Factor (TIF) was discovered. Most aircraft reliability predicted 
by the combination method with this developed TIF are closer to the actual aircraft 
FR, especially data collected after the year 1985. Unfortunately, there was very limited 
reliability data for unmanned air vehicles (UAV); therefore, the TIF developed for this 
type of aircraft was based only on the results of U-99 and U-3 I'71 FR predictions from 
both the combination and functionality methods. 
Another simple FR prediction model was also developed, based on the last 2 available 
reliability data sets, in conjunction with the other 2 almost complete reliability data sets. 
The failure rates predicted from this model were more approximate, yet less complicated 
to use than the failure rates predicted from the combination method. 
Using a similar approach, to an aircraft FR prediction, one of the aircraft MOPS for 
maintainability, namely defect man-hour rate (DMHR), could also be predicted by using 
the same principle as the highest and the lowest FR predictions. 6 major design para- 
meters, in conjunction with assumed 13 major critical maintained systems, and also the 
40: 70 Pareto distribution portion were applied for the DMHR prediction. Unfortunately, 
there were not sufficient maintainability data to develop the TIF, and a more accurate 
functionality model. This meant that the average difference of DNIHR predicted from the 
combination and the functionality methods was larger than the average difference of the 
FR predictions. 
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9.5 Validation and Discussion of Life Cycle Cost 
Estimation 
The aircraft LCC predicted by the LCC estimation sub-module in this study is quite 
good because it has very small differences between the LCC predicted by this sub-module 
and LCC quoted from both published sources and a commercial program, as shown in 
Chapter 8. The LCC estimation model for this study was based on previous work with 
validation in some parameters, and sub-modules based on restricted literature. 
The aircraft LCC comprises several costs over the entire aircraft life time. One of these 
costs is the total operational cost, which includes all necessary expense to operate and 
support an aircraft fleet on one base for the entire aircraft life. This cost can therefore, 
be averaged over both the total number of operational aircraft and total flying hours. By 
this approach, the total operational cost per aircraft over a specific mission duration can 
be thus calculated by multiplying the average operational cost per aircraft per flying hour 
and the total aircraft flying hours. The summation of all operational aircraft operation 
costs gives the total operational costs for the entire fleet on one base. 
The operation cost predicted from the LCC estimation sub-module for the wartime sce- 
nario is less than for peacetime scenario due to excluding additional costs during wartime. 
These are aircraft lost cost, weapons released expense, and auxiliary maintenance and sup- 
port. In this methodology, only the aircraft lost cost and weapons released expense, which 
are evaluated directly in the mission simulation, are taken into account, and added into 
the total operation cost. This makes the total operational cost in this study more sensible. 
9.6 Discussion of Operation Simulation 
Most of the aircraft MOPs are in the form of probability values; therefore, a reliability 
block diagram was developed in conjunction with an event tree diagram to predict the 
success probability for each flight phase in a sortie. They considered all possible occurring 
events in each flight phase. Some unpredictable or more complexly evaluated values in this 
study were, however, randomly generated. The success probability for each flight phase 
was used to indicate to which event an aircraft would proceed; such as aircraft being 
killed, the target being killed, and aircraft completing the flight phase. The number of 
specific sorties, targets, and aircraft could therefore be precisely determined in the form of 
realistic integer numbers. By this approach, the flying hours of every operational aircraft, 
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or in service time, could be recorded and be used to predict the operational cost for the 
entire mission simulation. 
The Monte Carlo simulation technique was applied, with the aim of producing more 
accurate prediction results. This technique was based on statistical analysis, and the 
predicted result accuracy depends upon both the number of trials and the range of the 
predicted results. This process was very time consuming and demanded high computa- 
tional power and performance. A number of trials were thus investigated to discover the 
optimum trial number to achieve sufficiently reliable predicted results. The number of 
200 trials was found to be suitable and was used as the default in this study. This is the 
main reason for the fluctuations, discontinuity curves, and overlapped intervals in some 
of results shown in the previous chapter. 
9.7 Discussion of Aircraft Measures of Performance 
on the Operational and Operational Cost Mea- 
sures of Effectiveness 
As shown in Table 8.15 - 8.17 in previous chapter, increase aircraft individual and/or 
several MOPs mostly leads to decrease total number of specific sorties and targets. The 
main reason is that the total service time (flying hours) and total number of weapons 
released for entire fleet during mission simulation reduce The reduction ratio of total 
specific sorties and targets depends on the combination of aircraft MOPs, which leads to 
earlier abort, additional aircraft lost, and/or aircraft lost in earlier sortie and operational 
day. The followings show the major combinations of aircraft MOPs and their effects on 
the total number of specific sorties and targets: 
I. ) Aircraft with low vulnerability and susceptibility probabilities: The total number 
of specific sorites and target slightly reduces. 
II. ) Aircraft with high vulnerability probability and low susceptibility probability: The 
total number of specific sorties and targets also sightly reduces due to that additional 
aircraft being killed takes places in later sortie and/or operational day. 
III. ) Aircraft with low vulnerability probability but high susceptibility probability: The 
total number of specific sorties and target reduces due to that additional aircraft 
being killed takes places in earlier sortie and/or operational day. 
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IV. ) Aircraft with high vulnerability and susceptibility probabilities: The total number 
of specific sorties and targets significant reduces due to that additional aircraft 
being killed happens more and takes places in earlier sortie and/or operational day. 
V. ) Aircraft with high defect arising rate, which represent reliability: The total number 
of specific sorties and target mostly reduce due to that aircraft abort their mission 
often and spend their most of the time in maintenance. 
VI. ) Aircraft with high vulnerability and survivability probabilities associate with high 
defect arising rate and mean time to repair: The total number of specific sorties 
and targets significant reduces due to that aircraft abort their mission often and 
additional aircraft lost also take place in earlier sortie and operational day. 
The effect of the combinations of aircraft MOPS on the total operational cost, on the 
other hand, increase or give in the opposite direction as the effects on the total number of 
specific sorties and target due to mainly that additional lost significant increase the total 
operational cost. Unfortunately, an average operation & support cost per flying hour per 
aircraft calculated directly from the aircraft life cycle cost in this research includes also the 
maintenance cost; therefore, reduction in total service time (flying hours) of entire fleet 
due to longer maintenance requirement leads to reduction of operation & support cost 
during the mission simulation. This reduction makes not much sense; therefore, further 
study to separate the maintenance cost from average operation & support cost per flying 
hour has to be performed in the future work. 
9.8 Discussion of Optimisation Results Relative to 
the Operational and Cost-Effectiveness 
The optimisation results are used as examples of this design methodology, specifically 
applied to the U-99 case study. Two alternative optimisation methods were shown in the 
previous chapter. 
The results from both optimisation methods show that the U-99 could achieve max- 
imum sorties flown or targets killed if the U-99 obtains very low PD and defect arising 
rate, as shown in Table 8.18 - 8.19. The total number of sorties flown and targets killed 
could also increase if the U-99 vulnerability probability decreased. 
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A similar approach to optimise the total number of specific sorties and targets, the 
operational cost MOEs can also be minimised by using the same principle. Additionally, 
these costs could supplementally reduce by decreasing MTTR and DMHR. 
Regarding LCC results shown in Table 8.12, the operation cost from aircraft LCC was 
averaged over the total operational aircraft in one base in conjunction with the number 
of annual flying hours and the total number of aircraft life time. Therefore, the operation 
cost of U-99, F-16 and Eurofighter could not be directly compared due to their difference 
in number of operational aircraft in one base, annual flying hours, and total number of 
entire aircraft life time. 
9.9 Future Work 
Due to the limited research time scale, restriction of data, information, and assessment 
methodology, several assumptions had to be made. This leads to the development of 
simple assessments. The results from these assessments are therefore approximate, but 
sufficient, to show trends as discussed above. However, to increase the accuracy of this 
design methodology, further developments are still required, and will be discussed below. 
In this study, only the radar signature has been taken into account for the evaluation 
of aircraft probability of detection. This can only be used for specific threat types. Other 
aircraft signatures, namely the infrared signature and optics signature, should also be 
taken into account to cover most threat types currently used. 
The radar cross section prediction method in this study was based only on the aircraft 
external shape. This method may not be sufficient to predict RCS of the new generation 
of combat aircraft which use more radar absorbing material. Therefore, the effects of 
the radar absorbing material has to be considered within the assessment methodology. 
Additionally, the aircraft external shape partition method used in this study is quite 
simple, but it may be improved with the assistance of a CAD program. 
The limited research time scale, and a wide-range of design aspect assessment method- 
ologies developed for this study, meant that the probability of detection was determined 
directly from pre-calculated charts. To improve prediction accuracy, the probability of 
detection could be calculated more quickly by using computational methods, which would 
require an extra sub-module due to the complexity of the equations. 
The manoeuvrability probability used in this study is quite a simple model, based 
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on assumed and logical values. To assess these values is quite difficult during the early 
design stage. However, further research and investigation to assess this value should be 
continued. 
The vulnerable area assessment model developed for this study uses simple graphical 
methods to predict the critical components and aircraft presented areas, by overlapping a 
generated grid over a graphic image. A semi-automatic grid counter has been developed. 
The values predicted by this method are approximate due to round edges and limited 
detail in the graphic image. More detailed use of CAD is another possibility to improve 
the accuracy of the presented areas predictions. 
The maintainability assessment model used in this study uses assumed default values, 
due to the limited research time scale and restricted data. This assessment methodol- 
ogy should be further researched and developed the relationship between reliability and 
maintainability in the mission simulation. 
To achieve more accurate prediction results using the Monte Carlo simulation tech- 
nique, requires much computational time on high performance computers. An alternative 
method to reduce time consumption is to use computational parallelisation, which allows 
one application to use several processors simultaneously. 
In this study, either operational or operational cost-effectiveness can be optimised. 
To extend the design methodology for combining optimisation of operational and cost- 
effectiveness, further development in optimisation has to be performed. The multiobjec- 
tive optimisation technique is one of the alternatives to be studied. 
Expansion of optimisation feedback could also be improved. The feedback variables 
used in this study are in the form of aircraft MOPs, which cannot be used directly at the 
vehicle level of design. Therefore, further developments of every sub-module should allow 
the conversion of the aircraft MOPs to fundamental aircraft design parameters. By this 




This combat aircraft design methodology for operational and cost effectiveness has been 
developed with the aim of integrating all fundamental aircraft design aspects and the 
operation simulation into the early design stage. The aircraft design aspects included 
in this design methodology are susceptibility, vulnerability, reliability, maintainability, 
manoeuvrability, and life cycle cost. An aircraft will be considered as a sub-system of 
an overall system representing an entire operation scenario. By this approach, aircraft 
measures of performance for an individual design aspect can be evaluated in the form 
of probability values. Therefore, aircraft operational effectiveness can be measured in 
the forms of number of specific sorties, targets, and aircraft remaining; such as total 
number of successful sorties, number of targets killed, and number of aircraft killed. Due 
to the aircraft life cycle cost prediction, aircraft operational cost-effectiveness can be 
thus measured in the forms of both total cost of and cost per specific sortie, target, or 
aircraft loss. The results in the form of either operational or operational cost measures of 
effectiveness indicate which aircraft design aspects have to be considered further and/or 
can be sacrificed to achieve the optimum objective function. 
The method used to evaluate the aircraft operational measures of effectiveness from 
the aircraft measures of performance is through the use of the reliability block diagrams in 
conjunction with the event tree diagram, in the mission simulation. With the assistance of 
the Monte Carlo simulation technique, the aircraft operational measures of effectiveness 
can be more accurately predicted. 
An aircraft measure of performance for susceptibility is represented by the aircraft 
probability of detection. A simple aircraft probability of detection assessment method, 
developed in this research, is to use the pre-calculated aircraft radar cross section indirectly 
to determine the probability of detection value from published charts. An aircraft radar 
cross section prediction method in this study is based only on the aircraft external shape. 
The aircraft probability of kill represents an aircraft measure of performance for the 
vulnerability design aspect. The principle assessment of this value is to predict and sum 
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the vulnerable areas of non-redundant critical components. The influence of reconfigura- 
tion of the non-redundant and redundant critical components layout has been discovered 
and can be used to vary the probability of kill. An alternative measure of performance 
for vulnerability on encounter with a proximity warhead is that the lethal radius can also 
be varied by the same principle. 
The measure of aircraft performance for manoeuvrability has been introduced as 
weighting factors, defining the percentage of aircraft view appearing to the threat en- 
counter direction. These values directly influence the aircraft performance in survivability 
because each aircraft view obtains separate probabilities of kill and of detection value. 
Alternative reliability and maintainability assessments developed in this research are 
based on statistical analysis cooperating with the Pareto principle, by using historical, 
published and unpublished data. This method predicts the aircraft reliability and main- 
tainability using the fundamental aircraft design parameters, instead of details of all 
aircraft components. Additionally, another possible method is to assess these values is by 
using the relationship between both the reliability and maintainability and the aircraft 
empty weight. 
The operational cost during a wartime scenario throughout the mission simulation can 
be estimated via aircraft life cycle cost. Finding the operation cost per aircraft per flying 
hour is the main objective of this sub-module. This cost can be evaluated by averaging 
the total operation cost over the number of operational aircraft in one base and total 
flying hours for the aircraft entire life time. By considering the number of flying hours, 
together with weapons released, and aircraft being killed during the mission simulation, 
the total operational cost can be determined. 
The optimisation methods used in this research are the gradient-based method and the 
genetic algorithms. Both methods have been used in this study, firstly to evaluate only 
the optimum solutions either for operational effectiveness or operational cost-effectiveness. 
Due to the optimisation feedback variables in the forms of aircraft MOPs, the solutions 
from the optimisation can be used just to indicate the design direction to fulfill the selected 
objective function. 
By increasing an individual aircraft MOP, the operational MOEs mostly reduce in 
different inclination depending on which aircraft MOP has been considered. However, 
by combine several aircraft MOPs, the reduction inclination may increase or decrease 
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depending also on which and how the aircraft MOPS have been combined. On the other 
hand, the effects on the operational cost MOEs are mostly opposite as the effect on the 
operational MOEs. 
For the unmanned air vehicle, U-99, used as a case study in this research, the prob- 
ability of detection and defect arising rate are the most appropriate parameters to be 
considered for both maximum operational MOEs and minimum operational cost MOEs. 
The next most appropriate parameters are probability of kill, followed by probability of 
hit. Additional appropriate parameters are MTTR and DIVIHR. 
Additionally, some alternative trade-offs with the aircraft MOPs to improve the opera- 
tional and operational cost MOEs can also be examined with these developed applications. 
However, there are still some improvements, further development and research re- 
quired to extend this design methodology, such as increased accuracy of aircraft MOPS 
assessment, and application of multiobjective optimisation. It should be made possible 
to use target values of aircraft MOPS to drive aircraft design parameters, such as span, 
mass etc, to optimised aircraft configurations. 
CHAPTER 11 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this study, several assumptions, constraints, and simple models have been applied, due 
to the research time scale, restricted data, and assessment methodology. The following are 
some recommendations, which should be performed to improve this design methodology. 
1. Improvement of RCS prediction models to consider the effect of the radar absorbing 
material. 
2. Development of the methodology to include the assessment of an aircraft's infrared 
signature in order to improve the aircraft's probability of detection assessment 
methodology. 
3. Development or improvement of the manoeuvrability probability assessment method- 
ology. 
4. Improvement of the optimisation to consider more than one objective function. 
5. Improvement on all sub-modules to convert the aircraft MMMIOPs back to the funda- 
mental aircraft design parameters. 
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APPENDIX A 
RELIABILITY BLOCK DIAGRAM AND EVENT 
TREE CALCULATION METHODS 
Due to several sub-events can be occur after each other or conditional in an event; there- 
fore, the reliability block diagram (RBD) will be used to group those sub-events and the 
event tree diagram will be applied to evaluate each sub-event and event probability values. 
In this appendix, the probability concept will be firstly introduced, then the funda- 
mental of the reliability block diagram and of the event trees will be briefly described. 
A. Probability Concept 
The probability has a strict technical meaning and is a scientific `measure of chance', i. e., 
the probability indicates quantitatively the likelihood of an event or events. It can be 
indicated as a numerical value between zero, which defines an absolute impossibility, to 
unity, which defines an absolute certainly [71. 
Each event or events will have at least two possible outcomes, one of which can be 
considered as the favourable outcome or success and the other as the unfavourable outcome 
or failure. For an event that has more than two outcomes, it is possible to group together 
those outcomes which can be called favourable or successes and those which can be called 
unfavourable or failures. 
A. 2 Reliability Block Diagram calculation 
RBD is a diagrammatic representation of system in which each item is represented by a 
box. The relationship between items is determined by the effect that the failure or success 
of each one has on the functionality of the system as a whole. The total probability of 
each system or each box is unity, which can be represented in numerical form as follows: 
'success +1 
Fellure -1 (A. 1) 
There are two main principle to combine system with each others; i. e., series and 
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parallel. Additionally, some systems may contain a combination of more than one types. 
A. 2.1 Series system 
This type of combination has been shown in Fig. A. 1, which all sub-systems have to be 
connected after each other. The consequence is that the system requirement for success 
is so `all sub-systems' must be working. If one of sub-system in this type of combination 






success' B success `A. 
2) 
AB 
Figure A. 1: Two components series system 
A. 2.2 Parallel system 
Fig. A. 2 shows an example of this parallel combination system, in which all sub-systems 
are connected parallel. In this case, the system requirement is that only one sub-system 
needs to be working for system success. Or in other words, the entire system will be 
failure, only if all sub-system are failure. The probability of system success can be thus 
obtained as the complement of the system failure or by using the expression of `either A 
or B or both' constitutes success to give 
PSystem 
success -1- rSystein failure -1 
PA 
failurerB failure 






Figure A. 2: Two components parallel system 
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A. 2.3 Series-parallel System 
The general principle used is to reduce sequentially the complicated configuration by 
combining appropriate series and parallel branches of the system until a single equivalent 
sub-system remains. This equivalent sub-system then represents the entire system of the 
original configuration. 
A. 3 Event Trees 
An event tree is a pictorial representation of all the events which can occur in a system. 
It is defined as a tree because the pictorial representation gradually fans out like the 
branches of a tree as an increasing number of events are considered [7]. 
With any system, in which the operation of a particular sub-system is dependent on 
the success or failure of another sub-system, the sequence of events must be considered 
















Figure A. 3: Reduced Event Tree Sample 
Fig A. 3 shows a reduced event tree of a system of five components. This is deduced 
by considering each sub-system or event with considering of outcome deduction, that 
can be made before each new sub-system or event is considered. If, at each of these 
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deductions, it is known that a particular outcome is reached by a path irrespective whether 
subsequent sub-systems or events are successful or not, there is no need to consider further 
development of this event path. The success probability of this deduced system can be 
evaluated as 
PSystem 
success = rPath I+ 
PPath 
2+ rPath 4+ 
Ppath 
5+p path 8+p path 9+P path 11 
PA 
success rB successrC success 
+ PA 
success rB success rC failure rD success 
PA 




failure' C failure rD success rE success 
PA 
failure rB success rC success rD success 
41A 
failure rB success 
PC 
successf D failure-'E success T 
PA 
failure' B successrC failure' D success 
APPENDIX B 
SURVIVABILITY ASSESSMENT MODULE 
This appendix will explain and show flowchart, algorithms, program dialogs and results 
of survivability assessment module, which can be split into two main sub-modules; sus- 
ceptibility assessment and vulnerability assessment modules. 
In the real program procedure, the vulnerability assessment module has to be first 
separately executed to determine presented areas of aircraft; therefore, the probability of 
hit or of fuse, when aircraft is detected, can be consequently evaluated from the suscep- 
tibility assessment module. With manoeuvrability probability, which is represented by 
weighting factors for each flight phase in a sortie, and uniform random of hits or explosion 
distance, an average survivability probability in each flight phase can be thus assessed as 
shown in Fig. B. 1. 
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Figure B. 1: Flowchart of survivability assessment module 
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B. 1 Susceptibility Assessment Module 
In this module, the probability of detection and probability of hit or of fuse, when aircraft 
get detected, are the main results. The probability of detection for each aircraft view 
can immediately determined, but for the probability of hit or of fuse evaluation needs to 
obtain aircraft presented areas from vulnerability assessment module before the actual 
determination can start. The flowchart of this module can be shown in Fig. B. 2. 
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[ Preflight phase] 
/// II[ 
Front view ] 
lip z 
Ca1CuLrte CaICut]te 
Sýsr. 1-To-Noise ratio Stgrýal-To-Nose ratio 
( Front view J (Prell gLt Phase J 
Load pre-calculated 
gmpb 
Select probabtbty of Select probabhty of 
detection detection 
[ Front v, ew [ Pref o) t phase ] 
Figure B. 2: Flowchart of probability of detection prediction 
Input variables for each aircraft view for this module can be loaded directly from 
default files or be given direct in the program dialog. 
B. 1.1 Radar Cross Section Prediction 
This module mainly calculates the aircraft RCS and the false alarm probability and shows 
these values in the dialog (Fig. B. 4). All simple shape data of the aircraft external 
geometry in all six aircraft views and radar performance can be either loaded from a data 
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file or filled directly in this application dialog page. Consequently, the aircraft RCS in 
each view can be thus determined. 
; oad 
Deafult atore Data RCS & 
Aircraft Radar Mission 
Model U-99 
Aircraft RCS [ -22 1452 dB 
Arcraf RCS 0.00610207 m2 
Show Graphs Fxlt 
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------ Number of Parts :8 
Part Number [ONE RCS 
r 
-34.1629 dB 
Part Type RCS 
1 0.000383448 m2 
SPHERE .º 
Length 0 233 SHARP EDGE m Area j m2 
Rados I 0.09 DIHEDRAL ---m Cone Angie [ 
Angle 32.88 Deg Angle 20-- Deg 
Figure B. 3: Susceptibility assessment dialog 
Table B. 1 - B. 3 show the results of front view radar cross section calculation from three 
different aircraft by using AN/FPS-16 radar system, which has approximate frequency of 
5 GHz, to represent the general frequency of Hight Finder, Aircraft, SAM transportable, 
and SAM mobile radar systems [51] 
Table B. 1: Results of F-117 front view radar cross section calculation from susceptibility 
assessment module 
Part number Simple shape Duplication RCS [m`] 
1 Flat plate 2 0.00007246 
2 Flat plate 2 0.00004680 
3 Flat plate 2 0.00000400 
4 Flat plate 2 0.00003193 
5 Flat plate 2 0.00000131 
6 Flat plate 2 0.00006247 
7 Flat plate 2 0.00000063 
8 Flat plate 2 0.01224193 
9 Flat plate 2 --0.00000000 
10 Sharp edge 2 0.00000204 
11 Sharp edge 2 0.00000072 
Total - - 0.02492856 
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Table B. 2: Results of B-2 front view radar cross section calculation from susceptibility 
assessment module 
Part number Simple shape Duplication RCS [m ] 
1 Ogive 1 0.04706017 
2 Flat plate 2 0.00000557 
3 Sharp edge 2 0.00001179 
4 Blunt edge 2 0.02369229 
5 Blunt edge 2 0.01579467 
6 Sharp edge 2 0.000010057 
7 Sharp edge 2 0.00001110 
8 Sharp edge 2 0.00001179 
Total - - 0.12613468 
Table B. 3: Results of U-99 front view radar cross section calculation from susceptibility 
assessment module 
. Fart number bimple shape L)uplication 1tub [m`] 
1 Blunt edge 2 0.00038345 
2 Blunt edge 2 0.00076690 
3 Blunt edge 2 0.00051126 
4 Blunt edge 2 0.00060282 
5 Blunt edge 2 0.00076690 
6 Sharp edge 2 0.00000967 
7 Sharp edge 2 0.00000796 
8 Sharp edge 2 0.00000208 
Total - - 0.00610207 
B. 1.2 Probability of Detection Estimation 
As described in chapter 3, the PD is a function of S/N and P,,; therefore, the both necessary 
parameters have to be firstly evaluated. The Pn is a direct function of radar threshold 
from Eqn. (3.17). The threshold can be loaded from default file or be directly filled in 
the dialog application. On the other hand, the S/N depends upon several parameters; 
one of them is distance between aircraft and radar system, which is subject to flight 
phase. Another influential parameter is aircraft RCS, which depends on the aircraft view. 
With the aircraft being seen view probability (manoeuvrability probability) and distance 
between aircraft and opponent radar system in each flight phase, an average S/N can be 
thus evaluated. 
Once, the necessary parameters for the average aircraft detection probability in each 
flight phase in a mission sortie determination have been calculated, the user has to in- 
terpolate value from the pre-calculated graph to receive the probability of detection (see 
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Figure B. 4: Graph for evaluation detection probability dialog 
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Fig. B. 4). By using the same principle, the detection probability of each aircraft view in 
each flight phase can therefore determined. 
Table B. 4: Results of U-99 probability of detection in attack flight phase of manoeuvra- 
bility option 2 with P = 3.72665 x 10-6 
View RCS [dBm ] S/N [dBm ] Pv1ev, PD 
Top 64.4827 79.1151 0.15 ,: 0.99 
Right -19.4542 -4.8218 0.15 --0.006 
Left -19.4542 -4.8218 0.15 --0.006 
Front -22.1452 -7.5128 0.40 --0.001 
Rear 0.6854 15.3178 0.00 ,: 0.65 
Bottom 64.4827 79.1151 0.15 --0.99 
Total 59.2539 73.8863 - --0.98 
B. 1.3 Probability of hit or of fuse Evaluation 
This application dialog offers two models to evaluate the probability of hit or of fuse, when 
aircraft is detected; i. e. Shoe-Box and Carlton (details see Chapter 3). Fig. B. 5 shows 
the program procedure to evaluate this value by using uniform random miss distance and 
statistical analysis. 
The probability of hit or fuse, when aircraft is detected, depends on aircraft presented 
area; therefore, PH, D for each aircraft view has to be separately evaluate 
(see Fig. B. 6). 
B. Survivability Assessment : Module 
Presented area 
[ Front view ] 
Create random 
miss distances 
Probability of hit by Probability of hit by 
Shoe Box method Carlton method 
[ Front view ][ Front vnew ] 
Weighting Factors 
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Probability of hit by Iýýý Probability of hit by 
Shoe Box method JI 
Carlton method 
[ Preflight phase ][ Preflight phase ] 
Figure B. 5: Flowchart of probability of hit (Ieteri»inatioii 
I las 
On the other hand, PF7D will obtain value 1.0 because after the proxiiiiit. v warhead deto- 
Hates, the fragments encounter directly aircraft, which can he treated as multiple hits by 
penetrators (more details see Section 3.1.3). 
B. 2 Vulnerability Assessment Module 
This module calculates mainly the probability of aircraft kill given a single naiidoiii hit 
and random multiple hits by contact warheads or penetrators. The flowchart, for the 
vulnerability assessment module can he shown in Fig B. 7: 
Input parameters have to be loaded frone stored files or directly given through the 
dialog application; and also some condition for vulnerability estiiiiat. ioii have to be Selected 
(sec Fig. B. 8) 
B. 2.1 Critical and Overlapped Critical Components Definition 
From the kill tree diagram, the critical components are identified; this ideiitificatioýiº ca» 
be given by loading from default file or by completing in the application dialog. The 
component redundancy can also obtain as the same way. 
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Load Deafult Store Data RCS & SIN calculation Show Graphs exit 
Aircraft Radar I, Mission Miss Distance 
Number of Hits 20 
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Probability of Hit 
FRONT CARLTON P 0644473 
Aircraft Presented Area Radius 10.6451 
Radius Sample Variance 29.6934 
Radius Standard Deviation F- 31.2563 
Figure B. 6: Application dialog for probability of hit determination 
'l'abte ts. b: U-vv critical components list 
Component Redundancy 
Fuel system 5 
Engine 2 
Flight Control system (FCS) 2 
Air Data (AD) 1 
Control Unit (CU) 1 
Global Positioning System (GPS) 1 
With the shotline technique, overlapped critical components in each view can be iden- 
tified as shown in Table B. 6. 
With the definition as shown in Table B. 6, the presented areas, probability of kill of 
these critical component overlapped area for each aircraft view can be evaluated as shown 
in Fig. B. 9. 
B. 2.2 Presented Area Prediction 
In this module, there are three options to obtain aircraft, critical component, and over- 
lapped presented areas; i. e. directly load from default file, directly input in the application 
dialog, and semi-automatic grid counting. 
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Figure B. 7: Flowchart of vulnerability assessment module 
Table B. 6: U-99 overlapped critical components list 
No. Right/Left Front/Rear 
1 FCSs + Tank No. 1 AD + Tank No. 1 
2 Tank No. 1 + No. 4 + No. 5 CU + Engine No. 1 
3 Tank No. 4 + No. 5 GPS + Engine No. 2 
4 Tank No. 4 + No-5 + Engines FCS + Tank No. 3 + No. 5 
5 Tank No. 1 + No. 4 + No. 5 + Engines Tank No. 3 + No. 5 
6 Tank No. 2 + No. 3 + Engines FCS + Tank No. 2 + No. 4 
7 Tank No. 1 + No. 2 + No. 3 Tank No. 2 + No. 4 
8 GPS + CU 
9 Engine No. l + No. 2 
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In the third option, information about aircraft and/or critical component presented 
areas are not available either from default file or from drawing, a semi-automatic grid 
counter option offers a simple alternative to count presented area of aircraft and/or critical 
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Figure B. 8: Vulnerability assessment module application dialog 
New Data Load Defauk Overlapped Area Calculation 
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Store Data Show Drawnq Ext 
Overlapped Component 
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1st Component : FUEL SYSTEM No: ONE 027 
2ndCompor FCS ZJ No: PORT . 0.64 
Id Component ZERO w No: ZERO I I 
4thComP on: ºýº ZERO No. ZERO I0 I0 
5thComponert : ZERO No: ZERO 
F0 0 
Figure B. 9: Critical component overlapped area presented area tab dialog 
components including overlapped areas in each aircraft view in Grid unit as shown in 
Fig. B. 10. The generated grid can be resized; and the drawing can be moved and zoomed 
to mark component and/or aircraft presented areas more precisely. 
B. Survivability Assessment Module 
Araaf Model Resented Area Vulnerable Area UNIT PkA Hts se 
u 99 no Gnd G -ý J Load Di&mg 
- IT0P - i. - .: TOP Gnd 
KK AL ýRCRAFT 
Q Grid Size 
Type 
Nm Re6x4&t 
Figure B. 10: Semi-automatic Grid counting 
B. 2.3 Transition Matrices Elaboration 
152 
In the vulnerability assessment module, transition matrix in each aircraft view is a very 
importance functionality to evaluate the probability of kill by multiple hits of penetrators. 
As described in Chapter 3, an aircraft can be examined in three main categories; i. e. 
non-overlapped critical component, non-shielding effect overlapped critical component, 
and shielding effect overlapped critical component. Fig. B. 11 - B. 18 show the transition 
matrices of case study aircraft U-99 in different views and categories. 
B. 2.4 Lethal Radius Estimation 
The lethal radius is one measure of aircraft vulnerability probability on encounter with a 
proximity warhead. The expected number of fragments impacting on the aircraft depends 
mainly on the detonation distance. It is assumed that all fragments (n) from the spray 
zone, whose shotline are within the aircraft presented area (see Fig. 3.8), hit the aircraft. 
The probability of kill given an encounter with this warhead is thus a function of the 
detonation distance. If the detonation distance resulting enough fragments impacting on 
the aircraft, such that the probability of kill is equal to 0.5. This distance will be defined 
as lethal radius [s) 
By using the same U-99 drawings as usual in the determination of the U-99 presented 
areas for all 6 main aircraft views, the lethal radius of each U-99 view can be thus evaluated 
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firstly in grid units. Unfortunately, to display every U-99 view drawing in the same display 
dialog, the drawings have to be either expanded or shrunk. Therefore, scale factors (see 
Table B. 9) have to be applied to convert the grid units to metre units. Table B. 7 - B. 8 
show the lethal radius of the U-99 in different critical component layouts, and also with 
and without fuel system redundancy consideration. 
Table B. 7: Lethal radius[m] of U-99 with and without non-redundant fuel systems 
Non-Shielding Overlapped 71.48 48.27 43.34 143.34 130.11 26.12 25.21 125.21 
Shielding Overlapped 71.48 46.75 43.16 42.82 30.11 25.18 25.16 24.90 
Table B. 8: Lethal radius[Grid] of U-99 with and without non-redundant fuel systems 
Non-Shielding Overlapped 642.94 507.55 500.00 500.00 270.84 274.61 290.89 290.89 
Shielding Overlapped 642.94 491.51 497.96 494.07 270.84 264.69 290.25 287.31 
The lethal radius can be read from graph between P,; and s as shown in Fig. B. 19. 
Due to different scale of U-99 drawing in each view, the ratios of drawing grid in each 
aircraft view to the actual size of U-99 have been investigate and shown, as in Table B. 9 
Table B. 9: U-99 drawing *grid factor in six main aircraft views 
Span Length 
Grid Metre Factor Grid Metre Factor 
Top/Bottom 57 7.8 0.136842 76 6.5 0.08552 
Left/Right 82 7.8 0.095122 - - - 
Front/Rear - - - 75 6.5 0.08667 
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Figure B. 19: Lethal radius estimation application dialog 
APPENDIX C 
RELIABILITY & MAINTAINABILITY 
ASSESSMENT MODULE 
This appendix shows and explains mainly how the reliability & maintainability assess- 
ment module works. All regression equations and results from several models will be 
additionally shown in this appendix. 
Fig. C. 1 shows the flowchart of this module, which several prediction models for the 
highest and the lowest reliability and maintainability measures can be chosen; such as 
linear regression, exponential regression, Pareto distribution of 40: 60 portion, of 40: 70 
portion, and direct linear equations. 
The application offers two alternatives to initial variables; i. e. loading data from text 
file or directly giving in the application dialog. Updating some data directly after loading 
from default file is also another possibility to acquire the input data. Before an aircraft 
reliability and maintainability are estimated, an aircraft type has to be chosen to select 
an appropriate TIF for the combination method for reliability prediction (see chapter 4). 
C. 1 Reliability Assessment Module 
In this section, equations and prediction method of the third (functionality of aircraft 
empty weight) and the fourth (combination method between linear regression and Pareto 
distribution) reliability models are described. The fourth method has been used in this 
design methodology, as shown in Reliability & Maintainability application dialog (see 
Fig. C. 2). 
C. 1.1 Empty Weight Functionality Model 
This model offers the simplest prediction method of aircraft reliability from four limit 
data sets (1985,1987,1993, and 1996). Due to limit data and timescale to develop this 
module, all data have been used to find an average failure rate prediction equation to 
160 
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art of reliability & maintainability assessment module 
cover all aircraft types and generations as shown in Table C. 1. 
Table C. 1: Linear equations to predict aircraft failure rate in each data set 
Data in Linear Equation 
1985 FR(We) = 0.0726 " We + 0.268 
1987 FR(We) = 0.0733 " We - 0.0844 
1993 FR(We) = 0.0870 " We - 0.2776 
1996 FR(WW) = 0.1372 " We - 0.7499 
All sets FR(We) = 0.0666 " We + 0.0476 
C. 1.2 Combination Model 
As described in Chapter 4, this model contains following procedures (see Fig. C. 1): 
1. Determination of the highest and the lowest FR via linear regression or exponential 
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Load Default Update Data calculate Store Qata lave AN Data Exit 
Variables & Equations' Details Reliability Assessment Maintainability Assessment 
Model :; U 99 
No of Engines (Nei: [2 
Empty Weight (We) : 3269 Kg 
Total Thrust [T I: F--j§ 64 kN 
Wing Area (Wa) : 2532 rn2 
Max Altitude (H(: 12192 m 
Aircraft Hedgh (h) 1 55 m 
Total FR/1000 FH Total DMHR/1000 FH 
j- 298.679 12379 5 
Unmanned_Awaatt _ý 
v Lnear Regression Logarithm Regression 
Pareto apply et - 100: 70% 60`: 
Coefficients 
bO - 518.6 
b1 - 19.656 b4 - -2 298e-002 
b2 - 3.721 b5 - 59.411 
b3 - -5.4422e-003 b6 - -1.87 
Y. bO + b1'h + b2'T + b3'We + b4'H . b5'Ne + b6'We 
NUM 
Figure C. 2: Reliability & Maintainability assessment application dialog 
regression. 
2. Evaluation of the Pareto distribution b coefficient. 
3. Determine the FR distribution values of the rest 60% aircraft systems. 
4. Sum all aircraft system FR 
C. 1.2.1 Linear Regression Model 
With this model, linear equations to evaluate the highest and the lowest failure rate from 
several variables by using the linear regression analysis. The six aircraft design variables 
are Thrust, We, H, Alt, NE, and W. 
Only two full details data sets with anonymous aircraft name were available (data in 
1985 and 1993). The first reliability data set was collected in middle of 90's and based on 
the technology in that time, but the second data set was collected in early 20th century; 
therefore, both data sets could not directly used with each other without any TIF. Due 
to limit data and timescale, any development to integrate these two data sets could not 
be done in this research. 
The linear equations to predict the highest and the lowest aircraft component failure 
rate can be here presented as follows: 
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1. Data from 1985: There were nine anonymous aircraft in this data set with design 
variable data as shown in Table C. 2 and the highest and the lowest failure rate 
linear regression equations are: 
FR(100) =122.245 - 61.126 "H+2.299 " Thrust + 0.0149 " VV + 0.00166. Alt 
+125.517. NE-1.465" WQ (c. 1) 
FR(70) =90.896 - 1.806 "H-4.9641 " Thrust - 0.0197. We + 0.04018 " Alt 
-232.866"NE+15.88" WQ (C. 2) 
2. Data from 1993: Five anonymous aircraft, whose data have been shown in Table C. 3, 
were given in unpublished data 141; therefore, the highest and the lowest linear 
regression equations can be given: 
FR(100) =49.442 + 76.511 "H- 30.247 " Thrust - 0.082 " WW + 0.1962 " Alt 
+1633.004"NE+89.427" Wa (C. 3) 
FR(70) =- 196.905 - 16.280 "H-4.893 " Thrust - 0.0245. We + 0.0465 " Alt 
- 211.153. NE + 17.958 " WQ (C. 4) 
Table C. 2: Aircraft design variable from Serahides L38I 
A/C Thrust Empty Weight Height Altitude Engine Wing Area FR(100) FR(70) 
B1 355.83 2540.2 8.28 19800 4 370 464.55 74.253 
Fl 143.18 2650.0 5.97 18300 2 39 393.3 71.685 
F2 186.82 3444.0 5.02 18300 2 49 471.48 57.394 
Al 98.07 3565.0 4.95 12192 2 48 310.91 46.942 
A2 64.94 3628.8 4.89 14000 2 24 248.86 38.251 
ATR1 19.57 6387.0 2.69 14630 1 16 261.76 31.986 
ATR2 24.03 7000.0 4.09 14630 1 17 99.048 20.455 
F-104D 70.26 8978.0 4.11 17680 1 18.22 302.3 43.458 
A-7D 63.40 10886.4 4.93 12192 1 34.83 236.95 37.868 
Table C. 3: Aircraft design variable from unpublished data [41 
A/C Thrust Empty Weight Height Altitude Engine Wing Area FR(100) FR(70) 
GA1 Early 95.94 6139 3.63 15605 1 18.68 19.843 1.867 
GA1 Late 95.6 7050 3.55 15240 1 21.37 117.98 13.767 
Ti 23.13 3635 4 15240 1 16.9 2225.7 364.705 
GA2 46.8 7000 4.89 14000 2 24.18 75.65 13.581 
GA3 80.96 14502 5.95 21335 2 26.6 162.02 29.415 
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C. 1.2.2 Exponential Regression Model 
This model is an alternative to predict the highest and the lowest failure rate by using 
exponential regression analysis. The same six design variables have been used to evaluate 
the FR(100) and FR(70), which can be given for two data sets as: 
1. For data in 1985: 
FR(100) =52.93115866.0.717544857H " 1.008068746 Thrust " 1.000142602WW 
. 1.000012 logAlt " 3.132437067NE " 0.991647611'° (C. 5) 
FR(70) =8.87061032.0"994149478H " 1.004561319Tt""`st " 1.00005692We 
. 1.000017867 Alt " 1.625167302NE " 0.994925813Wa (C. 6) 
2. For data in 1993: 
FR(100) =9739866.727.0.913310811Thrust " 1.000980832W " 7.20193950811- 
0.999151797 Alt " 0.0000954549NE " 1.3005779011 va (C. 7) 
FR(70) =11786500000.26.3778653H " 0.90033209Th`ru3t " 1.0016021891v° 
" 0.998460316 Alt " 0.00000949137NE " 1.078421347tiv° (C. 8) 
C. 1.2.3 Pareto Distribution Model 
Because the fourth method of aircraft failure rate prediction is using Pareto principle to 
evaluate the whole aircraft failure rate; therefore, the real data of aircraft reliability has 
to be investigated and proved that it follows this principle as shown in Fig. C. 3. 
Fig. C. 4 shows that the comparison between the real highest failure rate and the one 
from results of using Pareto distribution presentation. It shows that the Pareto distribu- 
tion predicted highest failure rates are close to the original data. Hence, the highest and 
the lowest aircraft component failure rate from evaluated from Pareto distribution will 
represented the highest and the lowest failure rate of the real data to be used in develop- 
ment the linear regression the highest and the lowest failure rate equations. Consequently, 
Pareto distribution of each aircraft can be thus evaluated with the assumption that every 
aircraft obtains constant thirteen aircraft components as shown in Fig. C. 5. 
With the highest and the lowest FR, calculated by linear or exponential regression 
equations, the Pareto distribution b coefficient can be determined by using Eqn. (4.5). Ta- 
ble C. 4 shows the Pareto distribution coefficients from example aircraft based on available 
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Figure C. 4: Comparison between the highest failure rate from the real data and from 
the Pareto distribution representative 
data. 
Table C. 5 shows the comparison between calculated results from the third and the 
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Load Default date Da[a 4akilate Stae Qata have Al Data Exit 
Ik Variables & Equations' Details Reliability Assessment Maintainability Assessment 
Model 
Max Fa" e Rate IFR(1)) 401 774 / 1000 FH Total A/C Flue Rate 
Mn Feiue Rate [FR(811 20 4817 / 1000 FH 298679 / 1000 FH 
No. of Systems [NoS] 13 2d No of NoS(8) 00 
No of No$(8) 5: of FR(8) 70 
Paeto s Drstr &4 on 
-1 160397 
FR(x) " 401.77 X 
ý, ý., 
Figure C. 5: Failure rate Pareto distribution coefficient calculation tab dialog 
Table C. 4: Failure rate Pareto distribution coefficients 
Ai ft 
Pareto distribution coefficient 
rcra FR(100) b 
B1 465.2821473 -0.714627222 
F1 350.5325186 -0.666972376 
F2 506.191688 -0.802766808 
Al 299.5143338 -0.749937326 
A2 266.1150186 -0.718763674 
ATR1 224.7953014 -0.85533625 
ATR2 157.1861043 -0.621304266 
F-104 295.1601972 -0.767448387 
A-7 224.3806853 -0.714819826 
GA1 Early 19.84300092 -0.872729379 
GA1 Late 117.9800012 -0.793275107 
T1 2225.7 -0.667910969 
GA2 75.6500011 -0.634183602 
GA3 162.0200032 -0.630053015 
C. 2 Maintainability Assessment Module 
Similar difficulties to an aircraft failure rate prediction, but there were much less avail- 
able data to develop a certain prediction model; therefore, only a simple model as a 
function of aircraft empty weight is firstly examined. And the DMHR equations from 
linear and exponential regression analysis of six design variables with assumption that an 
aircraft obtains thirteen component have been then developed, in which the combination 
method can be examined. Fig. C. 6 shows the application tab dialog in this reliability & 
maintainability assessment module. 
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Table C. 5: Compare results of failure rate prediction per 1000 flying hour 
Ai ft R ld t 
Combination method Functionality method 
rcra ea a a 40: 80 40: 70 Average Original 
F2 1493.5 1433.364 1873.319 276.97 521.744 
Al 1250.7 875.968 1149.294 285.029 530.94 
A2 1052.4 793.648 1043.67 289.278 535.7888 
ATR1 832.8 617.122 808.302 472.974 745.4728 
ATR2 547.4 499.349 661.507 513.8 792.00 
F-104 1147.2 853.977 1119.292 645.535 942.328 
A-7 958.5 670.828 882.449 772.634 1087.3664 
GA1 Late 454.0 983.986 1270.121 517.73 335.75 
GA2 445 787.591 1030.723 513.8 331.4 
GA3 959 1145.412 1493.86 1013.433 984.074 
F-16 420.0 873.134 1149.976 505.142 419.171 
F-18 700 1532.18 1982.528 743.237 681.2185 
F-4 850 1254.931 1626.063 968.716 923.9881 
F-15 710 1278.09 1664.799 863.117 813.1585 
F-105 680 887.399 1170.958 905.341 859.6307 
C9 Reliability a Maintainability Assessment Fw-I 
Load Defauit Update Data Cakubte Store Data Save AY Data Et 
Variables & Equations' Details Reliability Assessment Maintainability Assessment 
Model U 99 
Total A/C Defect Man+lo. a Rate Max DMHR JDMHR(1(1 03%42 / 1000 FH 
Mn DMHR LDMHR(811 '. { 409.145 / 1000 FH 
123795 / 1000 FH 
No of Systems (NoS) 13 : of No of NoS(8) 40 
No of NoS(8) [5 %of FRI8i' 70 
Pareto s DotoNs on 
-08250111 
FR(. ) - 3395.4 X 
DMHR - Defect Man+losa Rate 
Ready NUM 
Figure C. 6: Defect man-hour rate Pareto distribution coefficient calculation tab dialog 
C. 2.1 Functionality of Aircraft Empty Weight 
There were very less maintainability data available than of reliability. Only two linear 
equations can be investigated, and be shown as in Fig. C. 7. 
Therefore, an average aircraft DMHR per 1000 flying hour linear equation can be 
developed and shown as the following equations: 
DMHRAircra ft = 12221 - 0.8009 " We (C. 9) 
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Figure C. 7: Defect man-hour rate as a function of aircraft empty weight 
C. 2.2 Combination Method 
This method uses the same principle and variables as used for the FR combination method 
(see Section C. 1.2). Firstly, the highest and the lowest aircraft system DMHR have to be 
evaluated via linear or exponential regressions. The next step is to determine the Pareto 
distribution b coefficient by assuming that aircraft contains thirteen major systems. Each 
aircraft system DMHR can be thus predicted by dint of the Pareto principle. Finally, the 
total aircraft DMHR can be summed from these thirteen major aircraft system DMHR. 
C. 2.2.1 Linear Regression Model 
Similar as the highest and the lowest failure rate predictions, the only two data sets could 
not be used together due to different technology and aircraft types. 
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1. Linear regression analysis of data in 1985: 
DMHR(100) =4615.405078 - 230.2682582 "H 
+ 24.08205537 " Thrust - 0.050116816 " We - 0.229619018 " Alt 
+ 696.7274414. NE - 9.78649894. Wa (C. 10) 
DMHR(70) =518.5990642 - 19.65587772 "H 
+ 3.720986756 " Thrust - 0.005442201 " We - 0.022979769 " Alt 
(C. 11) + 59.41102159 " NE - 1.870040774 " W. 
2. Linear regression analysis of data in 1993: 
DMHR(100) =4598.171944 + 989.3250555 "H 
- 20.55090072 " Thrust + 0.441361581 " We - 0.392431133 " Alt 
- 2379.658742 " NE - 5.152069 " W. 
DMHR(70) =855.1331753 + 209.8118117. H 
(C. 12) 
- 3.350542173 " Thrust + 0.080594332 " We - 0.082597689 " Alt 
- 492.851663 " NE + 0.372898482 " W. (C. 13) 
C. 2.2.2 Exponential Regression Model 
The exponential model can be also used to predicted the highest and the lowest DMHR 
by using two available maintainability data sets as follows: 
1. Exponential regression analysis of data in 1985: 
DMHR(100) =8491.619193.0.935621878H " 1.010783441Thrust " 0.999968623We 
" 0.999871213 Alt " 1.290320816NE " 0.99448234x'° (C. 14) 
DMHR(70) =1010.2661880.944147718H " 1.010921795 Thrust , 0.999976427w" 
" 0.999899442 Alt " 1.086936452NE " 0.994702854w" (C. 15) 
2. Exponential regression analysis of data in 1993: 
DMHR(100) =2147374.605.12.00683986" " 0.956821917Thrust , 1.000883348'° 
" 0.998972826Aft " 0.001303594NE " 1.164114963'° (C. 16) 
DMHR(70) =293832.5362.15.86936996H " 0.947961121Thrust " 1.000966956We 
" 0.99883298A1t " 0.000284034NE " 1.3554410310 (C. 17) 
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C. 2.2.3 Pareto Distribution Model 
Similar to reliability prediction, the real data of aircraft maintainability has to be inves- 
tigated and proved that it follows this principle as shown in Fig. C. 8. 
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Figure C. 8: Pareto distribution of real data in 1985 and 1993 
As the same principle to predict aircraft failure rate, the highest defect man-hour 
rates of the real data have to be examined to confirm that the aircraft system DMHR 
distribution follows the Pareto distribution (see Fig. C. 8). From these two available data 
sets, the 40: 70 portion has been discovered and be used as default in this methodology. 
Figure C. 9: Comparison between the highest defect man-hour rate from the real data 
and from the Pareto distribution representative 
After the highest and the lowest aircraft system DMHR have been determined, the 
Pareto distribution coefficients can be evaluated. Table C. 6 shows the defect man-hour 
rate Pareto distribution coefficients of each aircraft. Finally, the total aircraft DMHR, 
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which is a summation of all assumed thirteen system DMHR calculated from the Pareto 
distribution, can be calculated. Table C. 7 shows the comparison between the total aircraft 
DMHR calculated from the combination, functionality method and the two available real 
data. 
Table C. 6: Defect man-hour rate Pareto distribution coefficients 
Airc aft 
Pareto dis tribution coefficient r FR(100) b 
B1 5770.044 -0.791963 
F1 3365.716 -0.70983 
F2 4497.754 -0.723593 
Al 3782.826 -0.77689 
A2 2815.331 -0.76411 
ATR1 1327.99 -7438 
ATR2 1072.513 -0.69379 
F-104 1396.812 -0.63395 
A-7 2017.742 -0.7272 
GA1 Early 2713.00 -0.7121 
GA1 Late 2735.07 -0.7164 
T1 1101.11 -0.6978 
GA2 2207.76 -0.7648 
GA3 702.41 -0.4843 
Table C. 7: Compare results of defect man-hour rate prediction per 1000 flying hour 
Aircraft Real data Combination method Funct ionality 
40: 60 40: 70 Average Original 
BI 1893.6 1391.216 1830.471 10186.55 13288.41 
F1 2118.3 1080.544 1426.933 10098.62 13176.865 
F2 17029.7 23206.39 17580.38 9462.7 12370.24 
Al 13405.5 18789.28 14289.28 9365.792 122473.165 
A2 9584.4 14133.77 10695.21 9314.694 12182.502 
ATR1 7459.6 6755.324 5118.266 7105.652 9380.4467 
ATR2 4990.7 5697.414 4282.271 6614.7 8757.7 
F-104 6216.3 7593.171 5711.828 5030.52 6748.2498 
A-7 7810.6 10425.88 7867.151 3502.082 4809.50624 
GA1 Late 3430 14183.74 10744.59 6574.655 3010.385 
GA2 4500 11095.1 8384.3919 6614.7 3025.3 
GA3 959 4435.54 3283.273 606.348 787.4534 
T1 5040.0 5828.263 4383.341 9309.729 4029.0795 
APPENDIX D 
LIFE CYCLE COST ESTIMATION MODULE 
This Appendix will show LCC estimation module and its model in details, which is based 
mostly on Woodford [13] Birkler [$] and Burns [11l. Some parts have been modified to make 
this model more simple and to avoid restricted and/or unavailable data. Fig. D. 1 shows 
the overall outlook of the LCC estimation application dialog, which contains another five 
tap dialogs. 
L0ad D. aI ult _alculaticm :. a, e Data E. it 
Life Cycle Cost Cost Factor Research... ; Production... Operation... Disposal 
Aircraft Model :r WARTIME 
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation r3.37751e+009 
Production 2.60048e+009 
Ground Support & Initial Spare : 2.60048e. 008 
Operation and Support 4.71894e+007 
Disposal: (2 63788e+007 
Life Cycle Cost 6 28496e+009 
Average discount LCC / Aircraft 
Research, Development & 6 68814e. 006 
Production 5.14947e+006 
Ground Support S Initial Spare : 520097 
Operation and Support 4 71894e+006 
Disposal 52235 3 
L/e Cycle Cost 1 71289e. 007 
Figure D. 1: Life Cycle Cost estimation application dialog 
Similar to the other module, LCC estimation application dialog can load the default or 
pre-data directly from stored file or be given directly through the application dialog. Ad- 
ditionally, the pre-calculated unscheduled maintenance (DMHR) is automatically passed 
direct from the reliability & maintainability assessment module. 
The next importance step is to choose mission scenario, in which an aircraft LCC 
will be evaluated. Then, the initial of the necessary parameter and variable can be done. 
Finally, after total aircraft LCC has been estimated, and the average costs per aircraft per 
172 
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Start 
DMHR from R&M 
assessment module 
ýNO 











Figure D. 2: Flowchart of LCC estimation module 
flying hour will be evaluated; for instant, operation & support cost, personnel cost, and 
unit level consumption. These values will be used for mission operational cost calculation 
afterwards. 
Fig. D. 2 shows an overall flowchart of LCC estimation module. During the 0&S cost 
estimation process, the O&S cost for wartime and peacetime operation will be separate 
calculated. 
D. 1 Parameter Initiate 
Before the LCC can be evaluated, some global variables and assumed values have to be 
initiate. These values will be used in many different equations. These variables are: 
1. Advanced technology factor: The advanced technology factor (FATE) value can be 
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estimated from a single equation presented by Woodford [531 Unfortunately, his 
model is too details in design which excess this methodology; therefore, this value 
will be assumed as 1.275 throughout LCC estimation model. 
2. Advanced design tool factor: This value is assumed as a constant value (FADT 
= 1.3) and is integrated mainly in RDT&E and production cost due to increasing 
usage of advanced composites and new technology. 
3. Advanced technology testing factor: This factor is integrated aiming to cover flight 
test engineering planning, data reduction, manufacturing support, flight test instru- 
mentation, spares, fuel and oil, pilot's salary, facility rental, and insurance during 
the flight test during the RDT&E process. This factor is assumed as constant 
variable (FATT = 1.2). 
4. Number of partners: The number of partners is defined as the ratio of number of 
aircraft production to number of largest single buy from the program as: 
NPART = 
NIR°D (D. 1) 
NLARGE 
5. Airframe-only mass: This mass is equivalent to the airframe unit mass, and is 
defined by MIL-STD-1374. The airframe-only mass (11ýIgirJrnme) can be estimated as 
aircraft empty mass minus wheels, tires, tubes & brakes, engines, rubber or nylon 
fuel cells, starters and power unit, instruments, batteries & electrical power supply 
and conversion, avionics equipment, air conditioning, anti-icing & pressurisation 
units, cameras and other surveillance equipment, trapped fuel and oil. 
6. Consumer Price index: This variable aims to include inflation within the cost of 
aircraft, which is a function of accounting year (YRACC) as shown in Eqn. (5.2). 
7. Labour rates: The engineering (CLE), quality/tooling (CLT), and manufacturing 
labour rate (CLIVI) are based on `then year' dollars, and can be given as following 
equations, which have an extra security factor (FS) built in PI 
CLE = (0.0191 x YRACC2 - 0.5432 x YRACC - 37.964) x FS (D. 2) 
CLT = (0.0054 x YRACC2 + 1.0755 x YRACC - 89.215) x FS (D. 3) 
CLM = (0.0132 x YRACC2 - 0.5627 x YRACC - 13.679) x FS (D. 4) 
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8. Advanced materials factor: This cost factor considers for using advanced materials 
(FAMA), which is a function of the percentage, by mass, of advanced materials used 
for structural application. This factor can be given as a function of aircraft empty 
mass. 
FAMA =4.4028 x MATýo,,, ro,; te - 
5.7025 x MATco,,, no;; te + 
2.8658 x MATc. , pa»ite 
+ 0.3168 x MATCO,,, po,; te +1 
(D. 5) 
9. Collaborative factor: Woodford [53I developed a separate factor (FPART) to allow 
for the collaboration nature of modern aircraft programs with suggestion of Mr. P. 
Pugh, formerly of the Directorate of Project, Time, and Cost Analysis (DPTCAn), 
a division of the Ministry of Defence as: 
FPART = NPARTO. 33 (D. 6) 
10. Pay rates: Officer (OPR), Enlisted (EPR), and Civilian pay rate (CPR) are approx- 
imate average annual payment for U. S Air Force officer and engineer regarding to 
information from the open sources [33,34] These rate have been set as default values 
as: 
41 OPR = 50400 $ 
" EPR = 22200 $ 
" CPR = 42000 $ 
D. 2 Research, Development, Test,. & Evaluation Cost 
This estimation model breaks the develop procedure into three major categories with 
several different activities. The total RDT&E cost is a summation of the multiples between 
the effort quantity in hours and its relevant labour rate. 
D. 2.1 Airframe Development Cost 
Cost of airframe development can be broken down into following activities: 
1. Engineering cost for the airframe development (CDAE) 
CDAE =0.066 x M°ir96ame xV 
fax 8x 
1VRD183 T&E 
x FATF x FAMA/FADT x FPART x CLE (D. 7) 
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2. Development support cost (CDDS) 
CDDS =0.0356 x M°i°°3ame xV9x 
N°TD&E 
X CPI 
x FATF x FS/FADT x FPART (D. 8) 
3. Flight test cost (CDFT) 
CDFT =0.00558 x MA; rframe XV fä 
ýl 
x NR1.281 
DT&E x CPI 
FATT x FS (D. 9) 
4. Tooling cost (EDTP) 
EDTP =5.083 x M°768 X V°'899 x N°'18 x RATE° °ss Airframe Afaa RDT&E 
x FAMA/FADT°"5 x FPART x CLT (D. 10) 
5. Development manufacturing cost (EDML) 
0 76 0 549 N' 554 EDML =43.61X MAir frame x VMax x NRDT&E 
x FAMA/FADT°"5 x FPART x CLM (D. 11) 
6. Quality control cost (CDQL) 
CDQL = 0.13 x CDML x CLT/CLM (D. 12) 
7. Manufacturing material and equipment cost (CDMI\'IE) 
CDMME =96.77 x M°; r J2af11e XV 
ýax °X NTD&E 
X CPI 
x FAMA x FLO (D. 13) 
Total cost for development airframe (CDA; rfra,,, e) is a summation of above 
labour costs 
as: 
CDAirframe =CDAE + CDDS + CDFT + CDTP 
+ CDML + CDQL + CDMME (D. 14) 
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D. 2.2 Engine development cost 
Woodford PI explained that the constant 0.833 and 1.0E6 are added into model from 
Birkler I8] due to CPI value in 1980. Regarding to CPI value from The United States 
Bureau of Labour Statistics web site [491, the constant value 0.833 has been replaced by 
0.842. 
CDE -_ -845.804 
+ 0.00002244 x Thrust + 249.838 xM+0.313 x TT4 
0.6 x 0.8421 x FADT 
x CPI x FPART x 1.0E6 (D. 15) 
CDEF =0.77 x CPE x (NRDT&E - NSTAT) X (NE + 1) (D. 16) 
CDE9iTLe =CDE + CDEF (D. 17) 
where M become 1 if an aircraft is not designed for supersonic vehicle. 
D. 2.3 Avionics development cost 
This model to estimate avionics cost is based on the uninstalled avionics mass, which is 
approximated 90% of the total avionics mass, as follows: 
CDV =853820 x WV x FPART x CPI 
CDVF =3950 x WV x (NRDT&E - NSTAT) X CPI 
CDAvioniCS =CDV + CDVF 
Total RDT&E cost is a summation of these three development costs as: 
CRDT&E 
=v 
DAirfrnme +v DEngine +v LAvionics 





Similar to RDT&E cost, the production can be split into three main groups; airframe, 
engine, and avionics production. The summation of all three main component production 
costs brings to the total aircraft production cost. 
D. 3.1 Airframe Production Cost 
During the production processes, the following activities and costs can be occurred. These 
can be estimated as: 
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1. Production engineering cost for the airframe development (CPAE) 
CPAE =[0.066 x M°; *f6a.. XV58X 
(NRDT&E + 1'PROD)o. iss 
x FATF x FAMA/FADT x FPART x CLE] - CDAE (D. 22) 
2. Production tooling cost (EPTP) 
EPTP = 
[5.083 
x M°i 68ame x 
Vý 8x 9X (NRDT&E + 1YPROD)°'18 X RATEo. oso 
x FAMA/FADT°"5 x FPART x CLT] - EDTP 
3. Production manufacturing cost (EPML) 
EPML = 
[43.61 
x M°; 76rame X 
V0 549 X (NRDT&E + NPROD)0.554 
rf ax 
x FAMA/FADT0.5 x FPART] - EDML 
4. Production quality control cost (CPQL) 
CDQL = 0.13 x CPML x CLT/CLM 






x M°i6 f2671e XVý6X 
(NRTD&E + NPROD)o. sos X CPI 
x FAMA x FLO] - CDMME (D. 26) 
D. 3.2 Engine Production Cost 
The engine production cost (CPE) is based on the aircraft turbine engine production cost 
developed by Birkler [81 and multiply by the effect of CPI value of year 1980, when this 
model has been developed, and CPI of aircraft design accounting year. Therefore, the 
total engine production costs (CPE9;,, e) can 
be given as: 
CPE - 
(0.043 x Thrust + 243.25 xM+0.969 x TT4 - 2228 
0.8421 
x CPI x 1E6 (D. 27) 
CPE,, 
9i, ze =CPE x NPROD x NE 
(D. 28) 
D. Life Cycle Cost Estimation Module 179 
D. 3.3 Avionics Production Cost 
The avionics production cost (CPAV; of; cs) is given as: 
CPA=o,,,, s = 3950 x 
WV x CPI x NPRQD (D. 29) 




CrAirframe +v rEngine + 
CrAvionics (D. 30) 
To estimate the trade value of the design aircraft, flyaway (CF, yawaU) and acquisition 
cost (CAcquisitio) will be evaluated as: 
C 





Acquisition NRDT&E T ýT 
\1J J 
lY+ lYPROD 
D. 4 Ground Support Equipment and Initial Spares 
The GSE&IS cost is about 10% of the aircraft flyaway cost, as described in chapter 5. 
CCSE&IS = 0.1 X 
CFlyaway (D. 33) 
D. 5 Operation and Support 
The operation and support cost (Coperat; o) 
breakdown follows the methods and structure 
by the US Office of the Secretary of Defense [12] This O&S cost is estimated for one 
main operating base only; therefore, the cost for the individual aircraft contains the total 
deflated O&S cost divided by the number of aircraft on the base. 
D. 5.1 Personnel Cost 
The personnel cost includes all expense for operation personnel, support personnel, and 
also service allowances, personnel support and training. 
D. 5.1.1 Operation Personnel Cost 
Operation personnel cost (COM) is a summation of number of office, enlisted, and civilian 
in the first and second line operation multiply with their relevant annual payment rate 
as: 
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1. Number of active flight-crew member (NOMOF): 
NOMOF = 0.923 x FMOF x Nopcration (D. 34) 
where FMOF is the `crew-ratio' (1.1 for fighter, 1.5 for bomber, 1.5 - 3.5 for trans- 
port). 
2. Number of operation officer (NOMO): 
NOMO = 
(0.40799 + 0.923 x FMOF + FHY x DMHR x 6.708E - 5) 
x N0peration + 3.0 (D. 35) 
3. Number of operation enlisted (NOME): 
NOME = 
(3.7246 FHY x SM FHY x DMHR1 XN Operation + 301.5075 
+ 208.695622 J 
Operation 
4. Number of operation civilian (NOIVVIC): 
NOMC = 0.0577 x 1.67 + 
FHY x DMHRl x Noperation CJ (D. 37) 
208.695622 
5. Total number of operation personnel (NOM): 
NOM = NOMO + NOME + NOMC (D. 38) 
6. Total operation personnel cost (COM): 
COM = NOMO x OPR + NOME x EPR + NOMC x CPR (D. 39) 
D. 5.1.2 Support Personnel Cost 
Support personnel cost (CSM) depends on number of operation aircraft and operation 
personnel on the base. 
1. Number of support office (NSMO): 
NSMO = 7.0 + 0.6155 x N0peratio + 0.0555 x NOMOF + 0.00837 x NOM (D. 40) 
2. Number of support enlisted (NSME): 
NSME = 16.0 + 5.8974 x No,, erat; o + 0.0921 x 
NOM (D. 41) 
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3. Number of support civilian (NSMC): 
NSMC = 0.02222 x NOMOF + 0.0705 x NOM (D. 42) 
4. Total support personnel cost (CSM): 
CSM = NSMO x OPR + NSME x EPR + NSMC x CPR (D. 43) 
D. 5.1.3 Service Allowance, Personnel Support and Training Cost 
This service allowance, personnel support and training cost (CSASTT) model aims to 
obtain all officer and enlisted training cost; training funds; and officer and enlisted per- 
manent change of station. 
1. Officer training cost (CSOT): 
CSOT =(0.0643 x NOMO + 0.0028 x NOM + 0.0001 x NOME) 
x OPR (D. 44) 
2. Enlisted training cost (CSET): 
CSET =(0.1294 x NOME + 0.0232 x NOM + 0.0077 x NOMO) 
x EPR (D. 45) 
3. Training funds (CSTF): 
CSTF =(0.0042 x NOME + 0.052 x NOMO + 0.1128 x NOM) x 
CPI 
0.739 x 10-4 
(D. 46) 
4. Officer permanent change station cost (CSOPCS): 
CSOPCS = 1795 x 
5884 
x (NOMO + NSMO) (D. 47) 
5. Enlisted permanent change station cost (CSEPCS): 
CSEPCS = 940 x 
5884 
x (NOME + NSME) (D. 48) 
6. Total service allowance, personnel support and training cost (CSASTT): 
CSASTT = CSOT + CSET + CSTF + CSOPCS + CSEPCS (D. 49) 
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D. 5.2 Unit level consumption 
Woodford [53] modified this model from the US Navy 0&S cost estimating model FY-1979 
with RAF Cost of support spreadsheet. This model can be split as follows: 
1. Cost of Fuel, other petroleum, oil, and lubricants (COF): 
COF = 1.213588X MF7ej X 
FHY 
X CF, Lel X Noperation 
(D. 50) Ts-. -rt,,: 
2. Maintenance material cost (COMMAT): 
COMMAT =(6.9313 + 0.1028 x 
F12Y 
x (SM + DMHR) + 0.145 x V,,... ) 
x 1.27199 x FHY x CPI X Noperat; on 
(D. 51) 
3. Miscellaneous support supply cost (COMSS): This cost is about 53.19 % of main- 
tenance material cost (COMMAT). 
COMSS = 0.5319 x COMMAT (D. 52) 
4. Depot level reparable cost (CODLR): 
CODLR = 5.751 x (SM + DMHR) 
1.2234 X V°2486 x FHY x CPI (D. 53) 
5. Temporary additional duty cost (COTAD): 
COTAD = 6925.2077 x N0peratio x CPI (D. 54) 
6. Transport cost (COUTRN): This cost is approximately 3.79 % of total above costs. 
COUTRN =(COF + COMMAT + COMSS + CODLR + COTAD) 
x 0.0379 (D. 55) 
7. Other cost (COUOTH): This cost can be approximately estimated as 25 % of total 
unit level consumption cost until here. 
COUTH =0.25 x (COUTRN + COF + COMMAT + COMSS+ 
CODLR + COTAD) (D. 56) 
8. Total unit level consumption cost (Cu,,;, ): The CU,,;, is simple a summation of all 
above described costs; 
Cu,,; t =COF + COMMAT + COMSS + CODLR+ 
COTAD + COUTRN + COUOTH (D. 57) 
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D. 5.3 Contracts 
183 
Model from Woodford PI defined this cost for the third and the forth line maintenance 
following structure of RAF and can be split into four main costs as: 
1. Mechanical contract cost (COAC): 
COAC = 
[(-9.7977 + 0.52085 x (SM + DMHR) + 1.1902 x MA/c x 2.2046E - 3) 
x 1000 x 
FHY 
160 x 
NOpera`ion + (32.30965 + 7.688 x (SM + DMHR)) 
x FHY X Noperationx 
CPI 
(D. 58) 1 
0.793 
2. Engine contract cost (COEC): 
COEC =1.9(NE-1) x 
(FRROR x ERO) + ERM 
x 1000 x 
CPI 
(1 + FPROR) x DAR 0.793 
x N0peratio x FHY (D. 59) 
ERO =5.574 + 4.527 x Thrust + 70.71 x FD (D. 60) 
ERM =8.9434 + 1.235 x Thrust + 11.321 x FD (D. 61) 
where ERO is unit cost for an engine overhaul, ERI\'I is unit cost for engine repair, 
FD =1 if engine bypass ratio > 0, unless FD = 0, FPROR is the overhaul/repair 
ratio (here is assumed to be 0.4), and DAR. is the depot arrival rate in operating 
hour (assumed to be 250 hours) 
3. Avionics contract cost (COVC): 
COVC = 0.5 x No,,, ; o x WV x CPI x FHY 
(D. 62) 
4. Supply contract cost (COCT): 
COOS =(COF + COMMAT + COMSS + CODLR + COAC + COEC) 
x 0.5 




COAC + COEC + COVC + COSC (D. 64) 
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D. 5.4 Sustaining Support Cost and Installation Support Funds 
Woodford [53I showed that cost of replacement support equipment and modification kit 
procurement (CSEK) are approximate 0.55% of total flyaway cost of operating base. But 
the sustaining engineering support cost (CSSE) depends on labour, material and overhead 
costs. Therefore, the installation support funds (CSISF) are incurred by the personnel 
pay and allowances, material, and utilities needed for the maintenance of the base. 
CSEK =0.0055 x CFLvaWQY x 1YOperation 
CSSE =0.2396 x CODLR + 0.098 x (COAC + COEC) 
(D. 65) 
+ 0.123 x (COF + COMMAT + COMSS) - COSC - COUTRN (D. 66) 
CSISF =3565 x 
5884 
x NOSM 
CSST =CSEK + CSSE + CSISF 
(D. 67) 
(D. 68) 
Total 0&S cost for one year is simply a sum of all of the precious calculated costs. 
As the aircraft will be operated for certain year; the `discounted' value must be added for 
each year to reach the true total O&S cost. 
COperation year =COSM + CSASTT + COULCT + COCT + CSST (D. 69) 




where DEF can be calculated from Eqn. (5.8) and RED is economic discount rate (default 
value as 6% details see chapter 5). 
D. 6 Disposal 
Woodford PI developed a model to estimate disposal cost (CJT) based on material price 
in FY83 and validate with CPI factor; however, the final disposal cost is deflated following 
aircraft life time. Hence the deflated disposal cost (CDiaposa! ) can be given as: 
CJM =0.05 x EPML (D. 71) 
CJA =-5x (NPROD + NRDT&E) X (1 MATýo,,,,, o,; e) x 
T'V, x CPI (D. 72) 
CJMAT =(NPORD + NRDT&E) x MATTanipo,; te x WW x 27.86567 x CPI (D. 73) 
CJT =CJM + CJMAT + CJA (D. 74) 
CD;, 
pa, al =CJT x DEF (D. 75) 
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D. 7 Life Cycle Cost 
In this module, the total life cycle cost can be simply calculated as a summation of 
the different cost phases already calculated, apportioned to different number of aircraft, 







`Operation + `Disposal (D. 76) LCC 
NRDT&E + NPROD NPROD NOperation 1YRDT&E + 1VPROD 
Figure D. 7 - D. 7 show the results of LCC estimation module for F-16 and Eurofighter 
during wartime and peacetime operation by using most values from Woodford [531 with 
some validated value from open sources; such as payment rates, CPI factor. 
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OPERATION MISSION SIMULATION MODULE 
This module is the core of the entire program, because it links every submodule, which 
evaluate or measure aircraft performance and/or effectiveness, and apply these values to 
measure aircraft operational and cost-effectiveness, as shown in Fig E. 1. Due to objective 
of this design methodology aiming to integrate a mission simulation within the early 
design stage, only general information and major conceptual design variables are available. 
Therefore, this mission simulation has been developed with some assumptions and simple 
models. 
Susceptibility II Reliability & 
Assessment ýýbility J Assessment 
Vulnerability Operation Mission Assessment Simulation We Cycle Cost 
(Monte Carlo) Estimation 
Save in File Show in linear graph Show in numeric 
mow in simple mini 
animation 
Figure E. 1: Flowchart of entire application 
E. 1 Flowcharts of Alternative Studies Missions 
The new generation of combat aircraft will be used as multi-roles air vehicle, but the 
performance and specification for each role is not the same. Therefore, primary mission 
for the designed aircraft has to be firstly established. 
Finally, `bombing' mission is chosen to be a model to develop this simulation due to 
specification of case study aircraft, U-99. Fig. E. 2 - E. 8 show all historical developed 
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E. 2 Manoeuvrability Probability 
In this methodology, a simple model called weighting factors has been chosen to repre- 
sented the manoeuvrability probability (details see Chapter 3). These values will be used 
as default values throughout the mission simulation. Fig. E. 9 show five alternatives of 
manoeuvrability probability used in this study. 
E. 3 General Results 
Table E. 1 shows U-99 RCS, PD and PK predicted by susceptibility and vulnerability 
assessment sub-modules with different manoeuvrability probability options. 
Table E. 1: Results from susceptibility and vulnerability assessment sub-modules with 
different manoeuvrability probability options 
Manoeuvrability probability 
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 Option 5 
RCS [dBm ] -22.1452 54.4621 61.4724 63.2333 644827 
S/N [dBm2] -41.9063 38.701 41.7113 43.4723 44.7216 Pre-flight 
PD 0.001 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
PK 0.085146 0.06635 0.047569 0.02878 0.00999 
RCS [dBm ] 54.4827 54.4827 57.493 56.2436 58.46 
Outbound S/N [dBm2] 42.5294 42.5294 45.5397 44.2904 46.5089 
PD 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
P1 0.06866 0.06866 0.06413 0.07088 0.06336 
RCS [dBm ] 61.4724 59.2539 57.493 54.4827 -21.7876 
Attack S/N [dBm2] 76.1048 73.8863 72.1254 69.1151 -7.1552 
PD 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.003 
PK 0.0386 0.05363 0.06413 0.07464 0.082157 
RCS [dBm ] 54.4827 54.4827 57.493 56.2436 58.4621 
S/N [dBm2] 42.5295 42.5295 45.5398 44.2904 46.5089 Inbound 
PD 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
PK 0.06738 0.06738 0.06285 0.06928 0.06198 
RCS [dBm ] 0.6854 58.4621 61.4724 62.2333 64.4827 
Post-Flight S/N 
[dBm2] -19.0757 38.701 41.7113 44.2904 44.7216 
PD 0.001 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
PK 0.08301 0.06475 0.0465 0.02824 0.00999 
Table E. 2 shows general results from mission simulation module with different ma- 
noeuvrability probability options. 
Fig. E. 10 shows the effect of aircraft probability of detection in number of sorties flown, 
successful sorties, complete sorties, and targets killed with the associated costs. 
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Table E. 2: Results from mission simulation module with different manoeuvrability prob- 
Manoeuvrability probability 
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 Option 5 
Sorties Flown 130 156 151 152 175 
Complete Sorties 106 136 133 135 157 
Targets Killed 78 107 110 96 115 
Aircraft lost cost [M$] 26.0048 15.6029 15.6029 15.6029 0.00 
Operational Cost {M$] 11.0655 13.7995 13.2599 13.5429 15.7375 
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Figure E. 10: Effect of probability of detection 
Fig. E. 11 shows the effect of aircraft probability of hit in number of sorties flown, 
successful sorties, complete sorties, and targets killed with the associated costs. 
Fig. E. 12 shows the effect of aircraft probability of kill on encounter with penetrators 
in number of sorties flown, successful sorties, complete sorties, and targets killed with the 
associated costs. 
Fig. E. 13 shows the effect of aircraft probability of kill on encounter with proximity 
warhead in number of sorties flown, successful sorties, complete sorties, and targets killed 
with the associated costs. 
Fig. E. 14 shows the effect of aircraft defect arising rate in number of sorties flown, 
successful sorties, complete sorties, and targets killed with the associated costs. 
Fig. E. 15 shows the effect of aircraft mean time to repair defect in number of sorties 
flown, successful sorties, complete sorties, and targets killed with the associated costs. 
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Figure E. 12: Effect of probability of kill on encounter with penetrators 
Fig. E. 16 shows the effect of aircraft mean time to repair damage in number of sorties 
flown, successful sorties, complete sorties, and targets killed with the associated costs. 
Fig. E. 17 shows the effect of aircraft defect man-hour rate in number of sorties flown, 
successful sorties, complete sorties, and targets killed with the associated costs. 
Fig. E. 18 - E. 30 show the effects of, and the relationships between susceptibility and 
vulnerability on the operational and operational cost MOEs. 
E. Operation Mission Simulation Module 202 
200 r"se. uP. ud . pcm: -oootf .o il-uoh* 7474 5.. Ooo, - 140 - ,. """. 
"" 




, ee .... 45000Q 
. . .. _r 
ýi .,.. p P1 
t eo 0 




350000 Y l0U ýýýýý" Iýº-" `, iii inýiii S 
1]0 ý_""ý ", 
- ., 




,.. _.. _ .. ý!! ..,: ,. _... 




200000 llo- - 
60 








0 01 02 03 O4 05 06 07 08 09 0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 
Ptobalmlity of Kill Fit t, v E*, I ai l E, ilo V\C i<k., t it) Fh-ut . i. ýl, t o(F: ý11 Hit In E+ctnual Ez7, looý. t (c. idais l 
" SerbeýFlown " DetoredTryes Tr1i Co. 
-Lner (5croe. Flown) -- Poy (Some. hlnvn) -L+ýer (Lem'oye4Trass) --P4, (De. 9oyed Trpn) 
ISO >. -sctY. . aunt-ycoJ. o 3o . t31 i.. is. » 600000 140 r-ýt3. 
"-tzwt. tcm. "-nu'. o Y. tois. ý4734 ý. ýuiýi ýo 
Rý-09933 Rý-U 9047 
160 r v. m. 
ee. -. rov Y ýý 500000 120 
.-i. r i. 
r '"` 140 \ 
ýýýýý" 
iý 
/' N .. '. n 
400n00 Tl 
" F -.. 





. ýý... ,.. ý.. _,, ýeý" 
'i 
aioooo 
' 31 r. ýýa t y 
g 60 a 000U 
` 
4o 
. .. isýnn 200000 y 4U . v, ý.. . w>.. y 
2oo. ol) 
100000 20 f 20 100000 I 
0 0 00 
0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 OS 09 
Frobaluht% of K. 11 Hd Iv Ext. n al Exploors. IM. 4ý°c. I P.. Wbd I of 6d1 HO t' Erzfanal Espdoo, s iA. ýtaun1 
< 
-Ise. (_. >0.. le. e ;.. n.. t --P.. I I .,.... i. r. S +3... 4 -Icier t5Icce. afil 5:. runt --P.. N IS0(Iex0CW _'ýnext 
Figure E. 13: Effect of probability of kill on encounter with proximity warhead 
2. x. 210000 140 . _.,. s)iiooO 
tit ". 
t (+; -00000 
tai .., Y tx ý. i .ms.. remau) _ ýýnýý(, tl Ys ", "r < 19000 0 
1 
y-9EllllEW2. I£Ati IEOIaý"O12Jd7.. ItýR J: F^ 
i. 5"WO 
F"' 




y-1Erl:. SwJ . ý¢m ]EDý. o U/1-ob.. ý3tlr 231)000 
ý. 
17JUUJ J Rý-o9A68 
p 
ý ao y _vy3N V...:. ooiýýý 210000 
40 
16ý: ýo0n 20 190000 20 
0 ---ý- 150000 0 170000 
0 001 002 n0i il J. f nl5 0 11 u7 1. O 001 002 u03 004 (105 006 007 008 009 
1). f. " A. ýwua K. Detect irtx u¢ R. 
" So. 9 Flow, " Saa< Cot " Dntroys d Tr¢e " Trya Con 
-L (00.9.. F1o. m) -- Po (Soýoe. Flowr) - Iý. r .. 9o d (D T s) -P oved Tr eu) 









, ' ' y 110 _OUiUO 
Ö 
y_ 80 
0 lý 4U 1ý _ 
ý a lvua, o ,P a4oooo 
y 




20 130000 20 180000 
0 140000 0 160000 
0 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009 0 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009 
t). hol ArIxuc Rate D<fýct 
.. o.... 
Rae 
" Complex Soma " Co.. plerc Svee Con "= . u Su .. "_. n. Wl So ron 
-laser tComFleee Sane. l -- F-W 1--jle k. e.. l . 
: 
teer 5uc<e. "00 ýolnen - -Cole ISI "IdI4 Suroe. l 
Figure E. 14: Effect of defect arising rate 
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Figure E. 15: Effect of mean time to repair defect 
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Fig. E. 31 - E. 49 show the results of the effect of all major aircraft MOPs predicted in 
this study on the operation and operational cost MOEs. 
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Figure E. 32: Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTTRDefect on the total 
number of sorties flown with PKNon = PKExt = 0.25 
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Figure E. 33: Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTT Roe fCCt on the total 
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Figure E. 35: Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTT RDe fect on cost [$] /sortie 
with PKNon = PKExt = 0.25 
220000 
P_((O. 25): P_k(0.5): DMFQt(0.5) 





0 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 006 009 
Defect Ares 
ýM7TR0 -M7TR2 -MTIR4 5 
nsoooo 






0 001 002 003 0w 005 006 007 008 009 
450000 P_d(0.75); P_k(O. 5); DMHR (0.5) 
. ooooo 
ýSOOOO 




0 001 002 001 004 005 0 00 007 008 009 
II - MTTR 0- MTTR 2 -MTTR/? - MTTR 0- MTTR 2 -M1TR45 
Figure E. 36: Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTTRDPIPCt on cost[$]/sortie 
with PKNon = PKExt = 0.50 
E. Operation Mission Simulation Module 214 
300000 











0 001 002 003 001 005 006 007 008 009 
Defect Ans 
-M'lTRO -MTFR2 -MTTR45 












0 001 002 003 0N 0 05 006 007 008 009 
MTTR0 - MTTR2 -M=4 5 
600000 







0 001 002 003 00.005 006 007 008 009 
-MTTR0 -MT TR2 -MT rR45 
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Following are results from two alternative optimisation by using six aircraft MOPS to 
find the possible optimum solution to design an operational and cost-effectiveness U-99, 
case study aircraft. Table E. 3 shows the overall results from the gradient-based method 
optimisation. Fig. E. 50 - E. 53 show the developments of the optimised solution by using 
the gradient-base method. 
Table E. 3: Total results from the gradient-based method optimi 
Minimise Maximise 
Cost[$]/Target Cost[$]/Sortie Targets Killed Sorties Flown 
Defect Arising 0.029519 0.099899 0.00494 0.00 
PD 0.062758 0.117555 0.29574 0.00 
PKNon 0.371593 0.485130 0.007653 0.618059 
PKE 
t 
0.515784 0.216124 0.148098 0.330151 
x MTT RDe f ect 4.180827 6.534311 0.6544909 0.00 
DMHR 0.00 5.374156 5.092504 4.074727 
Sorties Flown 171 128 185 198 
Complete Sorties 151 90 177 193 
Successful Sorties 116 68 134 148 
Targets Killed 120 78 136 150 
Aircraft Killed 1 1 1 0 
Cost [$] /Sortie 131547.125 117821.8125 142369.2188 143275.9844 
Cost [$] /Target 187454.6562 193348.6094 193664.0000 189124.2969 
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Figure E. 50: Development of the possible minimum cost [$] /target solution by using the 
gradient-based method 
Table E. 4 show the overall results of the possible solutions optimised by the genetic 
algorithms, and Fig. E. 54 - E. 57 show the improvements of populations during the opti- 
misation process. 
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Figure E. 52: Development of the possible maximum targets killed solution by using the 
gradient-based method 
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Figure E. 54: Improvement of minimum cost[$]/target solution populations optimised 
by the genetic algorithms 
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Targets Killed Sorties Flown 
Defect Arising 0.011719 0.098817 0.000194 0.000092 
PD 0.0857886 0.169359 0.030381 0.006378 
PKNon 0.927993 0.279011 0.048066 0.452994 
PKE 
t 
0.138689 0.456199 0.000565 0.245471 
x MTTRDefeet 1.505455 7.514457 0.408179 1.979400 
DMHR 0.075532 0.236438 2.873198 2.895339 
Sorties Flown 179 125 194 193 
Complete Sorties 168 87 189 187 
Successful Sorties 129 66 144 142 
Targets Killed 132 73 146 143 
Aircraft Killed 1 1 1 1 
Cost [$] /Sortie 136669.9844 113487.3984 142378.4375 141507.8594 
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Figure E. 55: Improvement of minimum cost[$]/sortie solution populations optimised by 
the genetic algorithms 
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Figure E. 56: Improvement of maximum targets killed solution populations optimised 
by the genetic algorithms 








0 2000 4000 6001 8000 10000 
Population 
Figure E. 57: Improvement of maximum sorties flown solution populations optimised by 
the genetic algorithms 
APPENDIX F 
MISSION EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS 
APPLICATION 
This application has been developed by using Microsoft Visual Studio C++ version 6 
as compiler. The program bases on Windows operating system, which offers easy usage, 
such as drag & drop, inter-active, and graphic display. The main application has been 
implemented in the form of one main workspace, which comprises 8 main individual 
projects. Each project can transfer data and be execute separately as pop-up windows 
dialogs, such as vulnerability assessment, susceptibility assessment, and life cycle cost 
estimation dialogs. 
Fig. F. 1 shows the overall flow chart of mission effectiveness analysis workspace. Due 
to some data exchange between pop-up dialogs, the following pop-up dialog execution 
order has to be preformed. 
1. Mission Effectiveness Analysis 
2. Vulnerability Assessment 
3. Susceptibility Assessment 
4. Reliability & Maintainability Assessment 
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F. 1 Mission Effectiveness Analysis 
The first and main project is `Mission Effectiveness Analysis', which will be firstly executed 
as the main application dialog, as shown in Fig. F. 2. This application comprises 5 tab 
dialogs and several commands in the menu bar, which will load and run the remaining 
pop-up dialogs (projects). 
Start r ss4on load Default Opturx: atlon Display Result Su 
Cost Estimation Data Collect, on Update AU Data Exit Fleip 
Mission Fleet Aircraft Enemy Cost 
situation ; w/ Morde Cerb Smulatan 500 runs 
Day Run -_. lp Satie Per Day 2 Total Salle Flown 0 
Sortie Duration 416106 
Tad Con $&e Satie r 
Total Sucessti Satie j0 
Mission Type: BOMBING 
Phase Name [PREFLIGHTPHASE 
TOP 1 -'S = BOTTOM; 0% 
LEFT r0 FRONT 7% 
REAR 0% RIGHT 0% 
Total Service Time IaIAC) 0 
Number of Phases n Satie 5 
Store New Data 
fa showreg Fhght Phase 
%L" 
Figure F. 2: Operation mission simulation application dialog 
Firstly, the necessary variables have to be initialled by either loading directly from 
a file or directly giving in the application dialog. By using `Load Default' command on 
the menu bar, the stored data in file namely `input. dat' in the folder `... \input' will be 
loaded. In case that the file `input. dat' does not exist or not locate in the folder `... \input', 
the windows browse dialog will be display. Therefore, the correct location or file can be 
indicated. 
On the other hand, the threat and mission simulation information will be automatically 
loaded directly from the default file namely `mission. dat', which is normally located in 
the same folder as `input. dat'. On similar approach, if this file does not exist or locate in 
the folder, the browse dialog will be also display. 
The next step is to execute the individual pop-up dialogs, as shown above. The 
vulnerability and susceptibility assessment pop-up dialogs will be shown by choosing 
the `vulnerability' and `susceptibility' sub-menus, which locate under the `survivability' 
menu. The reliability & maintainability assessment pop-up dialog will be displayed, if 
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the command `Reliability & Maintainability' has been chosen. By pressing command 
`Cost Estimation', the life cycle cost estimation dialog will be popped up (details how to 
operate the vulnerability pop-up dialogs see section F. 2, for susceptibility assessment see 
section F. 3, for reliability & maintainability assessment see section F. 4, and for life cycle 
cost estimation see section F. 5). 
Before the mission simulation starts, the calculation method for vulnerability on en- 
counter with proximity warheads has to be identified by choosing `By Detonation Range' 
to calculate with generated random detonation distance and `By Lethal Radius' to calcu- 
late with calculated lethal radius (details see Chapter 3). 
By choosing `Start Mission' command, the mission simulation will start with or with- 
out Monte Carlo Simulation technique depending on whether the option `Monte Carlo 
Simulation' has been checked. In case that 'Monte Carlo Simulation' option has been 
checked, the small dialog will be displayed to show the current number of trial runs, as 
shown in Fig. F. 3. 
Mission Fleet Aircraft Enemy Cost 
Situation ZWAR TIME - ., Monte Carlo Srnutation i 500 runs 
Day Run 
Mission Operation Smuletion runs at step of 1 Close 
0 Monte Carlo Svnulatan 500 
Mission Type 
PhaseName iPREFLIGHT_PHASE 
TOP 0% BOTTOM 0 Stole New Data 
f« show" FYgt Phase 
LEFT 0X FRONT r0 
REAR j0% RIGHT Fp% 
Figure F. 3: Monte Carlo Simulation Dialog 
There are three results display possibilities; i. e. Numerical, Linear Graph, and Sim- 
ple Graphic Simulation display dialogs. Additionally, the general results in each sortie 
and operational day will be stored automatically into `sortie. dat' located in the folder 
`... \output'. The details information of each aircraft will be also generated and stored 
into the file name `aircraftN. dat', where N is a number of aircraft. The information dur- 
ing each flight phase will be stored into the file 'FlightPhase. dat', where FlightPhase 
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is the flight phase name in the sortie. 
The first results display option is numerical display dialog, which appears as Fig. F. 4. 
The information of each sortie and operational day will be display in specific pop-up 
dialog, and by choosing `Previous' and `Next', the next and previous sortie or operational 
day information will be displayed. 
Day Amount of Arrcraf 10 
A/C Floe 15 Numerical Result in each SORTIF 
Success Sortie 8 Sortie Day 
11 
Into Maintenar ' 
Total Aircraft Available Aircraft 
Killed Aircraft I 
I 
r 10 5 
Abort Aircraft lrAo Maintenance 
Damage Aircraft Killed Aircraft 
Defect Aircraft: Abort Aircraft :3 
Damage Aircraft 0 
Detect Aircraft 0 
- _. 
Next Sortie 
Total Flown Complete Satte Success Satre 
10 5 4 
Total Target Detected Destroy Damage 
200000 112 94 0 
Out from Maintenance Ener y 
Abort Aircraft f-ý--- - Detected 
8 
Damage Aircraft : rp Destroyed 
Defect Astraft r0 
Damage 
Close 
Figure F. 4: Simple numerical graphical result display 
The second opportunity to show an overall results throughout the mission simulation 
is to display in the form of linear graph. In this pop-up dialog, the horizontal axis can be 
chosen to scale in the forms of sortie or operational day. On the other hand, the vertical 
axis can show several information types, such as number of available aircraft, number of 
targets killed, and number of aircraft in maintenance. Due to different scale for both axes, 
the details of each dot on the graph can be obtained by using mouse click on that point. 
The results will be displayed in the edit boxes at the right bottom corner, as shown in 
Fig. F. 5. 
The last alternative to display the results is simple graphic simulation (semi-animate 
graphical) display. This option simulates and displays the entire results in every flight 
phases throughout the mission in motion. Aircraft status during the mission is represented 
by different colour (red = READY, purple = ABORT, grey = KILLED). During the 
simulation, if the encounters by threats or weapons release by the aircraft take place, dot 
lines with different colour will also be display (red = weapon released, green = threat 
encounter). Fig. F. 6 shows one shot of entire simulation. 
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Figure F. 5: Simple line graph result display 
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Figure F. 6: Simple semi-animate graphical result display 
Due to lots of information displayed in this pop-up dialog, an option to show only 
the occurrence in specific flight phase, sortie and operational day has been offered by 
pressing `Get Phase' command and giving the specific sortie and operational day. To 
display the occurrence during the selected flight phase, sortie and operational day, the 
command `Show Detail Phase' has to be chosen. 
Fig. F. 7 shows example of general results from an operation simulation with following 
constraints: 
" Ten operational days with maximum two sorties per day 
1 Sane 20 
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. Fleet size is maximum ten aircraft 
" twelve additionally maintenance hours at the end of operational day 
" Encounter from both penetrators and proximity warhead with probability of en- 
counter of 0.05 and 0.02 
" Mean time between repair for defect component is assumed as 1.53 hours and for 
damage is assumed as 2.6 hours 
" 100% supportability and spare parts availability 
" weapon accuracy is randomly with probability of being launched is 1.0 
The mission effectiveness analysis application offers also alternative to investigate effect 
of, and relationship between an individual design aspect on mission simulation results 
by using `Data Collection' or `Optimization' commands. The data management pop-up 
dialog will firstly appear, as shown in Fig. F. 8. In this dialog, the necessary variable 
can be initialed, such as total study variables, maximum and minimum values for each 
variable. In case that an option `Collect Sortie Details' has been checked, all details for 
each aircraft and flight phase will be stored in specific files. However, an overall results 
from the mission simulation with given constraints and variables will be defaulted stored 
into the file `DataCollection. txt' and `DetailsResults. txt'. These file names can be also 
changed and located into specific folder by changing in the browse dialog, which appear 
before the mission simulation actually starts. 
On similar approach, the optimisation constraints and variables can be also set through- 
out this pop-up dialog, such as minimise, maximise, and terminate with convergence. The 
default file name for `GAlib' optimisation are `GALiblter. txt' and `GALibDetail. txt'. For 
`Solver' optimisation, the `SolverIter. txt' is the only results collection file. 
F. 2 Vulnerability Assessment 
This application dialog can be executed by select command `Vulnerability', which is a 
sub-menu in `Survivability' menu. Fig. F. 9 shows an application dialog. 
By using the same principle as load default initial data from the specific file, the 
default file for this application dialog is `vulnerinput. dat'. 
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Total Variable F5 Iteration 100 
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F- Cotlect Sortie Details 
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Figure F. 8: Data Management Dialog 
New Data Load Defauk Calculation View Position Store Data Show Dravxp Exit 
Aircraft pilot Ft `r eid Errecr Control System Overlapped Component 
No Shield Effect 
Non Overlapped 





View ii ', TOP j Theat: NON EXPLOSIVE 23016 TOP 25 % 
seAUude RIGHT 0 
Seat :0 Overlapped 0 12192 LEFT 0 % 
Tank 5 Prob Of KA Aircraft I Attack Speed FRONT 75 '/. 
241.5 
Engine f2 Taal Present Area: r 2562 Grid REAR 0 % 
Attack Altitude 
Control System: 5 TotalVuherableArea ý- Grid X7620 
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Figure F. 9: Vulnerability Assessment Dialog 
Next step is to choose overlapped area category from the menu `Overlapped Area'. The 
probability of overlapped area and aircraft kill for every aircraft view will be calculated by 
pressing the command `Calculation'. The average probability of kill (view in `TOTAL') 
will be also calculated in conjunction with the weighting factor for each flight phase. 
However, by select specific aircraft view from the menu `View Position', the information 
and probability of aircraft kill in selected aircraft view will be displayed. 
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In case that the threat type 'EXTERNAL -EXPLOSIVE' 
has been selected, both prob- 
ability of kill on encounter with proximity warhead calculated by random detonation 
distance will be calculated and displayed in the form of curve, as shown in Fig. F. 10. 
Therefore, the lethal radius for specific aircraft view can be determined and the user has 
to give the value in the edit box `Lethal Radius'. To store this value, the command `Save 
Data' has to be selected. 
Figure F. 10: Lethal Radius Assessment Dialog 
From this pop-up dialog application, 2 default files are automatically created and will 
be saved into the current folder. The `matrix. dat' file obtains the Makrov matrix of each 
aircraft view, and the full results will be saved into the 'vulnerability. day' file. 
In case that information about critical component and aircraft presented area are not 
available, these information can be created from the semi-automatic grid counter option. 
However, the necessary information has to be initialed in the main application dialog, 
such as number of fuel tank, number of pilot, and number of overlapped area. After the 
command `New Data' has been chosen, the aircraft drawing dialog will appear, as shown 
in Fig. F. 11. 
By choosing `Load Drawing' command, the aircraft image in `BMP' format can be 
loaded and displayed in the dialog. Regarding to the number of critical components, 
which have been given in the main dialog, their details have to be future given by using 
the scroll down menu and radio bottom, such as redundancy, position, and kill level. By 
pressing `Save' for each critical component, its details will be stored into the memory. 
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Figure F. 11: Semi-Automatic Grid Counter Dialog 
The `Grid' option will turn on and off the grid over the image. The size of grid can be 
also resized by using the bottom `-' and `+', as shown in Fig. F. 12. The image can also 
be zoomed and moved by using commands at the right bottom corner. 
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Figure F. 12: Zooming and Moving Image Possibility 
By pressing mouse right bottom, a small pop-up menu will be displayed. This menu 
offers the selection of kill level for each critical component. And by pressing left mouse 
bottom, the grid will be coloured mark depending on the kill level and automatically 
counted for the selected critical component. To stop counting grid for the selected critical 
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component, the command `Save' has to be chosen to store to number of grid into the 
memory of that component. These procedures have to be performed for every critical 
component, aircraft, and aircraft view. 
F. 3 Susceptibility Assessment 
The susceptibility assessment pop-up dialog has to be executed after the vulnerability 
assessment dialog due to aircraft presented area requirement. This application dialog 
execution and variable initial use the same principle as for the vulnerability assessment 
dialog. The default file name is `suscept-input. dat'. Fig F. 13 shows the overall outlook 
of the susceptibility assessment application dialog. 
Load Deaf ult Store Data RCS & SIN Calculation Show Graphs Exit 
Aircraft Radar Mission 
Model U-99 
Ai craft RCS "22.1452 dB 
Aircraft RCS 0.00610207 m2 
View Position FRONT 
Number of Parts :[8 
Part Number ONE RCS "34.1629 dB 
Part Type RCS 0.000383448 m2 
SPHERE 
Length r0 233 SHARP EDGE m Area r m2 
Radius 009 DIHEDRAL `ý -m Cone Angle Deg z-r 
Angle j 32.88 Deg Angle 2i0 Deg 
NUM 
Figure F. 13: Susceptibility Assessment Dialog 
The next step is to calculate radar cross section and signal-to-noise ratio of the external 
aircraft shape by pressing command `RCS & S/N Calculation'. Unfortunately, the aircraft 
probability of detection can not be calculated directly with this version; therefore, the pre- 
calculated graph has to be display by choosing command `Show Graphs'. A new pop-up 
dialog will appear, as shown in Fig. F. 14. There are 2 alternative of pre-calculated graph; 
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i. e. with and without scintillation effect. The selected graph will be displayed in the big 
square edit box in the left hand side of the dialog. The user has to give the probability 
of detection value in the `PD Value' edit box by using the S/N and P. values displayed in 
the dialog. The PD value will be stored in memory for the selected flight phase or aircraft 
view by pressing command `Save Data'. The process has to be repeated to determine PD 
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Figure F. 14: Pre-Calculated Graph Display Dialog 
After terminate the pre-calculated graph display dialog, all PD values will be saved 
into the default file `suscept. dat' by pressing command `Save All Data'. 
At the same time as calculation aircraft external radar cross section and signal-to- 
noise ratio, the probability of hit will be calculated by using 20 generated random miss 
distance. In case that the model to represent an aircraft presented area (`Carlton' or 
`Shoe Box') has been change, the new probability of hit can also be new calculated by 
pressing command `Recalculation', as shown in Fig. F. 15. 
6 IO Cf f1 16 1{ 
$ A4TOWOi6 PAT10. 
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Load Deaf ult 5tß ire Data -iN =alculatior h.. . yphs E" it 
Aircraft Radar Mission Miss Distance 
Number of Hits 20 Recalcuation 
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Figure F. 15: Probability of Hit Assessment Tab Dialog 
F. 4 Reliability & Maintainability Assessment 
This application dialog will be executed by pressing command `Reliability & Maintain- 
ability' on the menu bar in the mission effectiveness analysis dialog. This application 
dialog comprises 3 tab dialog, as shown in Fig. F. 16. By using the same approach to load 




In case that the initial values are not correct or need to be changed, the new val- 
ues can be given directly in the application dialog. These new values will replace in the 
memory by pressing command `Update Data', and can be also save into file by press- 
ing command `Store Data'. The file containing new values will be created and named 
`AircraftModel-new 
_rel-main _data. 
dat', where AircraftModel is the same as shown in 
the dialog. 
Before the aircraft failure rate and defect man-hour rate can be calculated, the neces- 
sary parameters have to be set by using pop-up menu and radio bottom in the application 
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Figure F. 16: Reliability & Maintainability Assessment Dialog 
dialog. For example, the aircraft type can be selected from the pop-up menu positioning 
in the middle of the dialog or statistical analysis model to calculate the highest and the 
lowest failure rate or defect man-hour rate can be selected by using check box under the 
aircraft type pop-up menu. 
By pressing command `Calculation', the Pareto distribution coefficients, the remaining 
value either of failure rate or defect man-hour rate will be calculated, depending on the 
selected variable in the pop-up menu on right of aircraft type pop-up menu. Details of 
calculation will be also shown in the specific tab dialog. 
To save all results into file `reliability. dat', the command `Save All Data' has to be 
chosen. 
F. 5 Life Cycle Cost Estimation 
This application dialog has to be executed after the reliability & maintainability assess- 
ment dialog, and also cannot be terminated during the mission simulation runs. The 
reasons are that defect man-hour rate is one of the necessary variable to estimate aircraft 
life cycle cost, and the mission simulation need some values transferred directly from this 
application dialog. 
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The application dialog will be executed by pressing the command `Cost Estimation' 
on the menu bar of the main mission effectiveness analysis application dialog. This dialog 
comprise 6 tab dialogs, as shown in Fig F. 17. 
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Figure F. 17: Life Cycle Cost Estimation Dialog 
The default initial values will be loaded from the file `LCC_input. dat', when the com- 
mand `Load Default' has been chosen. Before actual calculation is performed, the user 
should also check the mission scenario in the pop-up manu because the application will 
calculate an aircraft life cycle cost based on the displayed scenario in that menu. Finally, 
the aircraft life cycle cost will be calculated by pressing command `Calculation', and the 
results will be stored into the file `lifecyclecost. dat' when the command `Save Data' has 
been chosen. 
